UC-NRLF 


7flD 


;/;,  :    ,>  *-^iV/;tfloo^  s#»/fcs 


OF 

SRNA.T 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Class 


DEBATERS'  HANDBOOK  SERIES 

ELECTION  OF 
UNITED  STATES  SENATORS 


Debaters'  Handbook  Series 


SELECTED  ARTICLES 

ON  THE 

ELECTION  OF 
UNITED  STATES  SENATORS 


COMPILED  BY 
C.   E.    FANNING 


MINNEAPOLIS 
THE  H.  W.  WILSON  COMPANY 

1909 


EXPLANATORY  NOTE 


In  offering  this  new  volume  in  the  "Debaters'  Handbook 
Series,"  it  may  be  well  to  claim,  as  has  been  done  for  other 
volumes  in  the  series,  that  the  chief  reason  for  compilation  is  the 
manifest  need  among  debaters  for  material  on  the  subject  under 
treatment,  and  the  general  lack  of  duplicate  library  copies  of 
publications  in  which  material  may  be  found.  The  most  valu- 
able articles  on  the  subject  have  been  collected  and  reprinted  en- 
tire or  in  part,  the  aim  being  to  furnish  the  best  material  on 
both  sides  of  the  question  without  unnecessary  repetition.  The 
book  also  contains  a  full  bibliography  of  the  subject.  Inasmuch  as 
the  greater  number  of  books,  pamphlets  and  documents  contain 
arguments  for  both  sides  of  the  question  all  references  to  them 
have  been  grouped  under  the  head  of  General  References.  The 
magazine  and  Congressional  Record  references  are  classed  as 
affirmative  and  negative  according  to  their  attitude  for  and 
against  the  popular  election  of  senators. 


210088 


CONTENTS 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bibliographies    j 

General  References 

Books,  Pamphlets  and  Documents   2 

Magazine  Articles   6 

Affirmative  References    7 

Negative   References    12 

SELECTED  ARTICLES 

Clark,  Walter.     Election  of  Senators  and  the  President  by 

Popular  Vote  and  the  Veto  Power Arena  15 

Reform  in  Senatorial  Elections   Arena  19 

Winchester,  Boyd.     House  and  the  Election  of  Senators... 

Arena  19 

Fox,   Charles  James.       Popular   Election   of  United   States 

Senators    Arena  20 

Maxey,  Edwin.     Election  of  United  States  Senators.  .Arena  27 

Garrison,  Wendell  P.    Reform  of  the  Senate 

Atlantic    Monthly  30 

Chandler,  William  E Senate  Report  39 

De  Armond,  D.  A House  Report  40 

Tucker,   Henry  St.  George Congressional  Record  41 

Hoar,  George  F Congressional  Record  41 

North  way,   Stephen  A Congressional  Record  80 

Bryan,   William  J Congressional  Record  81 

Turpie,    David    Congressional  Record  81 

Turpie,    David    Congressional  Record  82 

Depew,   Chauncey   M Congressional  Record  82 

Depew,   Chauncey   M Congressional   Record  83 

Vest,  George  G Congressional  Record  84 

Debates  on  the  Election  of  Senators  in  the  Federal  Conven- 
tion of  1787 Constitutional  Convention  85 


x  CONTENTS 

Hamilton,  Alexander  '. Federalist  99 

Hamilton  or  Madison  Federalist  100 

Senate  in  the  Light  of  History Forum  102 

Edmunds,  George  F.  Should  Senators  be  Elected  by  the 

People  ?  ." Forum  102 

Mitchell,  John  H.  Election  of  Senators  by  Popular  Vote 

'. Forum  1 10 

Chandler,  William  R  Election  of  Senators  by  Popular 

Vote  Independent  113 

Going  Back  to  the  People  Independent  1 14 

Power  of  the  Senate  Nation  115 

O'Neal,  Emmet.  Election  of  United  States  Senators  by  the 

People North  American  Review  115 

Crane,  Gondit.  In  the  Seats  of  the  Mighty Outlook  118 


SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON  THE  ELECTION 
OF  UNITED  STATES  SENATORS 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 


A  star  (*)  preceding  a  reference  indicates  that  the  entire  article  or  a  part  of 
it  has  been  reprinted  in  this  volume. 


BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Brookings,  W.  Du  Bois,  and  Ringwalt,  Ralph  Curtis.  Briefs  for 
Debate,  pp.  32-4. 

Ringwalt,  Ralph  Curtis.  Briefs  on  Public  Questions,  pp.  67-71. 

United  States.  57th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  399. 
Election  of  United  States  Senators  by  the  people.  List  of 
principal  speeches  and  reports,  made  in  Congress  in  recent 
years  upon  the  proposed  change.  Je.  9,  '02. 

United  States.  57th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  404. 
pp.  12-4. 

United  States.  57th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  406. 
Election  of  United  States  Senators  by  the  people.  List  of 
principal  speeches  and  reports  made  in  Congress  in  recent 
years  upon  the  proposed  change  in  the  method  of  electing 
senators.  Also,  a  reprint  of  principal  documents  relating  to 
the  subject  of  the  election  of  United  States  senators.  Pre- 
pared in  the  Senate  Library,  by  Clifford  Warden. 

United  States.  Library  of  Congress.  Division  of  Bibliography. 
List  of  References  on  the  Popular  Election  of  Senators,  pp. 

5-21. 

A   reprint  of  57th   Congress,    1st   Session.     Senate  document   404 
(also  40«)    with  additions. 
Wisconsin    University.    Popular    Election   of    Senators.    Bulletin. 

Serial  No.  257 :  General  Series  No.  139.  gratis. 


2  ELECTION    OF 

GENERAL  REFERENCES 

Books,  Pamphlets  and  Documents 

American  Antiquarian  Society,  Proceedings.  O.  21,  '02.  Connecti- 
cut Compromise.  Roger  Sherman,  the  Author  of  the  Plan  of 
Equal  Representation  of  the  States  in  the  Senate,  and  Rep- 
resentation of  the  People  in  Proportion  to  Numbers  in  the 
House.  George  Frisbie  Hoar.  pp.  233-58. 
Also  reprinted  in  separate  binding. 

American  Historical  Association.  Annual  Report,  1893.  Roger 
Sherman  in  the  Federal  Convention.  Lewis  Henry  Boutell. 
pp.  229-47. 

Also  printed  as  United  States.     53d  Congress,  2d  Session.  Senate 
miscellaneous   document   104. 

American  Historical  Association.  Annual  Report,  1896,  Vol.  II. 

Proposed  Amendments  to  the  Constitution.  Herman  V.  Ames. 

pp.  24,  60-3. 

Bryce,  James.  American  Commonwealth.  Vol.  I.  pp.  96-123. 
Burgess,  John  W.  Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law.  Vol. 

II.  pp.  41-6. 
Carpenter,  Stephen  C.,  ed.  Select  American  Speeches.  Speech  on 

Choosing  the    Members    of   the    Senate   by    Electors    (D.   31, 

1789)  by  James  Wilson.  Vol.  I.  pp.  276-94.  Philadelphia  1815. 

Found  also  in  Wilson,  James.  Works.  Vol.  III.  pp.  313-36.   Phil- 
adelphia.  1804. 

Dickinson,  John.   Political  Writings.   Letters  of  Fabius  in   1788, 

on  the  Federal  Constitution.  Vol.  II.  pp.  67-165.  Wilmington. 

1801. 
Hamilton,  Alexander.  Works,  ed.  by  Henry  Cabot  Lodge.  Speech 

on  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  Vol.  I.  pp.  448-96. 
Haynes,  George  H.  Election  of  Senators.  $1.50.  Henry  Holt  and 

Company.  1906. 
Hoar,  George  Frisbie.  Connecticut  Compromise.  Roger  Sherman, 

the  Author  of  the  Plan  of  Equal  Representation  of  the  States 

in  the  Senate,  and  Representation  of  the  People  in  Proportion 

to  Numbers  in  the  House.  Worcester.  1903. 

Reprinted  from  American  Antiquarian   Society,    Proceedings.    O. 
21,  '02.  pp.  233-58. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  3 

Johns    Hopkins    University   Studies    in    Historical   and    Political 
Science,  nth  series.  N.-D.  '93.  pp.  547-60.  Popular  Election 
of  U.  S.  Senators.  John  Haynes. 
Replies   to   Senator  Hoar's   arguments. 

Kerr,    Clara   Hannah.    Origin   and    Development   of    the    United 

States  Senate.  Election  of  Senators,  pp.  15-20.  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 

1895- 

King,  Rufus.  Life  and  Correspondence  of.  Ed.  by  Charles  R. 
King.  Vol.  I.  pp.  595-9,  607-12.  New  York.  1894-1900. 

Mason,  George.  Senate  Appointed  by  State  Assemblies.  In  Row- 
land, K.  M.  Life  of  George  Mason.  Vol.  II.  pp.  117-8.  New 
York.  1892. 
Reprint  of  Mason's  remarks  reported  in  Madison's  debates. 

Maxey,  Edwin.  Some  Questions  of  Larger  Politics.  Election  of 

United  States  Senators,  pp.  67-75.  New  York.  1901. 
Reprinted   from   Self-Culture   Magazine.   Je.    '00. 

Meyer,  Ernst  Christopher.  Nominating  Systems:  Direct  Prima- 
ries versus  Conventions  in  the  United  States.  Popular  Election 
of  United  States  Senators,  pp.  448-51.  Madison,  Wis.  1902. 

Michigan  Political  Science  Association  Publications.  Vol.  I.  No. 
i.  pp.  78-97.  My.  '93.  Should  United  States  Senators  be  Elected 
by  the  People?  T.  C.  Barkworth. 

Story,  Joseph.  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Vol.  I.  pp.  504-6.  Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  Boston,  1873. 

United  States.  43d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  miscellaneous 
document  66.  Resolution  of  the  legislature  of  California,  in 
favor  of  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  providing  that  senators  may  be  elected  by  a  direct 
vote  of  the  people.  F.  18,  '74. 

United  States.  43d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  miscellaneous 
document  69.  Resolution  of  the  legislature  of  Iowa,  in  fa- 
vor of  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  providing  for  the 
election  of  United  States  senators  by  a  direct  vote  of  the 
people.  F.  19,  '74. 

*United  States.  52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  report  794. 
Part  i.  Report  by  Mr.  Chandler  from  the  Committee  on 
Privileges  and  Elections  presenting  a  statement  of  his  views 
adverse  to  the  passage  of  the  joint  resolutions  (S.  R.  8)  for 
submitting  to  the  states  an  amendment  of  the  constitution 


4  ELECTION    OF 

providing  for  the  election  of  United  States  senators  by  di- 
rect vote  of  the  people.  Je.  8,  '92. 

United  States.  52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  report  794. 
Part  2.  Views  of  the  minority.  Report  by  Mr.  Mitchell  \oi 
the  Committee  on  Privileges  and  Elections  favoring  the  elec- 
tion of  United  States  senators  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  people], 
Jl.  i,  92. 

United  States.  52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  miscellaneous 
document  89.  Resolution  relative  to  choosing  United  States 
senators.  Mr.  7,  '92. 

United  States.  52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  House  report  368.  Re- 
port by  Mr.  Tucker,  from  the  Select  Committee  on  the  Elec- 
tion of  President  and  Vice-President  and  Representatives  in 
Congress.  F.  16,  '92. 

United  States.  52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  House  report  368. 
Part  2.  Views  of  the  minority.  Report  by  Mr.  Bushnell  of 
the  Select  Committee  on  Election  of  President  and  Vice- 
President  and  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress.  F. 
1 6,  '92. 

United  States.  53d  Congress,  2d  Session.  Senate  miscellaneous 
document  97.  Resolution  providing  for  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  regulating  the  election  of  President  and  Vice- 
President  of  the  United  States  and  the  election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  people.  F".  22,  '94. 

United  States.  53d  Congress,  2d   Session.   Senate  Miscellaneous 
Document   104.   Roger   Sherman   in  the   Federal   Convention. 
Lewis  Henry  Boutell. 
Also  printed  in  American  Historical  Association.  Annual  Report, 

1893.  pp.  229-47. 

United    States.    53d    Congress,    3d    Session.      Senate    report   916. 

Views  of  the  minority  of  the  Committee  on  Privileges  and 
Elections,  favoring  the  election  of  United  States  senators  by 
direct  vote  of  the  people,  presented  by  Mr.  Turpie.  F.  12,  '95. 

United  States.  53d  Congress,  3d  Session.  Senate  miscellaneous 
document  i.  Resolution  relative  to  election  of  United  States 
senators  by  direct  vote  of  the  people.  D.  3,  '94. 

United  States.  53d  Congress,  2cl  Session.  House  report  944.  Elec- 
tion of  Senators  by  the  people.  Report  by  Mr.  Tucker,  from 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  5 

the  Committee  on  Election  of  President  and  Vice-President 
and  Representatives  in  Congress.  My.  22,  '94. 

United  States.  54th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  report  530. 
Report  by  Mr.  Mitchell,  from  the  Committee  on  Privileges 
and  Elections,  to  whom  was  referred  "Joint  resolution  pro- 
posing an  amendment  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States 
providing  for  the  election  of  Senators  by  the  votes  of  the 
qualified  electors  of  the  States."  Mr.  20,  '96. 

United  States.  54th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  report  530. 
Part  2.  Views  of  the  minority,  presented  by  Mr.  Chandler, 
Je.  5,  '96. 

United  States.  54th  Congress,  ist  Session.  House  report  994. 
Election  of  the  United  States  senators.  Report  by  Mr.  Corliss, 
from  the  Committee  on  Election  of  President,  Vice-President, 
and  Representatives  in  Congress.  Mr.  30,  '96. 

United  States.  54th  Congress,  2d  Session.  Senate  document  26. 
The  Senate.  George  Frisbie  Hoar. 
Reprinted    from    Youth's   Companion.    63:  620.    N.    13,    '90. 

*United   States.    55th    Congress,   2d    Session.    House   report    125. 

Election  of  United  States  senators.  Report  by  Mr.  Corliss, 
from  the  Comrrtittee  on  Election  of  President,  Vice-President 
and  Representatives  in  Congress,  and  Minority  report  by 
Mr.  De  Artnond,  Ja.  12,  '98. 

United  States.  56th  Congress,  ist  Session.  House  report  88.  Elec- 
tion of  United  States  Senators.  Report  by  Mr.  Corliss,  from 
the  Committee  on  Election  of  President,  Vice-President,  and 
Representatives  in  Congress.  Ja.  22,  'oo. 

United  States.  56th  Congress,  ist  Session.  House  report  88.  Part 
2.  Election  of  Senators.  Views  of  the  minority  of  Committee 
on  Election  of  President,  Vice-President,  and  Representa- 
tives in  Congress,  presented  by  Mr.  Rucker.  F.  7,  'oo. 

United  States.  5/th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  404 
Debates  on  the  Election  of  Senators  in  the  Federal  Conven- 
tion of  1787. 

*United  States.  5/th  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  406. 
Appendix :     Debates  on  the  Election  of  Senators  in  the  Fed- 
eral Convention  of  1787. 
Reprinted  from  United  States.  57th  Congress.  1st  Session.  Senate 

document  404. 


6  ELECTION    OF 

United  States.  57th  Congress,  1st  Session.  House  report  125. 
Election  of  United  States  senators.  Report  by  Mr.  Corliss, 
from  the  Committee  on  Election  of  President,  Vice-President, 
and  Representatives  in  Congress.  Ja.  21,  '02. 

*United    States.    59th    Congress,    ist    Session.    Senate    document 
232.  Election  of  Senators  by  Direct  Vote  of  the  People.  George 
Frisbie  Hoar.  Speech  delivered  Ap.  6-7,  '93.    5c. 
Argument    against    popular    election.     Same     in     Congressional 

Record.  25:  67,   i>7,   101-10.  Ap.  3,  6,  7,   'y3. 

United  States.  59th  Congress,  2d  Session.  Senate  document  393. 

Abstract  of  laws  relating  to  election  of  senators. 
United  States.  6oth  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  512. 

Papers  relating  to  the  election  of  senators  by  direct  vote  of  the 

people. 

Contents:  A  speech  by  Hon.  George  F.  Hoar,  delivered  in  the 
Senate,  April  6  and  7,  1893.  A  list  of  principal  speeches  and  reports 
made  in  Congress  in  recent  years  upon  the  proposed  change,  cor- 
rected and  extended  to  June  12,  1902;  also  a  reprint  of  the  principal 
documents  relating  to  the  subject  of  the  election  of  United  States 
senators  introduced  in  Congress  during  the  same  period  of  time, 
introduced  by  Mr.  Gallinger  in  the  Senate  June  13,  1902.  Abstract 
of  laws,  relating  to  the  election  of  United  States  senators,  present- 
ed by  Mr.  Clapp  in  the  Senate  March  2,  1907. 

United  States.  6oth  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  document  518. 
Papers  relating  to  amendment  of  constitution  for  election  of 
senators  by  direct  vote  of  the  people. 

Contents:  Speech  delivered  by  Senator  Turpie,  D.  17,  1891;  53d 
Congress,  3d  Session.  Senate  document  F.  12,  1895.  Report  of 
Committees;  Speech  delivered  by  Senator  Turpie,  F.  6,  1836;  Speech 
delivered  by  Senator  Turpie,  Mr.  23,  1897. 

Wilson,  James.  Works.  Speech  on  Choosing  the  Members  of 
the  Senate  by  Electors  (D.  31,  1789).  Vol.  III.  pp.  313-36. 
Philadelphia.  1804. 

Found  also  in  Carpenter,  Stephen  C.,  ed.  Select  American 
Speeches.  Vol.  1.  pp.  276-94.  Philadelphia.  1815. 

Magazine  Articles 

*Forum.  16:272-81.  N.  '93.  Senate  in  the  Light  of  History. 

Independent.  66:267-8.  F.  4,  '09.  Senator  Root  on  Direct  Elec- 
tions. 
Favors  direct  nomination  but  election  in  present  method. 

independent.  66 : 382-3.  F.  18,  '09.  Going  Back  to  the  People. 

Public  Opinion.  12 :  500.  F.  20,  '92.  Election  of  Senators. 
Quotes   press  comments  on  both  sides. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  7 

Public  Opinion.  12:524.  F.  27,  '92.  Election  of  Senators. 

Quotes  press  comments. 
Public  Opinion.  15:46.  Ap.  15,  '93.  Election  of  Senators. 

Quotes   press   on   both   sides. 

AFFIRMATIVE  REFERENCES 

*Arena.  10:453-61.  S.  '94.  Election  of  Senators  and  the  Presi- 
dent by  Popular  Vote,  and  the  Veto  Power.  Walter  Clark. 

Arena.  21:311-26.  Mr.  '99.  Legislature  that  Elected  Mr.  Hanna. 
John  T.  Kenny. 

Gives  instance  of  the  paradoxical  spectacle  of  a  man  occupying 
a  seat  in  the  United  States  Senate  to  whom  a  majority  of  both  the 
people    and    the    legislature    of    his  "state    have,    by    their    ballots, 
expressed  their  unequivocal  opposition. 
*Arena.  21  : 391-3.  Mr.  '99.  Reform  in  Senatorial  Elections. 

*Arena.  27 : 455-67.  My.  '02.  Election  of  Senators  by  Popular 
Vote.  Charles  James  Fox. 

*Arena.  40:428-31.  N.  '08.  Election  of  United  States  Senators. 
Edwin  Maxey. 

Arena.  41:461-6.  Jl.  '09.  People's  Rule  in  Oregon.  C.  H.  McCol- 
loch. 

*  Atlantic  Monthly.  68:227-34.  Ag.  '91.  Reform  of  the  Senate. 
Wendell  Phillips  Garrison. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  76-80.  D.  17,  '91.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  David  Turpie. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  1267-70.  F.  18,  '92.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  John  M.  Palmer. 

Congressional  Record.  23:3201-4.  Ap.  12,  '92.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  John  M.  Palmer. 

*Congressional  Record.  23:6060-6.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Henry  St.  George  Tucker. 

Congressional  Record.  23:6066-7.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  A.  R.  Bushnell. 

Congressional  Record.  23 : 6067-9.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Martin  K.  Gantz. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  6069-70.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Robert  E.  Doan. 

Congressional  Record.  23:6070-1.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  people.  S.  W.  T.  Lanham. 


8  ELECTION    OF 

Congressional  Record.  23 : 6071,  6072.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators  by  the  people.  William  J.  Bryan. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  6072-5.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Omer  M,  Kem. 

Congressional  Record.  23 : 6076.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Amos  J.  Cummings. 

Congressional  Record.  23 : 6076.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  David  B.  Henderson. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :6o77-8.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  D.  A.  De  Armond. 

Congressional  Record.  23 : 6078.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  J.  Logan  Chipman. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  appendix  602-4.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  H.  Henry  Powers.  Delivered 
Jl.  12,  '92. 

Congressional  Record.  26 :  7724-7.  Jl.  19,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  D.  A.  De  Armond. 

Congressional  Record.  26 :  7766-70.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Michael  J.  McEttrick. 

Congressional  Record.  26 :  7771-3.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Robert  E.  DeForest. 

*Congressional  Record.  26 :  7775-7.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  William  J.  Bryan. 

Congressional  Record.  26:  appendix  ii,  1134-6.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Henry  St.  George  Tucker.  De- 
livered Jl.  20,  '94. 

Congressional  Record.  27 : 73-6.  D.  6,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  David  Turpie. 

*Congressional  Record.  28:  1382-5.  F.  6,  '96.  Speech.  David  Turpie. 

Congressional  Record.  28:6152-6.  Je.  5,  '96.  Election  of  Senators 
by  Direct  Vote.  George  C.  Perkins. 

Congressional  Record.  28:  6151-2,  6161-2.  Je.  5,  '96.  Election  of 
Senators  by  Direct  Vote.  John  H.  Mitchell. 

Congressional  Record.  28:6159-61.  Je.  5,  '96.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  Direct  Vote.  John  M.  Palmer. 

*Congressional  Record.  30 :  169-73.  Mr.  23,  '97.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  Direct  Vote.  David  Turpie. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  9 

Congressional  Record.  31:4809-12.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  J.  B.  Corliss. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4812-4.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  H.  Henry  Powers. 

Congressional  Record.  31  :  4814-5.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  David  B.  Henderson. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4815.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Senators 
by  the  People.  Adin  B.  Capron. 

Congressional  Record.  31  :  4815.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Amos  J.  Cummings. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4816-7.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Jerry  Simpson. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4817-8.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  T.  McEwan. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4818-9,  4824.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of 
Senators  by  the  People.  John  T.  Shafroth. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4819.  My.  n,  '98.  Election  of  Senators 
by  the  people.  Thomas  H.  Tongue. 

Congressional  Record.  31:4820-4.  My.  u,  '98.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Albert  M.  Todd. 

Congressional  Record.  31  :  appendix  441-2.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Samuel  S.  Barney.  Delivered  My.  n,  '98. 

Congressional  Record.  31 :  appendix  451-2.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  William  Sulzer.  Delivered  My.  n,  '98. 

Congressional  Record.  31  :  appendix  460-2.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  William  S.  Kirkpatrick.  Delivered  My. 
u,  '98. 

Congressional  Record.  33:4109-14.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators.  J.  B.  Corliss. 

Congressional  Record.  33:4112-4.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators.  H.  Henry  Powers. 

Congressional  Record."  33 : 4113,  4117.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators.  Theodore  F.  Kluttz. 

Congressional  Record.  33:4114-7.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators.  Edward  D.  Ziegler. 

Congressional  Record.  33:  4119-21.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators.  J.  W.  Ryan. 


io  ELECTION   OF 

Congressional  Record.  33:4121.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 

States  Senators.  William  Sulzer. 
Congressional  Record.  33 : 4122-3.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 

States  Senators.  James  T.  Lloyd. 
Congressional  Record.  33 :  4123-4.  Ap.  12,  'oo.  Election  of  United 

States  Senators.  Edward  Robb. 

Congressional  Record.  33 :    appendix  199-200.   Election  of   Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Nicholas  Muller.  Delivered  Ap.  12,  'oo. 
Congressional  Record.  33 :  appendix  220-1.  Election  of  Senators 

by  the  People.  John  A.  McDowell.  Delivered  Ap.  12,  'oo. 
Congressional   Record.    33 :     appendix   314-7.    Election    of    Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  John  H.   Small.   Delivered  Ap.   12,  'oo. 
Congressional    Record.   35:1721,    1722.    F.    13,    '02.      Election   of 

United  States  Senators.  J.  B.  Corliss. 
Congressional  Record.  35:39/6-9,  3983.  Ap.  n,  '02.     Election  of 

United  States  Senators.  H.  DeS.  Money. 
Congressional  Record.  35 :  5205-10.  My.  9,  '02.  Election  of  United 

States  Senators.  Joseph  W.  Bailey. 
Congressional  Record.  35:6590-3.  Je.  n,  '02.    Election  of  United 

States  Senators.  Moses  E.  Clapp. 
Forum.  16:263-71.  N.  '93.  Shall  the  Senate  Rule  the  Republic? 

H.  von  Hoist. 
*  Forum.  21  :  385-97.  Je.  '96.  Election  of  Senators  by  Popular  Vote. 

John  H.  Mitchell. 
Forum.  23:271-81.  My.  '97.  Has  the  Senate  Degenerated?  C.  R. 

Miller. 

Reply  to  Senator  Hoar's  article  in  Forum,  Ap.  '07. 
Forum.   37 :  158-62.    O.   '05.    Movement   for    Election   by   Popular 

Vote. 

Forum.  42 :  142-7.  Ag.  '09.  Mode  of  electing  United  States  Sena- 
tors. 

Green  Bag.  10:4-6.  Ja.  '98.  Election  of  United  States  Senators 
by  the  People.  Walter  Clark. 

Harper's  Weekly.  44:  113-4.  F-  3»  'oo.  Shall  Senators  be  Chosen 
by  the  People?  Henry  Loomis  Nelson. 

Harper's  Weekly.  50 : 289.  Mr.  3,  '06.  Nomination  at  Primary 
Elections. 

Independent.  52:1291-2.  My.  31,  'oo.  Election  of  Senators  by 
Popular  Vote.  William  A.  Harris. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  11 

Independent.  54 :  1672-4.  Jl.  10,  '02.  Direct  Election  of  Senators. 
Independent.  55 :  106-7.  Ja.  8,  '03.  Election  of  Senators  by  Popu- 
lar Vote. 

Review  of  Prof.  Burgess's  article  in  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
D.  '02. 

Independent.  55 : 278-9.  Ja.  29,  '03.    Nullifying  the  Popular  Will. 
"We    should    eliminate    from    our    political    system    an    absurd 
anachronism  which  is  a  continuing  cause  of  corruption  and  of  mis- 
representation of  the  people  in  the  Senate  at  Washington." 

Independent.  63:847-51.  O.  10,  '07.  Electing  United  States  Sena- 
tors. Frederick  W.  Mulkey. 

Independent.  64:  1311-2.  Je.  4,  '08.  Direct  Election  of  Senators. 

Independent.  64 :  1446-7.  Je.  25,  '08.  Oregon  Election.  George  A. 
Thacher. 

Nation.  54:44-5.  Ja.  21,  '92.  Popular  Elections  of  Senators.  Wen- 
dell Phillips  Garrison. 

Nation.  74 : 222.  Mr.  20,  '02.  Election  of  Senators  by  Popular 
Vote.  [E.  P.  Clark.] 

*Nation.  76:  104-5.  F.  5,  '03.  Power  of  the  Senate. 

Nation.  79 :  295.  Ap.  19,  'oo.  Money  and  Senatorships. 
Gives  instances  of  rich  men  buying  seats  in  Senate. 

Nation.  80 :  166-7.  Mr.  2,  '05.  Senatorial  Primary. 

Nation.  80:435.  Je.  I,  '05.  Popular  Election  of  Senators.  Charles 
S.  Lobingier. 
Cites   Nebraska's   experience. 

North  American  Review.  185 :  70-2.  My.  3,  '07.  People  as  Legis- 
lators in  Oregon.  Charles  William  Fulton. 

Outlook.  61 :  258.  F.  4,  '99.  Senators  and  Legislatures. 

Outlook.  70 :  695.  Mr.  22,  '02.  Popular  Election  of  Senators. 

Outlook.  79:911.  Ap.  8,  '05.  Popular  Senatorial  Elections.  R.  T. 
Paine,  jr. 

Outlook.  82 : 819-20.  Ap.  14,  '06.  Direct  Vote  for  a  Senator. 

Outlook.  83 :  612-4.  Jl.  14,  '06.  Significance  of  the  Oregon  Ex- 
periment. George  A.  Thacher. 

Outlook.  84:  120-2.  S.  15,  '06.  Trend  toward  a  Pure  Democracy. 
Philip  L.  Allen. 

Outlook.  84:902.  D.  15,  '06.  Des  Moines  Conference. 

Outlook.  85:  101.  Ja.  19,  '07.  Direct  Primaries  in  New  Jersey. 

Outlook.  86:  17-9.  My.  4,  '07.  Proven  Failure. 


12  ELECTION    OF 


Outlook.  89 :  363-4.  Je.  20,  '08.  Responsible  Government. 
Comment  on  election  in  Oregon. 

Political  Science  Quarterly.  10 :  248-56.  Je.  '95.  Is  the  Senate  Un- 
fairly Constituted?  S.  E.  Moffett. 

Political  Science  Quarterly.  17:650-63.  D.  '02.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  Popular  Vote.  John  W.  Burgess. 

Reviewed  in  Independent.  55:  106-7.  Ja.  8,  '03,  and  Review  of 
Reviews.  27:  219-20.  F.  '03. 

Political  Science  Quarterly.  20:577-93.  D.  '05.  Popular  Control 
of  Senatorial  Elections.  George  H.  Haynes. 

Object  of  the  study  is  to  trace  the  progress  of  a  movement — a 
determination  that  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be  made 
responsible  to  the  people. 

Public  Opinion.  14:391-3.  Ja.  28,  '93.  Election  of  Senators. 
Has   quotations   from   the   press. 

Public  Opinion.  24 :  647.  My.  26,  '98.  Popular  Election  of  Sena- 
tors. 

Public  Opinion.  26:388-9.  Mr.  30,  '99.  Senatorial  Deadlocks. 

Public  Opinion.  28:516-8.  Ap.  26,  'oo.  Election  of  Senators. 
Newspaper   comments. 

Public  Opinion.  30:  133.  Ja.  31,  '01.  Senatorial  Elections. 
Comments  on   the   elections  of  the  year. 

Review  of  Reviews.  26 :  644-5.  D.  '02.  Direct  Election  of  Senators. 

Review  of  Reviews.  27 :  219-20.  F.  '03.  Representation  in  the  Unit- 
ed States  Senate. 
Review  of  Prof.  Burgess's  article  in  the  Political   Science  Quar- 

teily.    17:  650-63.    D.    '02. 

Review  of  Reviews.  27 :  400.  Ap.  '03.  Let  us  Have  Popular  Elec- 
tion of  Senators. 

Review  of  Reviews.  34:174-5.  Ag.  '06.  New  Way  of  Choosing 
United  States  Senators  in  Oregon.  J.  Schafer. 

World  To-Day.  12:178-81.  F.  '07.  Remaking  the  Senate.  F.  G. 
Moorhead. 

World's  Work.  13  :  8489-90.  F.  '07.  Popular  Election  of  Senators. 

NEGATIVE  REFERENCES 

*Arena.  24:14-20.  Jl.  'oo.    House  and  the   Election  of  Senators. 

Boyd  Winchester. 
Congressional  Record.  23:  1271.  F.  18,  '92.  Remarks.  William  E. 

Chandler. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  13 

Congressional  Record.  23:3191-201.  Ap.  12,  '92.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  people.  William  E.  Chandler. 

Congressional  Record.  23 :  6075-6.  Jl.  12,  '92.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Irvine  Dungan. 

*Congressional  Record.  25:67,  97,  101-10.  Ap.  3,  6,  7,  '93.  Elec- 
tion of  Senators  by  Direct  Vote  of  the  People.  George  Frisbie 
Hoar. 
Reprinted  in   United   States.   59th   Congress,   1st   Session.    Senate 

document  232. 

^Congressional  Record.  26 :  7/63-6,  7770.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators  by  the  people.  Stephen  A.  Northway. 

Congressional  Record.  26:7773-4.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Franklin  Bartlett. 

Congressional  Record.  26:7776-7.  Jl.  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  William  Everett. 

Congressional  Record.  26:7777.  Jl-  20,  '94.  Election  of  United 
States  Senators  by  the  People.  Thomas  B.  Reed. 

Congressional  Record.  26:  appendix  ii,  1352:  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  the  People.  Charles  H.  Grosvenor.  Delivered  Jl.  20, 
'94. 

Congressional  Record.  28:6157-9,  6160.  Je.  5,  '96.  Election  of 
Senators  by  direct  vote.  William  E.  Chandler. 

Congressional  Record.  28:6161.  Je.  5,  '96.  Election  of  Senators 
by  Direct  Vote.  Joseph  R.  Hawley. 

Congressional  Record.  35:2616-8.  Mr.  u,  '02.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  Direct  Vote.  George  Frisbie  Hoar. 

Congressional  Record.  35:2617-8.  Mr.  n,  '02.  Election  of  Sena- 
tors by  Direct  Vote.  William  M.  Stewart. 

*Congressional  Record.  35:  3925-6.  Ap.  10,  '02.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators.  Chauncey  M.  Depew. 

*Congressional  Record.  35:  3979-81,  3987.  Ap.  11,  '02.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators.  Chauncey  M.  Depew. 

Congressional  Record.  35 :  5204-9.  My.  9,  '02.  Election  of  United 
Senators.  George  Frisbie  Hoar. 

*Congressional  Record.  35:6595,  6596.  Je.  IT,  '02.  Election  of 
United  States  Senators.  George  G.  Vest. 

^Federalist.  Nos.  27  and  62. 


14  ELECTION    OF 

*Forum.  18:270-8.  N.  '94.  Should  the  Senators  be  Elected  by  the 

People?    George  F.  Edmunds. 
^Independent.  52:1292-4.   My.  31,  'oo.   Election  of   Senators  by 

Popular  Vote.  W.  E.  Chandler. 
>!:Xorth  American  Review.  188:700-15.  N.  '08.  Election  of  United 

States  Senators  by  the  People.  Emmet  O'Neal. 
*Outlook.  61  :  27-34.  Ja.  7,  '99.  In  the  Seats  of  the  Mighty.  Condit 

Crane. 
Youth's  Companion."  63 :  620.  N.  13,  '90.  The  Senate.  George  Fris- 

bie  Hoar. 

Reprinted  in   United   States.    54th  Congress,    2d   Session.    Senate 
document  26. 


SELECTED  ARTICLES 


Arena.  10:453-61.    September,  1894. 

The  Election  of   Senators  and  the   President  by  Popular  Vote, 
and   the   Veto   Power.     Walter   Clark. 

At  the  date  of  the  formation  of  the  federal  constitution  in 
1787,  the  governor  in  all  but  one  or  two  of  the  states  was  elected 
by  the  legislature.  In  determining,  therefore,  the  manner  of  se- 
lecting the  two  senators  who  were  to  represent  each  of  the 
several  states  in  the  federal  senate,  the  utmost  the  popular  ele- 
ment could  obtain  was  their  election  by  the  legislatures  of  the 
several  states.  Some  of  the  members  of  the  convention,  like 
Alexander  Hamilton,  insisted  on  their  being  chosen  for  life,  oth- 
ers on  their  election  by  the  lower  house  of  Congress,  and  some 
on  their  appointment  for  each  state  by  the  governor  thereof. 
George  Mason  of  Virginia  and  Mr.  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania  (aft- 
erwards on  the  United  States  supreme  bench)  alone  advocated 
their  election  by  the  people.  A  measure  so  far  in  advance  of  the 
times  received  the  vote  of  one  state  only — Pennsylvania.  The 
election  was,  as  a  compromise,  devolved  on  the  state  legislatures 
in  analogy  to  the  mode  then  in  vogue  of  electing  governors. 

One  by  one  the  several  state  constitutions  were  amended  to 
place  the  election  of  governors  in  the  hands  of  the  people.  The 
very  same  reasons  which  caused  this  change  should  long  since 
have  made  a  similar  change  in  the  mode  of  electing  senators. 
Doubtless  the  greater  difficulty  of  amending  the  federal  constitu- 
tion, and  the  opposition  of  the  Senate  itself  and  of  the  strong 
element  which  finds  its  benefit  in  the  present  mode  of  election, 
have  prevented  an  amendment  which  each  state  has  shown  to  be 
desired  and  desirable  by  amending  its  own  constitution  as  to  the 
manner  of  electing  its  governor.  The  facility  with  which  the 
present  mode  of  election  lends  itself  to  the  control  of  the  choice 
of  senators  by  the  money  power,  the  selection  of  a  large  propor- 


i6  ELECTION    OF 

tion,  probably  a  majority  of  the  senators,  at  the  dictation  of  the 
accumulated  wealth  of  the  country,  and  the  consequent  indiffer- 
ence with  which  the  average  senator  is  tempted  to  regard  the 
people's  interest,  or  the  people's  will,  are  reasons  enough  why 
the  mode  of  election  should  be  changed.  These  reasons  are 
patent  to  all  and  require  no  argument. 

But  there  are  many  other  reasons  which  do  not  lie  so  ap- 
parent and  on  the  very  surface  of  things,  but  which  nevertheless 
should  be  sufficient  if  fairly  considered,  to  justify  the  change 
to  an  election  by  the  people.  Among  them  are  these : — 

The  present  mode  of  election  virtually  disfranchises  all  the 
counties  in  which  the  party,  which  is  dominant  in  the  legisla- 
ture, does  not  control.  Take  a  state  in  which  either  party  has 
only  a  small  majority  in  the  legislature  on  joint  ballot.  In  such  a 
state  half  the  counties,  containing  possibly  one  half  the  voters 
of  the  dominant  party,  are  completely  disfranchised.  Nay, 
more;  as  the  choice  is  usually  by  caucus,  one  half  of  the  dom- 
inant majority,  coming  from  one  fourth  of  the  counties,  select 
the  senator.  The  parties  being  usually  nearly  equal  at  the  polls, 
the  members  of  the  legislature  who  cast  the  votes  of  those 
counties  may  thus  represent  less  than  one  eighth  of  the  voters  of 
the  state.  Such  a  system  is  not  democratic.  That  it  readily 
lends  itself  to  manipulation  and  to  the  influence  of  corporate  and 
plutocratic  influences  would  be  apparent,  even  if  the  world  was 
not  advertised  of  the  fact  by  that  unanswerable  teacher — experi- 
ence. 

But  it  is  argued  that  the  legislature  represents  the  state. 
But  so  do  the  governor  and  the  judiciary,  and  even  more  fully, 
since  they  must  be  chosen  by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of-  the 
whole  state,  while  not  unfrequently  the  majority  of  the  legisla- 
ture is  chosen  by  a  minority  of  the  voters  of  the  state.  Yet 
who  would  be  content  to  have  the  senators  appointed  by  the 
governor  or  elected  by  the  judges  of  the  state?  Why  should  they 
be  chosen  by  the  legislative  department,  when  the  people  them- 
selves are  competent  to  express  their  own  wishes  at  first  hand, 
and  not  leave  their  choice  to  be  determined,  as  often  happens, 
by  men  who  receive,  as  above  state.d,  less  than  one  eighth  of  the 
vote  of  the  state?  Each  of  those  members  of  the  caucus  majori- 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  17 

ty  may  have  been  the  choice  in  the  nominating  convention  of 
his  party  in  his  county  of  a  small  majority  only,  making  it  thus 
in  fact  possible  and  not  very  unusual  for  one  sixteenth  of  the 
voters  of  the  state  to  control  the  choice  of  the  senator;  and, 
by  means  familiar  to  all  men,  he  may  be  selected,  not  even  by 
the  will  of  that  one  sixteenth,  but  by  the  infinitesimal  fraction  of 
the  voters  of  the  state  who  happen  to  fill  one  fourth  of  the 
seats  in  the  legislature,  and  thus  constitute  a  majority  of  the 
caucus  of  the  party  dominant  in  that  body;  such  things  have 
happened. 

To  be  clear,  take  a  state  which  casts  400,000  votes.  A  ma- 
jority of  the  legislature  is  elected  from  counties  having  200,000 
voters,  or  often  less  when  there  is  a  gerrymander.  A  major- 
ity in  the  caucus  may,  therefore,  have  been  elected  from  counties 
having  100,000  voters.  But  nearly  half  of  these  were  of  the 
opposite  party,  leaving  the  majority  of  the  caucus  elected  by 
50,000  voters.  These  members  were  nominated  in  their  respec- 
tive conventions  usually  by  a  majority  only  of  their  party  in 
their  respective  counties,  or  say  25,000.  which  is  one  sixteenth 
of  the  400,000  voters  of  the  state ;  whereas  if  elected  by  pop- 
ular vote  of  the  whole  state,  as  he  should  be,  a  senator  must 
be  the  expressed  choice  at  the  ballot  box  of  more  voters  than 
have  cast  their  ballots  for  any  other  man,  and  his  nomination 
must  be  made  by  the  wish  of  at  least  one  fourth  of  the  voters, 
subject  to  approval  of  a  majority  at  the  ballot  box.  Can 
there  really  be  any  difference  of  opinion  as  to  which  is  the 
fairest  and  most  American  mode  of  selection,  or  as  to  which 
is  least  open  to  corruption,  or  is  most  likely  to  represent  faith- 
fully the  wishes  of  the  people?  It  is  true  states  are  not 
always  so  close ;  but  many  are,  and  any  state  may  at  any  elec- 
tion become  so.  What  particular  sixteenth  of  the  whole  vote 
shall  decide  the  result  is  rarely  left  to  chance.  Skilful  ma- 
nipulation and  the  adroit  use  of  money  for  political  machinery 
(not  necessarily  for  bribery)  decide  the  matter  and  not  the 
people's  will.  That  is  evil  enough. 

The  change  to  election  by  the  people  would  greatly  lessen 
the  chances  for  corruption.  The  members  of  the  party  con- 
vention of  the  state,  brought  together  directly  from  the  peo- 


i8  ELECTION    OF 

pie  and  so  soon  dispersed  again  among  them,  are  not  so  sub- 
ject to  tiae  subtle  arts  of  the  lobbyist  and  professional  wire- 
puller which  are  brought  to  bear  on  the  member  of  the  legis- 
lature as  soon  as  his  nomination  is  probable,  and  continued 
till  after  the  election  of  senator  is  over,  when,  like  a  squeezed 
lemon,  he  can  be  thrown  aside.  Besides,  the  party  convention 
acts  with  open  doors,  subject  to  public  sentiment  and  conscious 
that  its  choice,  if  not  wisely  made,  is  liable  to  rejection  at 
the  polls.  Xo  such  safeguards  surround  the  deliberations  of  a 
caucus. 

A  senator  who  is  tempted  while  in  office  to  disregard  the 
wishes  and  the  interest  of  the  people,  is  emboldened  by  the 
knowledge  that  if  by  certain  influences  he  can  control  the 
sixteenth — more  or  less — who  compose-  a  majority  in  the  nom- 
inating conventions  of  those  counties  which  send  a  majority 
of  the  legislators  of  the  dominant  party,  he  is  safe  for  a  re-elec- 
tion ;  and  knows  further  that  without  being  the  choice  of  any  per- 
ceptible element  among  the  people  it  is  sufficient  if  he  can  secure 
a  majority  of  the  caucus.  But  he  will  pause  if  he  knows  his  re- 
nomination  must  command  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  his 
party  convention  and  an  endorsement  of  a  majority  of  the 
voters  of  the  whole  state  at  the  ballot-box.  Is  there  any 
reason  why  the  people  should  not  have  this  potent  assurance 
of  the  fidelity  of  their  servant  in  his  office? 

One  of  the  disgraces  of  our  institutions  is  what  is  known 
as  gerrymandering.  It  is  a  disgrace  because  its  purpose  and 
object  is  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  majority,  which  is  the  cor- 
ner-stone upon  which  a  republican  form  of  government  is 
based.  One  of  the  commonest  instances  of  gerrymandering 
is  the  apportionment  of  legislative  districts,  and  sometimes 
even  the  creation  of  new  counties,  with  a  view  to  securing 
a  majority  of  the  legislature  to  the  party  which  is  in  the 
minority  in  the  state  on  a  popular  vote.  The  greatest  induc- 
ing cause  to  commit  this  crime  against  popular  sovereignty 
is  the  selection  of  United  States  senators.  It  is  well  to  remove 
the  inducement. 

It  is  well,  also,  at  this  stage  to  call  attention  to  the  point 
that  the  constitutional  amendment  which  shall  place  the  elec- 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  19 

tion  of  senators  with  the  people  instead  of  with  the  legislature, 
should  contain  the  provision  that  such  election  should  be  "from 
the  state  at  large" ;  else  there  will  be  attempts  at  a  modified 
gerrymander  by  dividing  the  state  into  two  senatorial  districts 
of  unequal  size  or  dividing  it  by  lines  drawn  to  give  party  ad- 
vantage. 


Arena  21:391-3.  March,  1899. 
Reform  in   Senatorial   Elections. 

At  every  great  political  crisis  during  the  last  twenty  years, 
instead  of  proving  itself  the  more  conservative  and  deliberate 
branch  of  Congress,  the  Senate  has  in  fact,  been  held  in  check 
by  the  House. 


Arena.   24:   14-20.   July,   1900. 
The  House  and  the  Election  of  Senators.     Boyd  Winchester. 

If  the  two  [houses]  were  elected  for  the  same  period  and 
by  the  same  electors,  they  would  amount  in  practice  to  little 
more  than  two  committees  of  the  same  house. 

All  foreign  critics  have  found  in  the  method  of  choosing 
the  members  of  our  Senate  a  sufficient  if  not  the  sole  cause 
of  its  excellence  as  a  legislative  and  executive  authority.  It  is 
their  opinion  that  the  mode  of  electing  that  body  constitutes 
its  functions  one  of  the  effectual  checks — one  of  the  real  bal- 
ances of  our  system. 

The  Senate  is  less  democratic  than  the  House,  and  conse- 
quently less  sensible  to  transient  phases  of  public  opinion ; 
but  it  is  not  less  sensible  than  the  House  of  its  ultimate  ac- 
countability to  the  people,  and  is  quite  as  obedient  to  the  more 
permanent  and  imperative  judgments  of  the  public  mind. 


20  ELECTION    OF 

Arena.  27:  455-67.  May,  1902. 

Popular  Election  of  United  States  Senators. 
Charles  James  Fox. 

The  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  popular  election  of  United 
States  senators  is  gradually  growing  stronger  and  stronger. 
On  February  13  the  fourth  resolution  providing  for  the  elec- 
tion of  senators  by  direct  vote  of  the  people  was  passed  by 
the  House  of  Representatives.  This  fact  is  significant,  for 
whatever  may  have  been  the  individual  opinions  of  the  represen- 
tatives themselves  they  have  given  by  their  vote  a  positive  dem- 
onstration of  their  interpretation  of  the  public  will  on  the  ques- 
tion. A  more  conclusive  proof  that  the  people  favor  this  change 
cannot  under  the  circumstances  be  reasonably  asked  for ;  yet 
those  who  oppose  this  change,  and  the  foremost  among  them, 
Senator  Hoar,  refuse  to  see  in  this  action  of  the  House  any  in- 
dication of  a  real  public  desire  for  this  change.  The  senator 
just  mentioned  even  went  so  far  as  to  state  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  that  in  his  opinion  the  House  had  passed  this  bill  "as 
half  a  joke."  There  is  little  evidence,  however,  to  show  that 
one  branch  of  our  national  legislature  permitted  a  resolution  ad- 
vocating an  amendment  to  the  constitution  to  pass  without  any 
opposition  "as  half  a  joke." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  people  generally  favor  this  new 
method  of  election,  and  when  the  people  of  the  United  States 
seriously  advocate  any  political  innovation  it  becomes  the  duty 
of  all  earnest  public  men  to  make  this  innovation  the  object  of 
their  thoughtful  attention.  There  are  many  who  claim  that,  since 
this  proposition  involves  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  those 
who  favor  it  have  assumed  a  difficult  burden  of  proof  and  must 
show  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  that  the  proposed  change  is 
positively  better  than  the  present  system  of  selecting  senators. 
This  is  true  to  a  certain  extent;  yet  it  might  be  answered  that, 
in  a  country  whose  political  dogma  is  the  sovereign  will  of  the 
people,  when  the  people  unite  in  demanding  a  certain  change  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  all  opposing  them  to  show  good  reasons  why 
they  should  not  have  it.  The  people  want  the  popular  election  of 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  21 

United  States  senators,  and  we  hope  to  show  clearly  that. there 
is  to-day  no  sound  reason  why  public  opinion  should  not  be  fol- 
lowed in  this  instance.  This  argument  of  the  popular  desire  will 
appeal  to  many ;  it  is  indifferent  to  very  few,  and  will  be  opposed 
chiefly  by  those  who  have  selfish  interests  to  guard. 

There  are,  however,  several  sound  and  positive  arguments  for 
the  election  of  senators  by  direct  vote  of  the  people.  First 
among  them  is  that  this  new  method  is  the  logical  outcome  of 
our  political  development,  and  is  quite  in  accord  with  our  ideals 
of  government  to-day.  To  look  upon  this  question  historically 
we  must  go  back  to  the  time  of  the  birth  of  our  constitution. 
This  step  is  important  and  necessary,  as  our  knowledge  of  the 
past  and  present  aids  us  in  our  efforts  to  foresee  the  future. 
But  this  attempt  to  seek  advice  from  the  past  is  often  dangerous. 
Influenced  by  a  natural  and  just  regard  for  the  sound  opinions 
of  the  framers  of  our  constitution,  we  are  very  apt  to  overlook 
the  fact  that  these  men  drew  many  of  their  conclusions  from 
premises  that  no  longer  exist  and  while  they  were  influenced 
by  conditions  that  we  have  great  difficulty  in  thoroughly  real- 
izing to-day.  In  wondering  at  the  stability  of  the  great  docu- 
ment drawn  up  by  these  men,  we  too  often  forget  that  this  sta- 
bility is  quite  as  much  the  result  of  the  sound  political  sense  of 
the  American  people  as  it  is  of  any  inherent  qualities  of  the  con- 
stitution itself.  Few  people  familiar  with  the  subject  ignore  the 
fact  that  our  constitution  to-day  differs  much  in  spirit  if  not  in 
letter  from  that  constitution  which  was  the  result  of  the  mutual 
ideas  and  concessions  of  the  members  of  the  convention  of  1787. 
And  yet  many  of  us  fail  to  take  this  fact  into  due  consideration 
when  we  quote  freely  the  opinions  of  these  men  upon  specific 
questions  of  the  present  day. 

Many  opinions  quite  rational  in  1787  would  be  ridiculous  in 
1902.  Because  our  forefathers  believed  in  a  certain  method 
of  selecting  senators  over  a  hundred  years  ago  is  no  reason 
for  supposing  that  they  would  favor  it  to-day.  Every  student 
of  history  knows  that  the  political  development  of  the  United 
States  has  been  a  gradual  change  from  the  aristocratic  and  con- 
servative ideals  of  the  framers  of  our  government  to  the  pop- 
ular democratic  ideas  of  to-day;  that  the  doctrine  of  the  sever- 


22  ELECTION    OF 

eign  will  of  the  people  has  ceased  to  be  our  abstract  philosophic 
theory  of  political  resources,  and  has  become  a  live,  practical, 
every-day  •  principle  of  the  politician.  Newspapers,  railroads, 
telegraphs,  and  accumulated  political  experience  have  in  the 
course  of  time  become  some  of  the  main  causes  of  this  change. 
When  communication  between  the  states  was  difficult;  when  the 
average  citizen  had  merely  local  interests — little  knowledge  of 
state  affairs  and  less  of  national;  when  to  many  Americans  a 
newspaper  was  a  novelty  and  to  all  of  them  a  railroad  or  a 
telegraph  was  a  dream,  we  can  see  the  wisdom  of  those  men  who 
wished  to  keep  direct  power  from  a  people  who  for  unavoidable 
reasons  had  not  acquired  that  political  knowledge  which  is  essen- 
tial to  the  proper  exercise  of  sovereign  power  in  politics.  But 
to-day,  under  present  conditions,  these  same  statesmen  and  pa- 
triots would  undoubtedly  be  of  another  opinion. 

Remembering  the  condition  of  affairs  in  1787,  we  can  eas- 
ily understand  how  the  state  legislatures  elected  the  governors 
and  all  other  officers,  civil  and  military,  of  the  state  (even  the 
members  of  the  constitutional  convention  themselves  were  chos- 
en by  the  several  state  legislatures)  ;  how  the  president  was  in- 
tended to  be  selected  by  electors ;  how  property  and  even  reli- 
gious qualifications  were  retained  in  several  of  the  states  as  ab- 
solutely essential  to  the  privilege  of  voting.  But  by  to-day  many 
changes  have  taken  place.  Our  president  is  practically  elected 
by  popular  vote ;  so  are  the  governors  of  the  states.  Civil  and 
military  officers  are  no  longer  appointed  by  the  legislatures,  and 
property  qualifications  are  generally  abolished.  And  it  is  not 
an  extravagant  supposition  to  believe  that  the  framers  of  our 
constitution  would  to-day  applaud  these  changes  in  the  great  in- 
strument of  their  own  creation.  But  this  change,  great  as  it  is, 
is  not  yet  complete.  We  have  still  the  choice  of  United 
States  senators  by  the  legislatures  to  remind  us  of  the  days  when 
the  people  were  not  trusted,  and  to  remind  us  also  that  there  re- 
mains still  something  for  us  to  do  in  order  to  make  the  doctrine 
of  popular  rights  everywhere  a  practical  proposition  rather  than 
an  abstract  idea.  These  several  steps  in  this  great  change  have 
been  gradual,  and  therein  lies  the  stability  of  our  institutions ; 
but  we  claim,  and  we  believe  not  rashly,  that  the  time  has  now 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  23 

come  to  make  this  change,  and  that  it  follows  in  logical  sequence 
with  the  others.  To  hold  otherwise  is  to  claim  that  a  people  that 
has  made  such  wonderful  advances  in  commerce,  industry,  and 
in  civilization  has  remained  at  a  standstill  in  politics.  This  argu- 
ment of  the  historic  necessity  of  this  change  gains  in  strength 
the  longer  and  more  attentively  we  consider  it. 

Another  argument  in  favor  of  the  change  we  propose  is  that 
the  present  method  of  choosing  senators  is  quite  inconsistent 
with  our  political  ideals  of  to-day.  A  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment should  avoid  all  inconsistencies  in  its  composition.  They 
form  a  great  element  of  weakness,  not  only  from  the  fact  that 
they  destroy  the  harmony  of  the  system  on  which  the  govern- 
ment is  based,  but  because  they  expose  the  government  to  the 
frequent  natural  and  adverse  criticism  of  the  people  and  thereby 
lessen  that  popular  respect  which  is  so  essential  to  the  strength 
of  any  institution  founded  on  the  will  of  the  people.  Political 
anomalies  can  be  supported  only  by  selfish  class  interests,  by 
narrow  bigotry,  or  by  that  timid  and  senseless  conservatism 
which,  forgetting  that  progress  is  an  irresistible  law,  looks  with 
dread  upon  all  changes.  We  claim  that  the  present  method  of 
choosing  our  national  senators  has  grown  to  be  one  of  these 
dangerous  political  anomalies.  It  fitted  logically  into  the  scheme 
of  our  government  when  it  was  framed,  but  it  is  not  in  keeping 
with  its  spirit  in  the  year  1902.  When  the  people  are  considered 
capable  of  directly  electing  every  four  years  a  president  who  rep- 
resents the  entire  nation,  why  should  it  be  considered  dangerous 
to  allow  them  to  choose  directly  two  men  who  represent  their 
state?  Are  not  these  two  contradictory  principles  an  excellent 
example  of  that  dangerous  inconsistency  just  referred  to?  This 
question  is  all  the  more  difficult  to  answer  negatively  when  we 
remember  that  the  president  is  nearly  always  a  man  of  another 
state,  and  that  the  people  know  far  less  about  him  person- 
ally than  about  their  own  senators.  It  may  be  claimed  that  in 
voting  for  the  president  the  people  are  voting  for  a  party;  but 
this  is  quite  as  true  of  the  senators.  It  may  also  be  argued  that 
the  people  of  one  state  alone  do  not  elect  a  president;  but  it 
is  quite  as  true  that  the  people  of  one  state  cannot  control  the 
Senate. 


24  ELECTION    OF 

Again,  the  position  of  chief  executive  may  be  filled  by  the 
people  acting  all  at  one  time  under  the  predominating  influence 
of  one  agitated  question,  while  the  people  can  fill  the  Senate  only 
after  expressing  their  will  in  three  separate  parts  and  under  the 
influence  of  three  successive  periods.  Perhaps  it  will  be  said  that 
periods  of  two  or  six  years  are  nothing  in  politics.  This  may 
be  true,  but  the  effects  of  a  continued  popular  excitement  of  a 
longer  period  would  invade  the  Senate  even  if  the  state  legis- 
tures  shield  them  from  the  terrible  influences  of  popular  enthu- 
siasm. Furthermore,  it  is  far  from  being  the  mere  assertion  of. 
a  demagogue  to  insist  that  to  hold  the  people  incapable  of  elect- 
ing senators  is  an  insidious  reflection  upon  the  dignity  of  a  na- 
tion whose  political  creed  is  the  sovereignty  of  the  people ;  and 
this  the  more  so  as  these  same  people  elect  directly  every  four 
years  the  executive  branch  of  the  government  whose  hasty  or 
foolish  acts  entail  quite  as  great  disaster  as  the  similar  action  of 
one-half  of  the  legislature.  Surely  these  two  principles  of  elec- 
tion are  quite  inconsistent.  Again,  our  national  legislature  does 
not  elect  representatives  of  the  nation,  and  why  should  the 
state  legislature  elect  those  of  the  state?  Every  state  in  the 
union  has  a  Senate,  and  its  members  are  chosen  by  direct  vote 
of  the  people.  In  fact,  all  the  agents  of  the  people  with  the  sin- 
gle exception  of  the  national  senators  are  practically  selected 
either  by  popular  vote  or  by  executive  appointment.  It  is  true 
that  the  legislatures  exercise  a  certain  control  over  executive 
appointments,  but  that  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  present 
method  of  selecting  senators  is  inconsistent  with  our  ideals  and 
our  practise. 

Another  consideration  in  favor  of  popular  election  is  that  it 
would  not  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  Senate  in  any  way,  and 
would  be  beneficial  to  the  senators  themselves.  Our  opponents 
usually  put  forward  the  claim  that  the  Senate  is  a  check  upon  the 
House,  and  then  imply  that  this  would  not  be  the  case  under 
the  system  we  propose.  The  Senate  should  no  doubt  exer- 
cise a  certain  restraining  influence  over  the  House.  Many  dif- 
ferent opinions  have  existed  on  this  subject,  but  to-day  the  only 
sound  principle  is  that  the  Senate  being  elected  for  a  longer 
term  than  the  House,  and  being  composed  of  older  and  usually 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  25 

more  prominent  men,  represents  the  more  permanent  interests 
of  the  nation  which  at  certain  moments  are  apt  to  be  disregard- 
ed ;  while  the  House  is  more  responsive  to  the  momentary  im- 
pulses of  the  people.  To  disregard  the  longer  term,  the  more 
advanced  age,  and  the  greater  prominence  of  the  senators,  and  • 
then  to  claim  that  their  acknowledged  conservatism  and  dignity- 
are  based  solely  or  even  principally  upon  their  manner  of  elec- 
tion is  ridiculous.  To  say  that  the  Senate  would  be  under  the 
new  method  of  election,  a  second  house  of  representatives  is  to 
declare  that  every  state  in  the  union  has  two  houses  of  repre- 
sentatives. It  has  often  been  said  that  the  popular  election  of 
senators  will  shorten  the  average  time  during  which  the  senators 
will  remain  in  office.  There  is  doubtless  some  truth  in  this 
statement,  but  its  force  is  greatly  diminished  when  we  think  of 
the  large  number  of  representatives  who  have  spent  a  great  part 
of  their  lives  in  the  lower  house  even  though  the  people  had 
every  two  years  a  chance  of  changing  them.  Then,  again,  it  is 
not  positively  demonstrated  that  it  is  very  essential  for  the 
senators  generally  to  remain  several  terms.  If  after  an  oppor- 
tunity of  six  years  a  senator  cannot  publicly  demonstrate  his 
worth  it  is  perhaps  just  as  well  to  give  another  an  oppor- 
tunity. The  upper  branch  of  our  legislature  is  not  a  school 
where  the  senators  are  supposed  to  remain  several  terms  be- 
fore becoming  capable  statesmen.  Furthermore,  a  senator  must 
watch  his  constituents  and  should  under  ordinary  conditions 
strive  to  be  honestly  re-elected.  It  is  far  more  dignified  as  we-ll 
as  more  profitable  for  a  senator  to  sound  the  people  at  different 
times  than  it  is  for  him  to  watch  the  state  legislatures.  Since  l 
he  ought  to  know  the  wishes  of  his  people,  is  it  not  better  for 
him  to  find  them  out  directly?  A  senator  can  well  afford  to 
-trive  to  remain  in  touch  with  the  people,  but  to  keep  in  com- 
munication with  a  certain  section  of  every  third  legislature  is 
undignified  to  say  the  least. 

This  new  method  of  electing  senators  would  be  very  bene- 
fkial  to  the  state  legislatures.  These  are  elected  primarily  to 
0'iisider  local  and  state  affairs,  and  it  is  better  that  they  should 
not  be  hampered  with  national  obligations.  This  is  all  the  more 
true  when  we  remember  that  the  choice  of  a  senator  has  many 


26  ELECTION    OF 

times  occupied  the  entire  session  of  a  legislature ;  that  senatorial 
dead-locks  are  not  of  infrequent  occurrence ;  that  the  election 
of  a  senator  has  often  divided  the  legislature  into  two  hostile 
sections ;  that  it  has  sometimes  split  the  party  in  power  and  there- 
by disrupted  its  working  harmony ;  that  the  question  as  to  how 
a  person  will  vote  for  senators  has  become  an  important  but  il- 
legitimate factor  in  his  qualification  for  the  state  legislature, 
and  furthermore  that  this  personal  question  relative  to  the  se- 
lection of  senators  is  something  foreign  to  our  ideals  of  the  de- 
liberations of  a  legislative  assembly.  It  may  be  claimed  that  de- 
priving the  state  legislatures  of  the  right  they  now  possess  will 
be  injuring  rather  than  aiding  them.  But  we  are  relieving  them 
of  a  duty  which  is  inconsistent  with  their  other  duties,  and  which 
is  often  disastrous  in  its  results,  as  has  just  been  shown.  Again, 
the  choice  of  the  state  governors  and  of  all  civil  and  military  of- 
ficers has  been  removed  from  the  state  legislatures,  and  why 
should  we  stop  when  we  reach  the  senators?  Why  should  we 
hesitate  to  make  this  change  in  order  to  continue  our  gradual 
progress  toward  the  absolute  rule  of  the  people?  It  is  the  growth 
from  which  we  derive  strength,  and  one  which  it  is  dangerous 
to  attempt  to  prevent. 

Finally,  one  important  argument  in  favor  of  popular  election 
is  that  it  would  be  of  great  political  value  to  the  people  them- 
selves. The  great  store  of  political  learning  and  experience 
which  the  railroads,  telegraphs,  and  newspapers  have  aided  in 
placing  before  the  people  is  not  always  readily  absorbed.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  people  do  not  take  entire  advantage  of  their 
opportunities  in  this  respect,  and  it  is  equally  undeniable  that 
the  government  should  do  all  in  its  power  to  encourage  either 
directly  or  indirectly  the  acquisition  of  political  knowledge  and 
experience  by  the  people,  because  on  the  political  foresight  and 
ability  of  the  people  depends  absolutely  the  welfare  of  all  dem- 
ocratic governments.  During  times  of  political  excitement  and 
when  called  upon  to  choose  by  election  their  representatives  the 
people  acquire  almost  involuntarily  a  certain  lesson  in  practical 
politics.  The  election  of  the  representatives  is  often  a  compara- 
tively local  affair  and  brings  up  usually  but  the  discussion  of 
local  issues.  All  the  other  elections  with  one  notable  exception 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  27 

in  which  the  people  take  a  direct  part  are  state  elections,  and 
the  issues  discussed  are  semi-local.  But  then  every  four  years 
the  people  are  called  upon  to  choose  the  chief  executive  of 
the  entire  nation.  There  is  no  real  medium  step  between  the 
popular  election  of  a  state  officer  and  that  of  the  president  of 
the  United  States.  From  the  discussion  of  state  issues  and 
the  consideration  of  state  interests  the  people  are  suddenly  called 
upon  to  give  their  opinion  on  the  greatest  questions  of  polit- 
ical category — on  questions  that  involve  the  vital  interests  of  the 
nation  as  a  whole.  Now,  the  popular  election  of  senators  would 
supply  that  salutary  and  essential  medium  step.  By  this  act 
the  people  would  be  instructed  to  a  certain  extent  in  national 
politics  before  being  called  upon  to  voice  their  opinions  on  a  na- 
tional  issue.  It  is  true  that  the  people  elect  only  two  senators 
every  six  years,  but  the  very  fact  that  they  are  elected  by  the 
people  and  that  they  are  directly  responsible  to  the  people  would 
naturally  bring  them  in  closer  touch  with  the  people — to  the 
great  benefit  of  the  latter.  To-day  a  senator  does  not  fear  pop- 
ular criticism  to  so  great  an  extent,  but  under  the  proposed  meth- 
od he  would  feel  a  more  direct  and  immediate  although  not 
necessarily  a  greater  responsibility  and  would  therefore  see  to 
it  that  the  people  understood  his  actions  in  order  to  approve  them. 


Arena.  40:  428-31.  November,  1908. 
Election  of  United  States  Senators.     Edwin  Maxey. 

We  will  mention  the  more  prominent  inconveniences  and 
evils  which  the  actual  working  of  this  method  has  developed. 
These  may  be  fairly  well  classified  under  three  heads,  according 
to  their  effects  (i)  upon  the  senate,  (2)  upon  the  state  legis- 
latures, and  (3)  upon  the  people. 

As  a-  result  of  this  method  the  Senate  is  congested  with  men 
whose  purse  and  political  trickery  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  their 
ability  as  statesmen.  For  it  is  a  matter  which  cannot  be  gain- 
said that  the  political  machine  can  be  used  far  more  effectively 


28  ELECTION    OF 

in  electing  a  legislature  favorable  to  a  boss  or  his  political  crea- 
tions than  in  securing  their  own  election  at  the  polls.  And  the 
further  fact  is  well  known  that  money  can  be  used  to  better 
advantage  in  lobbying  a  legislature  than  in  buying  an  election, 
where  the  money  must  needs  be  distributed  over  a  larger  sur- 
face and  the  safeguards  against  corruption  are  much  more  nu- 
merous. A  Pennsylvania  politician  formulated  this  with  more 
frankness  than  self-respect  in  the  following  statement :  "I  can 
use  my  money  to  better  advantage  in  buying  a  legislature  than  in 
buying  the  people  of  the  state." 

Senators  do  not  feel  their  responsibility  to  the  people  of  the 
state  to  the  extent  they  would  if  elected  directly  by  the  people. 
If  a  senator  is  unscrupulous  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  him 
what  the  people  think  of  him  so  long  as  he  can  retain  his  hold 
upon  their  legislatures.  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  represen- 
tative government  that  power  should  be  coupled  with  responsi- 
bility. While  this  in  theory  holds  with  reference  to  our  United 
States  senators,  as  a  matter  of  fact  responsibility  becomes  con- 
siderably attenuated  when  the  body  to  whom  one  is  responsible 
is  not  a  permanent  body,  and  this  is  the  case  with  our  state 
legislatures — few  members  of  our  legislatures  continue  in  office 
more  than  six  years,  so  that  a  senator  may  disregard  the  wishes 
of  his  state  legislature  with  comparative  impunity.  Not  so  when 
his  responsibility  is  to  the  people ;  they  are  a  relatively  perma- 
nent body  and  the  same  constituency  which  elected  him  once  will 
have  an  opportunity  to  elect  or  defeat  him  again.  The  fact  that 
they  are  elected  for  a  six  years'  term — which  is  three  times  as 
long  as  that  of  a  congressman — removes  sufficiently  their  sense 
of  responsibility  without  having  this  insulating  pad  in  the  way 
of  a  legislature  placed  between  them  and  the  people.  Responsi- 
bility is  always  most  effective  when  direct  and  certain. 

The  effect  upon  our  state  legislatures  is  equally  marked  and  all 
too  often  is  equally  demoralizing.  The  members  of  the  legislature 
are  chosen,  too  frequently,  not  with  a  view  to  their  fitness  to 
serve  their  state  in  the  capacity  of  legislators,  but  because  they 
favor  this  or  the  other  candidate  for  the  United  States  Senate. 
Here,  then,  is  a  mixing  of  issues  in  state  elections,  the  effect 
of  which  is  too  easily  understood  to  need  comment.  The  next 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  29 

effect  is  to  invite  corruption;  for  there  are  always  some  mem- 
bers uninstructed  by  their  constituents  with  reference  to  candi- 
dates for  the  United  States  Senate  who  can  be  influenced,  and 
some  more  who  are  willing  to  disregard  their  instructions,  pro- 
viding the  monetary  arguments  of  the  candidate  or  his  friends 
are  insufficiently  eloquent;  or,  to  put  it  in  a  balder  form,  they 
can  be  induced  to  set  a  price  upon  themselves.  There  is  the 
further  objection  that  it  frequently  uses  a  large  portion  of  their 
time.  A  direct  election  by  the  people  would  thus  save  the 
legislature  considerable  time  and  if  this  be  not  needed  for  legis- 
lation they  could  adjourn  and  go  home  so  much  earlier,  and  by 
so  doing  save  the  state  considerable  expense  as  well  as  sus- 
pense. If  the  contest  for  a  senatorship  is  fierce,  the  forces  of  the 
dominant  party  divided,  and  factional  feeling  bitter,  we  have 
a  "deadlock."  And  of  late  "deadlocks"  are  by  no  means  in- 
frequent. If  the  case  is  an  aggravated  one,  the  whole  session 
is  sometimes  consumed  without  getting  anything  done.  This  is 
a  two-fold  injury  to  the  state  first,  in  that  the  time  which  should 
have  been  spent  in  legislating  for  the  interests  of  the  state  has 
been  uselessly  squandered;  and  second,  in  that  the  state  loses  a 
part  of  its  representation  in  the  United  States  Senate.  The 
"deadlocks"  in  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  Kentucky,  Montana  and 
California  are  too  recent  to  need  more  than  a  passing  mention 
in  order  to  renew  in  our  minds  the  disgraceful  incidents  con- 
nected therewith. 

Upon  the  people  the  effect  is  certainly  not  such  as  to  com- 
mend the  present  method.  It  increases  their  distrust  of  their 
state  legislatures ;  because  if  the  contest  is  at  all  close  there  are 
seldom  wanting  charges,  too  often  well  founded,  of  treacherv 
and  bribery.  It  is  in  part  responsible  for  a  lack  of  confidence 
in  and  respect  for  the  United  States  Senate.  It  is  a  lamentable 
fact  that  the  American  people  have,  to  a  considerable  degree, 
lost  confidence  in  this  body  to  which  a  half-century  ago  they 
looked  with  pride;  and  justly  so,  for  during  the  early  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century  it  compared  favorably  with  any  legisla- 
tive body  in  the  world.  True  they  had  the  same  method  of 
electing  senators  then  as  now ;  but  circumstances  have  changed. 
The  political  machine  exerted  but  a  fraction  of  the  effect  upon 


30  ELECTION    OF 

the  legislatures  then  that  it  does  now;  nor  was  lobbying  prac- 
ticed to  anything  like  the  same  extent.  Corporate  influence, 
which  now  dominates  the  Senate,  was  then  a  relatively  unim- 
portant factor. 


Atlantic  Monthly.  68:  227-34.  August,  1891. 
Reform  of  the  Senate.    Wendell  P.  Garrison. 

It  might  plausibly  be  maintained  that  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate is  the  most  corrupting  element  in  our  national  political  sys- 
tem. This  is  not  because  it  has  become,  as  is  sometimes  alleged, 
a  club  of  millionaires.  Such  a  consummation  would  not  have 
displeased  certain  of  the  framers  of  the  constitution.  General 
Pinckney  opposed  the  payment  of  salaries  to  senators,  on  the 
ground  that  their  branch  "was  meant  to  represent  the  wealth  of 
the  country,"  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  salaries,  "the  wealthy 
alone  would  undertake  the  service."  Franklin  seconded  his  mo- 
tion. George  Mason  would  have  annexed  a  property  qualifica- 
tion, since  "one  important  object  in  constituting  the  Senate  was 
to  secure  the  rights  of  property."  Their  views  did  not  prevail, 
but  the  millionaires  have  arrived,  and -make  no  scruple  about 
drawing  their  salaries.  They  are  a  consequence  of  the  mode 
of  electing  senators  established  by  the  constitution,  and  a  part 
of  the  general  demoralization  ascribable  to  the  same  cause. 

Notoriously,  the  Senate  was  the  great  stumbling-block — 
almost  the  crux — in  the  constitutional  settlement.  Edmund  Ran- 
dolph's plan  provided  for  its  election  by  the  House  "out  of  a 
proper  number  of  persons  nominated  by  the  individual  legisla- 
tures." George  Read's  substituted  the  president  for  the  House. 
Dickinson,  following  Spaight,  of  North  Carolina,  moved  that 
the  legislatures  elect.  Wilson,  of  Pennsylvania,  on  the  other  hand, 
advocated  direct  popular  election  ;  arguing  that  a  choice  by  the 
legislatures  would  "introduce  and  cherish  local  interests  and 
local  prejudices."  Any  of  the  rejected  schemes,  we  can  see, 
would  have  had  its  own  dangers  and  abuses;  but  who  can  say 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  31 

whether  the  result  would  have  been  more  disastrous  than  that 
of  Dickinson's,  under  which  we  have  worked  for  a  century? 
Read  thought  he  foresaw,  from  a  general  character  of  the  con- 
stitution, an  end  of  the  federal  system  by  absorption,  so  that  the 
state  governments  would  "soon  be  reduced  to  the  mere  office 
of  electing  the  national  Senate";  and  this  fear  found  an  echo 
in  the  ratifying  conventions.  Thus,  in  Pennsylvania,  John 
Smilie,  speaking  for  the  minority  in  opposition,  said  the  state 
legislature  would  "necessarily  degenerate  into  a  mere  name,  or 
at  most  settle  in  a  formal  board  of  electors,  periodically  as- 
sembled to  exhibit  the  servile  farce  of  filling  up  the  federal  repre- 
sentation." In  New  York,  again,  it  was  objected  that  the  Senate 
would  tend  to  perpetuate  itself,  and  Chancellor  Livingston  re- 
torted :  "Can  they  make  interest  with  their  legislatures,  who  are 
themselves  varying  every  year,  sufficient  for  such  a  purpose? 
Can  we  suppose  two  senators  will  be  able  to  corrupt  the  whole 
legislature  of  this  state?  The  idea,  I  say,  is  chimerical.  The 
thing  is  impossible." 

No  contemporary,  so  far  as  I  can  discover,  anticipated  the 
precise  evil  which  has  brought  us  to  our  present  pass,  and  which 
is  touched  upon,  all  too. lightly,  by  Mr.  Bryce  in  the  chapter  on 
UK-  Senate  in  his  American  Commonwealth.  After  quoting 
Hamilton,  in  The  Federalist,  as  saying  that  the  Senate  would 
furnish  "a  convenient  link"  between  the  federal  and  state  sys- 
tems, Mr.  Bryce  remarks  (the  italics  are  mine)  : — 

"In  one  respect  this  connection  is  no  unmixed  benefit,  for  it 
has  helped  to  make  the  national  parties  powerful  and  their  strife 
intense,  in  these  last-named  bodies.  Every  vote  in  the  Semite 
is  so  important  to  the  great  parties  that  they  are  forced  to 
strut/file  for  asi-einicncy  in  each  of  the  state  legislatures  by 
t\.'lioin  the  senators  are  elected." 

In  other  words,  the  constitution  from  the  beginning  insured 
the  coincidence  of  state  with  federal  party  lines.  This,  it  may 
be  admitted,  tended  irresistibly  to  the  consolidation  of  the  coun- 
try, but  it  had  also  the  effect  of  mischievously  prolonging  the 
term  of  party  existence ;  producing  artificial  divisions  in  local 
matters ;  making  party  fealty,  and  not  competence  or  honesty 
or  patriotism,  the  credential  of  office-holding  at  every  degree  of 


32  ELECTION    OF 

the  scale,  whether  state  or  federal ;  and  so  leading  to  the  steady 
deterioration  of  the  personnel  of  state  legislatures,  the  growth 
of  machine  rule,  the  purchasability  of  senatorships,  and  the 
decline  of  the  federal  Senate  to  what  we  now  see  it, — in  large 
measure  a  medley  of  millionaires,  "bosses,"  and  the  representa- 
tives of  selfish  interests. 

If  we  must  have  parties,  it  is  highly  desirable  that  they 
should  arise  spontaneously,  on  clearly  formulated  principles 
and  with  definite  objects;  that  they  should  cease  to  exist  as  soon 
as  possible  after  these  objects  have  been  attained;  that  they 
should  be  easily  attacked  when  the  love  of  power  becomes  the 
real  motive  for  existence,  and  when  insincere  professions  take 
the  place  of  genuine  beliefs  and  aspirations;  that  honest  mem- 
bers should  be  free  to  withdraw,  and  cooperate  patriotically  with 
others  of  like  mind;  that  we  should  not  go  on  stupidly  trans- 
mitting from  sire  to  son  the  antipathy  begotten  by  obsolete 
party  differences  which  have  been  outlasted  by  party  names.  To 
such  flexibility  the  constitution  has  erected  a  formidable  barrier 
in  the  provision  which  forces  state  politics  to  turn  upon  the 
national  complexion  of  the  legislature,  and  makes  the  arbitrary 
control  of  that  body  by  the  managing  spirits  of  the  great  parties 
the  key  to  the  political  game. 

That  a  governor,  again,  in  ordinary  times,  or  a  mayor,  a  town 
collector,  an  overseer  of  the  poor,  a  constable,  should  be  selected 
for  his  national  party  badge,  and  not  for  fitness  and  probity,  is  of 
course  destructive  of  the  idea  that  public  office  is  a  public  trust, 
derived  from  the  people  and  answerable  to  the  people.  Have 
we  not  here  the  germ  of  the  most  of  our  civic  corruption  ?  The 
very  existence  of  the  machine  and  the  boss  is  involved  in  keep- 
ing up  this  vicious  confusion  of  things  entirely  distinct,  and  in 
hindering  the  subservient  partisan  from  voting  upon  the  real 
local  (state  or  municipal)  issue,  or  upon  the  character  of  the 
candidate,  by  making  his  concern  for  the  success  of  the  national 
party  paramount.  So  long  as  this  state  of  things  continues,  it 
seems  hopeless  to  look  for  any  such  purification  of  our  politics 
as  will  tempt  men  of  refinement,  honor,  training,  and  public 
spirit  to  seek  a  statesman's  career.  The  federal  Senate,  which 
should  be  the  assured  goal  of  the  class  competent  to  govern, 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  33 

and  a  model  of  legislative  dignity,  capacity,  and  behavior,  cannot 
be  expected  to  fulfill  these  functions  while  the  state  legislatures 
remain  vulgar,  petty,  and  sordid ;  and  the  state  legislatures,  in 
their  turn,  cannot  avoid  these  vices  so  long  as  their  excuse  for 
being  is  primarily  to  elect  senators,  and  only  secondarily  to  at- 
tend to  the  affairs  of  their  respective  commonwealths. 

One  who  examines  the  subject  closely,  in  search  of  a  remedy 
short  of  an  amendment  of  the  constitution,  will  fix  upon  the 
abrogation  of  the  existing  statute  regulating  the  election  of  sena- 
tors, and  propose  either  the  substitution  of  a  new  law,  or  the 
relegation  to  the  several  states  of  the  control  of  the  whole 
matter.  The  statute  in  question  was  approved  on  July  25,  1866, 
by  President  Johnson.  It  was  introduced  by  Senator  Clark,  of 
New  Hampshire,  pursuant  to  instructions  to  the  Judiciary  Com- 
mittee, on  motion  of  Senator  Williams,  of  Oregon,  to  inquire 
into  the  expediency  of  providing  a  uniform  and  effective  mode 
of  securing  the  election  of  senators  in  Congress  by  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  several  states.  It  was  reported — as  Senate  Bill  414, 
"to  regulate  the  times  and  manner  of  holding  elections  for 
senators  of  Congress" — and  read  and  passed  to  a  second  read- 
ing on  July  9,  1866.  It  excited  no  partisan  opposition,  and  was 
passed  two  days  later,  after  a  short  debate.  On  July  12  it  was 
ordered  printed  by  the  House ;  on  July  23  it  was  read  three 
times  without  debate,  and  passed  by  a  large  majority.  It  was 
intended,  in  the  language  of  Senator  Clark,  "to  avoid  the  ques- 
tions and  differences  that  have  sometimes  existed."  In  this  it 
has  only  partially  succeeded,  while  it  has  tended  steadily  to  im- 
pair the  quality  of  the  senators  returnable  under  it. 

The  law  provides  that  the  two  houses  of  the  legislature  shall 
meet  and  vote  separately  for  senator  on  the  first  ballot,  after- 
wards in  joint  convention  ;  that  voting  shall  be  viva  voce,  and 
election  by  majority;  and  that  at  least  one  vote  daily  shall  be 
taken  till  election  is  arrived  at. 

All  these  provisions  encountered  weighty  objections.  Sena- 
tor Sherman,  who  voted  in  the  negative,  and  who,  from  past 
experience,  saw  little  need  of  Congress  availing  itself  of  ils 
constitutional  right  to  interfere,  preferred  a  joint  convention 
at  once,  advocated  election  by  plurality,  and  was  indisposed  to 


34  ELECTION    OF 

interrupt  the  legislature's  proper  work  till  the  senatorial  election 
was  got  out  of  the  way.  He  also  pointed  out  the  awkward 
effect  of  the  law  in  the  case  of  states  holding  biennial  elections, — 
that  a  vote  for  senator  might  have  to  be  taken  fifteen  or  eighteen 
months  in  advance.  Senator  Fessenden  made  a  strong  but  in- 
effectual stand  against  the  viva  voce  vote,  as  not  being  the  usage 
in  his  state  of  Maine  for  one  thing,  and  because  "it  is  generally 
understood  that  tfce  ballot  is  a  more  free  and  unembarrassed 
mode  of  voting."  Moreover,  he  said,  the  viva  voce  vote  was 
liable  to  put  men  "under  restraints  from  party  discipline  which 
would  lead  them  to  act  against  their  conscientious  convictions 
of  what  was  right  and  proper  in  the  individual  case,  and  which 
might  bring  a  sort  of  compulsory  pressure  upon  them  which 
might  be  objectionable."  Against  this,  Western  usage  was  held 
up  by  Senators  Trumbull  and  Williams :  Trumbull  saying  that 
constituents  had  a  right  to  know  how  members  voted,  and  that 
there  would  be  no  chance  to  cheat  by  false  or  double  ballots; 
and  Williams,  that  members  were  frequently  instructed  by  con- 
stituents how  to  vote,  and  the  latter  had  a  right  to  know  if 
their  mandate  was  obeyed  as  it  should  be.  Senator  Anthony, 
of  the  pocket  borough  of  Rhode  Island,  even  advocated  open 
voting  by  the  people  at  the  polls  as  the  only  true  way;  alleging, 
"It  prevents  corruption,  it  prevents  deception,  and  cultivates  a 
manly  spirit  everywhere."  Senator  Sumner  was  of  the  contrary 
opinion  as  regarded  popular  elections,  but  held  that  in  the  legis- 
lature the  votes  belonged  to  the  constituents.  Mr.  Edmunds  and 
Mr.  Sherman  voted  with  Mr.  Fessenden,  and  there  were  three 
others  of  like  mind ;  but  twenty-eight  held  to  viva  voce. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  overruling  of  these  objections 
played  admirably  into  the  hands  of  the  machine,  insuring  its 
control  of  the  nominations  and  its  marshaling  of  supporters  by 
party  pressure  and  by  purchase.  The  open  vote  does  not  "pre- 
vent corruption" ;  it  favors  it  by  putting  an  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  treachery  oh  the  part  of  the  bribed.  It  "prevents  deception" 
of  a  certain  kind,  while  fostering  the  grave  deception  that  the 
legislator  is  voting  according  to  his  "conscientious  convictions," 
and  not  from  "compulsory  pressure."  It  "cultivates  a  manly 
spirit,"  such  as  rings  and  machines  most  delight  in,  or  manu- 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  35 

facturers  who  wish  to  coerce  the  vote  of  their  employees.  Hap- 
pily there  is  no  need  to  insist  on  this  point,  as  we  are  in  the 
midst  of  an  extraordinary  movement,  state  after  state,  to  sub- 
stitute everywhere  the  secret  for  the  open  ballot  as  a  means 
of  restoring  a  manly  spirit  to  the  voter,  protecting  him  from 
the  consequences  of  his  vote,  and,  above  all,  enabling  him  to 
baffle  the  cut-and-dried  schemes  of  the  caucus  and  the  machine 
with  independent  nominations,  having  a  chance  of  success  with- 
out great  outlay  or  preliminary  organization.  The  Australian 
ballot,  in  fact,  whose  potency  in  purifying  our  politics  cannot 
now  be  calculated,  but  which  is  certain  to  be  very  great,  com- 
mends itself  for  adoption  wherever  the  corruptionist  or  the 
boss  finds  a  field  for  his  devilish  activity;  and  were  the  states 
once  more  free  to  elect  senators  in  their  own  fashion,  this  mode 
of  voting  might  stand  a  chance  of  being  prescribed  for  sena- 
torial elections. 

To  make  it  of  the  greatest  utility  for  this  purpose,  however, 
it  ought  to  operate  on  a  greater  number  of  nominations  than 
are  commonly  presented  to  a  legislature  by  the  respective  party 
machines  or  caucuses.  To  secure  these  we  must  look  to  the 
people,  making  an  appeal  to  them  in  advance  of  the  mischief 
which  they  are  now  powerless  to  stave  off  or  to  repair.  For 
this  we  have  the  warrant  of  the  supporters  of  the  statute  of  1866 
themselves.  Senator  Williams,  as  we  have  seen,  held  that,  de- 
spite the  constitutional  injunction  that  the  legislature  should 
choose  senators,  constituents  had  a  right  to  instruct  members 
how  to  vote,  and  to  be  obeyed;  and  Senator  Sumner  quite  as 
frankly  took  the  same  ground.  Both,  in  other  words,  acknowl- 
edged the  rightful  force  of  public  opinion  in  shaping  the  legisla- 
ture's action ;  and,  as  a  matter  of  history,  senators  have,  in  cer- 
tain states,  again  and  again  owed  their  re-election  to  respect  for 
the  popular  sentiment  and  tradition  in  favor  of  retaining  faith- 
ful servants  in  office. 

Let  us,  then,  suppose  the  states  free  to  give  to  the  people 
the  power  of  nominating,  at  the  proper  general  election,  candi- 
dates for  the  approaching  senatorial  vacancy.  Suppose  that  these 
nominations  were  reached  as  now  under  the  ballot-reform  laws ; 
the  state  printing  on  the  official  ballot  the  names  of  such  as  had 


36  ELECTION    OF 

a  certain  group  of  petitioners  behind  them  (say  three  to  five 
thousand).  Then  let  the  five  to  ten  highest  be  the  popular  in- 
struction to  the  legislature  to  choose  from  among  these,  and 
let  the  legislative  voting  take  place  in  joint  convention,  again 
by  the  Australian  system,  each  member  to  vote  on  the  first 
ballot  for  three  on  the  list ;  on  the  second,  for  one  (or  two, 
as  the  case  may  be)  out  of  the  three  highest  as  determined 
by  the  first  ballot.  In  case  of  a  tie  let  the  decision  be  by  lot. 

From  this  method  certain  obvious  benefits  would  accrue.  The 
legislator's  choice  would  no  longer  be — as  it  too  often  is  now,  as 
the  common  voter's  generally  is — merely  a  choice  of  two  evils. 
The  people  of  the  state  would  scan  eagerly  their  own  list  of  can- 
didates, and  could  not  avoid  the  comparison  between  the  most 
worthy  and  the  least,  especially  if  the  latter  were  the  party 
nominees.  A  man  fit  to  be  senator  would  have  a  decided  prestige 
when  proposed  in  this  manner  as  against  the  product  of  intrigue 
and  jobbery.  Such  men  would  tend  to  multiply  in  the  popular 
nominations,  inasmuch  as  they  could  allow  their  names  to  be 
used  without  loss  of  self-respect,  and  with  no  obligation  to 
work  in  their  own  behalf.  Their  appearance  in  the  public  view 
as  ready  to  serve  the  state  would  recommend  them  for  election 
to  the  legislature  or  to  the  lower  house  of  Congress;  in  either 
of  which  positions  they  would  demonstrate  their  fitness  for  pro- 
motion to  the  federal  Senate,  while  meantime  elevating  the 
bodies  to  which  they  were  elected.  Moreover,  if  an  abundance 
of  good  material  were  always  in  sight,  the  practice  of  nominat- 
ing non-residents  of  the  congressional  districts,  which  is  much 
to  be  desired,  and  which  was  signally  exemplified  last  year  in 
Massachusetts  in  the  case  of  Dr.  William  Everett,  would  become 
common. 

If  a  precedent  be  demanded  for  nominations  in  the  manner 
just  described,  we  can  cite  that  recalled  to  mind  by  President 
Welling  in  a  recent  address  on  Connecticut  federalism  before 
the  New  York  Historical  Society. 

"I  must  add,"  he  says,  "that  the  old  electoral  system  of 
Connecticut  was  ingeniously  devised  to  promote  the  genesis  of  a 
natural  aristocracy, — the  aristocracy  of  talents  and  virtues.  Each 
freeman  in  the  colony  was  required,  in  September  of  each  year, 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  37 

to  name  twenty  men  whom  he  wished  to  have  placed  in  nomina- 
tion for  the  office  of  'Assistant,'  the  so-called  'Assistants'  being 
the  dignitaries  who  composed  the  Council,  or  colonial  Senate. 
From  the  mass  of  nominations  made  at  these  primary  assemblies 
of  the  townships,  the  General  Assembly,  six  months  before  each 
election,  selected  and  published  the  names  of  the  twenty  men 
who  had  received  the  highest  number  of  nominating  votes,  and 
these  men  could  be  voted  for  on  the  day  of  the  final  election, 
when  twelve  out  of  the  twenty  were  to  be  elected." 

Nearer  in  point  of  time  and  to  our  present  purpose  is  the 
Massachusetts  practice  during  the  first  quarter  of  the  century, 
by  which  each  congressional  district  nominated  three  presidential 
electors,  of  whom  the  legislature  chose  one  for  each  district, 
besides  the  two  electors  at  large. 

Still  closer  and  more  recent  is  the  provision  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nebraska  (1875)  noticed  by  Mr.  Bryce.  The  electors, 
in  voting  for  state  legislators,  are  allowed  to  "express  by  ballot 
their  preference  for  some  person  for  the  office  of  United  States 
Senator.  The  votes  cast  for  such  candidates  shall  be  canvassed 
and  returned  in  the  same  manner  as  for  state  officers."  The  fu- 
tility of  this,  however,  is  apparent,  as  the  legislature  is  in  no  way 
constrained  to  pay  any  heed  to  public  sentiment.  In  fact,  in 
actual  practice,  this  privilege  has  only  xonce  been  availed  of  by 
the  people  of  Nebraska,  namely,  in  1886,  when  General  Van 
Wyck  made  an  active  canvass  in  his  own  behalf  as  an  anti- 
monopolist.  The  Republican  and  Democratic  parties  abstained 
from  preliminary  nominations,  and  General  Van  Wyck  secured 
in  November  about  a  third  as  many  votes  as  were  cast  for  gov- 
ernor. In  January,  on  the  first  two  ballots,  he  received  a  plurality 
of  the  legislative  vote,  but  was  finally  rejected. 

To  head  off  the  machine,  to  give  back  to  the  people  the  right 
of  nomination  as  well  as  of  election,  to  restore  to  the  state  legis- 
latures their  state  ward-looking  character  and  duties,  to  divorce 
(so  far  as  is  possible)  national  from  state  politics,  to  fill  the  fed- 
eral Senate  with  men  whose  prime  qualifications  are  unpartisan 
and  whose  election  is  spontaneous,  to  pave  the  way  for  the  re- 
entrance  into  politics  of  the  cultivated  classes  to  whom  it  has 
become  abhorrent, — all  this  may  be  accomplished  by  making  the 


38  ELECTION    OF 

choice  of  United  States  senator  uncertain  to  such  a  degree  thai 
no  political  rewards  can  be  promised  or  obtained  in  connection 
with  it.  Let  the  people  nominate,  let  the  legislature  choose,  with- 
in limits.  Mr.  Bryce  remarks  on  the  Nebraska  provision  that 
it  is  "an  attempt  to  evade,  and  by  a  side  wind  defeat,  the  pro- 
vision of  the  federal  constitution  which  vests  the  choice  in  the 
legislature" ;  and  of  course  the  same  criticism  would  apply  a 
fortiori  to  the  scheme  set  forth  in  this  paper.  But  is  it  certain 
that  the  courts  would  so  pronounce?  The  legislature  would  still 
choose,  if  under  conditions  prescribed  by  the  state  laws,  suppos- 
ing the  statute  of  1866  to  have  been  abrogated.  Moreover,  in 
practice,  its  range  of  choice  would  be,  not  diminished,  but  en- 
larged. Nobody  has  challenged,  or  would  venture  to  challenge, 
Mr.  Bryce's  own  account  of  the  existing  procedure.  Senators, 
he  observes,  "are  still  nominally  chosen,  as  under  the  letter  of 
the  constitution  they  must  be  chosen,  by  the  state  legislatures. 
The  state  legislature  means,  of  course,  the  party  for  the  time 
dominant,  which  holds  a  party  meeting  (caucus)  and  decides  on 
the  candidate,  who  is  thereupon  elected,  the  party  going  solid  for 
whomsoever  the  majority  has  approved.  Now  the  determina- 
tion of  the  caucus  has  almost  always  been  arranged  beforehand 
by  the  party  managers.  .  .  .  Circumstances  may  change, 
compromises  may  be  necessary ;  still  it  is  now  generally  true  that 
in  most  states  little  freedom  of  choice  remains  with  the  legisla- 
ture. The  people,  or  rather  those  wire-pullers  who  manage 
the  people  and  act  in  their  name,  have  practically  settled  the 
matter  at  the  election  of  the  state  legislature." 

But  what  if  the  wire-pullers  find  that  electing  the  legislature 
is  not  the  same  as  electing  the  senator?  They  will  lose  the  chief 
reason  for  interfering  with  these  elections,  which  will  tend  more 
and  more  to  be  governed  by  local  issues  and  personal  merit. 
The  men  thus  sent  up  will  be  more  independent  of  party,  and 
more  free  to  choose  wisely  and  patriotically  from  the  list  for 
senator  returned  by  their  constituents. 

The  stability  of  the  federal  senate  is,  no  doubt,  a  whole- 
some feature  of  our  constitution,  but  we  must  not  forget  that 
this  branch  became  the  bulwark  of  slavery,  which  measured  its 
term  of  life  by  the  preponderance  of  its  supporters  in  the  upper 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  39 

house.  Two  years  ago,  the  promoters  of  our  present  tariff  legis- 
lation were  confident  that  their  control  of  the  Senate  would 
prevent  for  years  to  come  the  undoing  of  the  extremest  measure 
they  might  carry  in  the  short  interval  of  their  having  a  majority 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  also.  Certain  accidents  by  which 
the  .engineer  was  hoist  with  his  own  petard  have  falsified  this 
calculation;  but  the  danger  is  a  standing  one,  and  the  Senate 
ought  never  to  be  counted  upon  as  the  citadel  of  sectional  or 
selfish  combinations.  The  law  under  which  it  is  now  renewed 
favors  such  a  perversion  of  it,  and  it  has  not  prevented  dead- 
locks. It  is  time  that  the  states  should  ask  to  have  their  free 
dom  restored  to  them,  and  take  the  penalty  of  going  unrepre- 
sented so  long  as  they  cannot  agree  upon  a  candidate.  We  might 
then  introduce  by  degrees  the  combination  of  popular  nomina- 
tion and  secret  balloting  described  above,  and  trust  to  a  steady 
if  slow  amelioration  of  the  whole  tone  of  our  politics,  a  de- 
cline in  the  persistence  of  parties  and  a  falling-off  in  party  man- 
agement, the  emancipation  of  the  state  legislatures,  the  reforma- 
tion of  the  federal  Senate. 


Congressional  Documents. 
52d  Congress,  ist  Session.  Senate  Report  794.  pt.  i. 

Reported  by  William  E.  Chandler. 

Before  enlarging  by  changes  in  the  constitution  the  field  of 
popular  elections  we  should  take  steps  to  purify  the  suffrage  and 
to  secure  honesty  in  the  elections  now  required,  (i)  There  is 
at  the  South  a  large  body  of  citizens  whose  votes  are  suppressed 
in  violation  of  the  fifteenth  and  last  amendment  of  the  constitu- 
tion. The  amendment  is  a  dead  letter.  Our  very  first  next 
amendment  of  the  constitution  should  be  one  to  make  the 
fifteenth  amendment  for  manhood  suffrage  a  living  reality  all 
over  the  union/  (2)  There  is  a  vast  and  alarming  body  of  il- 
literate voters  in  the  country,  and  their  proportion  is  not  dimin 
isliing.  (3)  There  are  degraded  voters  in  masses  in  our  large 


40  ELECTION   OF 

cities,  many  of  them  ignorant  aliens  unlawfully  naturalized, 
making  republican  government  in  such  cities  a  failure  and  its 
•nominal  existence  a  peril.  The  suppression  and  degradation  of 
the  suffrage  by  the  three  causes  should  be  remedied  before  its 
scope  is  widened  by  more  popular  elections  than  the  marvelously 
wise  constitution  of  the  fathers  now  requires. 


Congressional   Documents. 
55th  Congress,  2d  Session.  House  Report  125. 

Minority  report  by  D.  A.  De  Armond. 

It  is  generally  believed,  whether  true  or  false,  that  in  some 
states  United  States  senators  have  been  elected  by  the  bribery 
and  corruption  of  members  of  the  legislatures  electing  them. 
This  high  office  ought  to  be  the  people's  reward  for  great  public 
services  rendered,  noble  patriotism,  high  ability,  and  true  states- 
manship, and  not  a  means  of  profit,  or  the  prize  of  the  highest 
bidder. 

For  a  hundred  years  this  distrust  of  the  people,  as  embodied 
in  our  national  constitution,  has  stood  congealed,  fixed,  and  im- 
movable. 

The  cause  of  free  government  in  the  several  states  has  stead- 
ily advanced,  until  now,  in  the  best  governed  among  them,  the 
will  of  the  intelligent  masses  of  the  people  is  truly  sovereign. 

The  idea  that  all  governments  derive  "their  first  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed,"  that  the  will  of  the  people  shall 
rule,  upon  which  the  fathers  of  the  republic,  cautiously  and  fear- 
ingly,  founded  our  government,  exemplified  and  expanded,  tried, 
tested,  and  not  found  wanting,  as  it  has  been  in  the  several  states, 
has  spread  triumphant  over  the  whole  Western  Hemisphere.  It 
has  crossed  the  Atlantic  and  swept  over  Europe.  Thrones  have 
crumbled  before  it,  and  out  of  their  wrecks,  or  upon  their  ruins, 
have  been  builded  governments  whose  administration  is  im- 
mediately responsible  and  responsive  to  the  will  of  the  people 
through  their  elected  lawmakers. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  41 

Congressional  Record.  23:  6060-6.  July  12,  1892. 
Henry  St.  George  Tucker. 

The  use  of  money  in  the  election  of  senators  has  a  most 
vicious  effect  in  another  respect.  The  legislatures,  under  vhe 
present  system,  possess  the  electoral  function  in  the  selection  of 
senators.  The  money  which  corrupts,  by  purchase,  the  member 
of  the  legislature  for  senatorial  elections  has  debauched  him  as 
a  servant  of  the  people  he  is  sworn  to  serve  in  local  legislation. 
The  corporation  that  ca.n  enter  the  halls  of  a  legislature  and  lay 
its  unholy  hands  upon  the  members,  claiming  them  as  its  own 
ir  the  selection  of  a  senator,  has  already  destroyed  the  hope  of  a 
pure  administration  of  the  local  affairs  of  the  people  of  that 
state  by  polluting  the  source  from  which  such  administration  is 
derived.  Under  the  specious  guise  of  interest  merely  in  the 
senatorial  election,  legislatures  are  debauched  and  the  purchased 
member  in  the  senatorial  election  can  hardly  pose  as  the  un- 
bought  and  unpurchasable  tribune  of  the  people's  local  rights. 
If  the  charges  of  corruption  in  senatorial  elections  are  true,  the 
reflex  action  on  the  legislation  in  the  states,  incident  to  such 
corruption,  must  be  immeasurable  in  its  destruction  of  the  rights 
and  liberties  of  the  people  of  the  states. 

We  find  also  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  under  the  treaty- 
making  power  of  the  constitution,  is  arrogating  to  itself  the  power 
to  lay  taxes.  That  power  has  been  given  by  the  constitution  of 
this  land  to  the  Congress,  but  we  find  now  that,  under  this 
power,  the  president  and  the  Senate  are  not  only  making  treaties, 
which  they  have  a  right  to  make,  but  they  are  making  the  treaties 
t  which,  in  effect,  levy  taxes  upon  the  people  without  the  consent 
o;  this  House,  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  Congress,  and  which  alone 
under  the  constitution  has  the  power  to  originate  tax  bills. 

It  marks  the  gradual  absorption  of  the  taxing  power  of  the 
government  by  the  Senate,  without  responsibility  to  the  people 
for  "its  exercise. 

Congressional  Record.  25:101-110.  April  6  and  7,  1893. 

George  F.  Hoar. 

The  resolution  submitted  by  Mr.  Hoar  on  the  3d  instant  was 
read  as  follows : 


42  ELECTION    OF 


Resolved,  That  it  is  inexpedient  that  the  resolution  sent  to  the 
Senate  by  the  Mouse  of  iiepresentatives  during  the  last  Congress, 
providing  for  an  amendment  of  the  constitution  securing  the  elec- 
tion of  senators  by  the  people  of  the  several  states,  be  adopted. 

Such  a  method  of  election  would  essentially  change  the  character 
of  the  Senate  as  conceived  by  the  convention  that  framed  the  con- 
stitution and  the  people  who  adopted  it. 

It  would  transfer  practically  the  selection  of  the  members  of  this 
body  from  the  legislatures,  who  are  intrusted  with  all  legislative 
powers  of  the  states,  to  bodies  having  no  other  responsibilities, 
whose  election  can  not  be  regulated  by  law,  whose  members  act 
by  proxy,  whose  tenure  of  oince  is  for  a  single  day,  whose  votes 
and  proceedings  are  not  recorded,  who  act  under  no  personal 
responsibility,  whose  mistakes,  ordinarily,  can  only  be  corrected 
by  the  choice  of  senators  who  do  not  represent  the  opinions  con- 
cerning public  measures  and  policies  of  the  people  who  choose  them. 

It  requiies  the  substitution  of  pluralities  for  majorities  in  the 
election. 

It  will  transfer  the  seat  of  political  power  in  the  great  states,  now 
distributed  evenly  over  their  territory,  to  the  great  cities  and 
masses  of  population. 

It  will  create  new  temptations  to  fraud,  corruption,  and  other 
illegal  practices,  and  in  close  cases  will  give  rise  to  numerous  elec- 
tion contests,  which  must  tend  seriously  to  weaken  the  confidence 
of  the  people  in"  the  Senate. 

It  will  absolve  the  larger  states  from  the  constitutional  obliga- 
tion which  secures  the  equal  representation  of  all  the  states  in 
the  Senate  by  providing  that  no  state  shall  be  deprived  of  that 
equality  without  its  consent. 

It  implies  what  the  whole  current  of  our  history  shows  to  be 
untrue,  that  the  Senate  has  during  the  past  century  failed  to  meet 
the  just  expectations  of  the  people,  and  that  the  state  legislatures 
have  proved  themselves  unfit  to  be  the  depositaries  of  the  power 
of  electing  senators. 

The  reasons  which  require  this  change,  if  acted  upon  and 
carried  to  their  logical  result,  will  lead  to  the  election  by  the  direct 
popular  vote,  and  by  popular  majorities,  of  the  president  and  of  the 
judiciary,  and  will  compel  the  placing  of  these  elections  under  com- 
plete national  control. 

It  will  result  in  the  overthrow  of  the  whole  scheme  of  the  Sen- 
ate and,  in  the  end,  of  the  whole  scheme  of  the  national  constitu- 
tion as  designed  and  established  by  the  framers  of  the  constitution 
and  the  people  who  adopted  it. 

Mr.  Hoar.  Mr.  President,  I  suppose  that  no  thoughtful  per- 
son will  deem  a  discussion  of  this  topic  out  of  time  or  premature. 
Four  important  states  have  sent  to  us  resolutions  of  their  legis- 
latures favoring  such  a  change  in  the  constitution.  Three  sena- 
tors have  advocated  it  in  elaborate  speeches.  The  House  of 
Representatives,  without  a  debate,  has  passed  resolutions  for 
submitting  the  change  to  the  states.  The  careless  and  thought- 
less dealing  with  this  subject  is  shown  by  the  proposal  to  take 
from  Congress  all  power  over  the  manner  of  electing  senators — 
a  step  which  would  go  far,  in  my  judgment,  to  change  this  coun- 
try from  a  nation  into  a  league  or  confederacy. 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  43 

I  am  not  sure  whether  it  is  the  good  fortune  or  the  ill  for- 
tune of  our  American  political  system  that  our  controversies  so 
often  relate  to  matters  which  are  vital,  not  only  to  the  well-being, 
but  to  the  very  existence  of  the  republic.  The  English  take 
their  constitution  for  granted.  They  can  change  anything  in 
their  state  by  a  simple  act  of  legislation.  But  it  has  been  rarely 
in  their  history  that  great  constitutional  changes  have  been 
brought  about  by  the  action  of  legislative  bodies.  They  have 
never  been  brought  about  by  the  direct  action  of  the  people. 

The  abandonment  of  the  influence  of  the  sovereign  in  legis- 
lation, the  abandonment  of  the  veto  power,  the  diminished 
authority  of  the  House  of  Lords,  the  transfer  of  executive  power 
from  the  immediate  servants  of  the  Crown  to  the  ministers,  who 
depend  for  their  official  existence  upon  the  majority  of  the  House 
of  Commons — all  these  things  have  come  to  pass  so  silently  that 
it  is  difficult  to  discover  when  any  of  them  took  place.  Although 
our  constitutions,  state  and  national,  are  all  in  writing,  there  are 
constant  attempts  to  make  changes  of  the  most  radical  and  vital 
character,  and  to  bring  them  about  suddenly  and  without  de- 
liberation or  discussion  by  popular  action. 

If  the  Senate  as  at  present  constituted  is  to  be  defended,  it 
is  to  be  defended  here.  If  the  great  reasons  which  moved  our 
fathers  to  establish  this  chamber,  which  they  hoped  would  last 
ia  unbroken  succession  until  time  shall  be  no  more,  to  give  its 
members  a  tenure  of  office  more  enduring  than  that  of  any  other 
department  of  the  government  save  the  judiciary  alone,  to  re- 
move it  from  the  operation  of  the  fleeting  passions  of  the  hour, 
to  lay  its  foundation  below  the  frost,  and  to  remove  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  men  who  are  to  compose  it,  as  far  as  may  be,  from 
the  temporary  excitements  which  so  often  move  the  people  to 
their  own  harm,  are  understood  anywhere,  those  reasons  must, 
be  understood  by  the  men  who  fill  these  seats.  If  this  great 
part  of  the  structure  of  our  body  politic  is  to  be  maintained, 
it  must  be  maintained  by  the  confidence  of  the  American  people 
in  the  character  of  their  senators  and  by  the  strength  of  argu- 
ment which  those  senators  must  themselves  at  least  help  to  fur- 
nish. 

This  is  clearly,  Mr.  President,  a  question  of  centuries,  and 


44  ELECTION    OF 

not  of  years.  In  determining  it  we  must  appeal  to  our  experi- 
ence of  a  hundred  years,  and  not  merely  to  that  of  yesterday  or 
the  day  before.  A  present  impatience  is  not  only  no  good  reason 
for  making  a  change,  but  its  existence  seems  to  me  an  especial 
reason  for  postponing  it.  If  we  listen  only  to  present  complaints, 
we  must  make  radical  changes  also  in  the  manner  of  electing  the 
president,  in  the  constitution  of  the  state  legislatures,  in  our 
judiciary,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  the  management  of 
our  great  corporations,  of  our  railroads,  our  schools,  our  uni- 
versities, the  church,  the  law,  and  the  private  habits  of  the  people. 
Complaint,  impatience,  uneasiness  attend  upon  everything  which 
depends  upon  human  instrumentality  for  its  administration.  They 
are  the  sign  of  vigorous  health,  and  if  soberly  and  thoughtfully 
dealt  with  are  the  conditions  of  all  life  and  growth. 

We  must  judge  the  Senate,  as  I  have  said,  by  the  experience 
of  a  century,  and  not  by  a  few  recent  failures.  Whatever  there 
may  be  of  existing  evil  may  be  corrected  by  the  intelligence  and 
good  sense  of  the  people,  as  other  evils  quite  as  great  have  been 
corrected  in  the  past. 

When  I  came  into  the  national  service  in  1869,  all  avenues  to 
this  and  the  other  chamber  and  to  every  executive  department 
were  swarming  with  a  powerful  and  corrupt  lobby.  That  lobby 
has  disappeared  before  an  aroused  and  vigorous  public  senti- 
ment. Who  hears  now  of  great  measures  of  legislation  promoted 
or  affected  in  Congress  by  corrupt  instrumentalities? 

When  I  came  into  public  life  in  1869,  the  Senate  claimed 
almost  entire  control  of  the  executive  function  of  appointment 
to  office.  Every  senator,  with  hardly  an  exception,  seemed  to 
fancy  that  the  national  officers  in  his  state  were  to  be  a  band  of 
political  henchmen  devoted  to  his  personal  fortunes.  What  was 
called  "the  courtesy  of  the  Senate"  was  depended  upon  to  enable 
a  senator  to  dictate  to  the.  executive  all  appointments  and  re- 
movals in  his  territory.  That  doctrine  has  disappeared  as  com- 
pletely as  the  locusts  that  infested  Egypt  in  the  time  of  the 
Pharaohs. 

When  I  entered  public  life  in  1869,  Tweed  was  the  dominant 
power  in  New  York  City.  He  dictated  alike  all  civic  expendi- 
tures and  the  appointment  and  the  judgment  of  the  courts  of  the 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  45 

city.  It  became  my  duty,  in  representing  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  the  impeachment  of  a  public  officer  before  the 
Senate,  to  utter  the  following  language  of  warning,  the  timeli- 
ness and  necessity  of  which  I  think  few  men  will  now  question : 

My  own  public  life  has  been  a  very  brief  and  insignificant  one, 
extending  little  beyond  the  duration  of  a  single  term  of  senatorial 
office.  But  in  that  brief  period  I  have  seen  five  judges  of  a  high 
court  of  the  United  States  driven  from  office  by  threats  of  im- 
peachment for  corruption  or  maladministration.  I  have  heard  the 
taunt,  from  friendliest  lips,  that  when  the  United  States  presented 
herself  in  the  East  to  take  part  with  the  civilized  world  in  generous 
competition  in  the  arts  of  life,  the  only  product  in  her  institutions 
in  which  she  surpassed  all  others  beyond  question  was  her  corrup- 
tion. 

I  have  seen  in  the  state  in  the  union  foremost  in  power  and 
wealth  four  judges  of  her  courts  impeached  for  corruption,  and  the 
political  administration  of  her  chief  city  become  a  disgrace  and  a 
byword  throughout  the  world.  1  have  seen  the  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  in  the  House,  now  a  distinguished 
member  of  this  court,  rise  in  his  place  and  demand  the  expulsion  of 
four  of  his  associates  for  making  sale  of  their  official  privilege  of 
selecting  the  youths  to  be  educated  at  our  great  military  school. 
When  the  greatest  railroad  in  the  world,  binding  together  the 
continent  and  uniting  the  two  seas  which  wash  our  shores,  was 
finished,  I  have  seen  our  national  triumph  and  exultation  turned 
to  bitterness  and  shame  by  the  unanimous  reports  of  three  com- 
mittees of  Congress — two  of  the  House  and  one  here — that  every 
step  of  that  mighty  enterprise  had  been  taken  in  fraud. 

I  have  heard  in  highest  places  the  shameless  doctrine  avowed  by 
men  grown  old  in  public  office  that  the  true  way  by  which  power 
should  be  gained  in  the  republic  is  to  bribe  the  people  with  the 
offices  created  for  their  service,  and  the  true  end  for  which  it 
.should  be  used  when  gained  is  the  promotion  of  selfish  ambition 
and  the  gratification  of  personal  revenge.  I  have  heard  that  sus- 
picion haunts  the  footsteps  of  the  trusted  companions  of  the 
President. 

These  things  have  passed  into  history.  The  Hallam  or  the 
Tacitus  or  the  Sismondi  or  the  Macaulay  who  writes  the  annals 
of  our  time  will  record  them  with  his  inexorable  pen. 

Will  any  man  deny  the  truth  of  any  of  these  charges?  Will 
any  man  find  occasion  to  repeat  them  to-day?  These  great  evils, 
one  and  all,  have  been  corrected  by  the  American  people  with 
the  abundant  resources  which,  under  their  existing  constitutions, 
were  at  their  command.  Other  evils,  as  grave,  but  not  graver, 
demand  our  attention  to-day.  These  evils  will  in  their  turn  dis- 
appear when  brought  into  the  daylight  before  the  intelligence 
and  the  justice  of  the  American  people. 

The  sufferings  of  the  people  have  been  mostly  from  their 
apprehensions,  never  from  any  actual  misgoverhment.  Even  our 
civil  war  itself  came  through  the  apprehension  of  the  people  of  one 
section  of  the  country  of  which  those  who  waged  it  against  the 


46  ELECTION    OF 

government  now  think  it  was  an  unmixed  good.  Our  political 
history  seems  to  be  almost  made  up  of  popular  movements  which 
are  the  result  of  the  fears  of  the  people — of  evils  apprehended 
from  legislation  which,  in  fact,  are  never  experienced. 

The  history  of  the  United  States  for  a  hundred  years  has 
been  the  history  of  marvelous  prosperity  and  growth,  which 
reads,  even  in  the  pages  of  soberest  historians,  like  an  oriental 
tale.  Yet  our  political  journals  have  been  constantly  filled  with 
prediction  of  disaster  and  ruin.  If  anybody  needs  confirmation  of 
this  statement,  let  him  read  the  political  platforms  of  the  party 
conventions  of  the  minority.  It  is  marvelous  to  see  how  safe, 
conservative,  and  beneficent  has  been  our  national  legislation 
in  spite  of  all  the  violence  and  all  the  extreme  utterances  of  the 
journals  and  the  platforms.  This  quality  in  our  legislation  is  de- 
rived largely,  though  not  wholly,  from  the  character  of  the  Sen- 
ate under  the  existing  method  of  choosing  its  members. 

The  dangers  of  the  country  are  the  dangers  to  the  elective 
franchise — violence,  fraudulent  voting,  fraudulent  counting,  in- 
timidation, corruption,  gerrymandering,  the  unseating  of  legisla- 
tors with  unquestioned  title  to  their  seats  for  the  accomplishment 
of  political  objects  by  unscrupulous  men,  the  use  of  weapons  in- 
tended to  protect  our  institutions,  to  subvert  them.  These  things 
—  not  mistakes  in  finance,  or  an  erroneous  fiscal  policy,  or  unwise 
laws  of  succession,  or  even  rash  and  violent  projects  of  social 
extremists — are  the  things  that  menace  the  permanence  of  our 
institutions  to-day. 

Every  generation  since  the  dawning  of  civilization  seems  to 
have  been  gifted  with  its  own  peculiar  capacity.  The  generation 
of  Homer  has  left  nothing  behind  but  a  great  epic  poem,  which 
for  thirty  centuries  remains  without  a  rival.  Italian  art  had  its 
brief  and  brilliant  day  of  glory  which  departed  and  never  has 
returned.  The  time  of  Elizabeth  was  the  time  of  dramatic 
poetry  which  has  been  alike  the  wonder  and  the  despair  of  all 
succeeding  ages.  The  generation  which  accomplished  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  had  a  genius  for  framing  constitutions  which  no 
generation  before  or  since  has  been  able  to  equal  or  to  ap- 
proach. The  features  of  the  state  constitutions  framed  in  that 
day  have  been  retained  with  little  changes  in  substance,  and  have 
been  copied  since  by  every  new  state. 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  47 

The  men  of  that  day  had  many  great  advantages  for  this 
work.  They  had  conducted  a  great  revolution.  To  prepare  for 
it,  they  had  been  engaged  for  a  century  in  discussing  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  self-government  is  founded  and  by  which  con- 
stitutional liberty  is  secured.  They  were  men  of  English  stock, 
trained  in  the  principles  of  English  liberty.  There  was  no  ad- 
mixture in  their  body  politic  of  men  who  had  been  born  under 
despotic  governments,  and  who  associated  the  idea  of  govern- 
ment inseparably  with  the  idea  of  tyranny.  At  their  fathers'  fire- 
side the  great  debate  of  constitutional  liberty  had  been  conducted 
from  the  earliest  recollection  of  the  oldest  men  then  living. 
They  had  the  other  advantage,  that  in  framing  their  constitutions 
they  were  free  from  all  party  bias  and  from  the  temptation  to 
consult  party  advantage,  or  appeal  to  the  party  prejudices  of  the 
people. 

I  do  not,  of  course,  claim  that  the  people  can  not  now  amend, 
or  that  they  can  not  now  improve,  our  constitution.  That  con- 
stitution itself  would  be  a  failure  if  the  experience  of  a  hun- 
dred years  under  its  operation  found  the  people  unfitted  to  im- 
prove it.  The  lives  of  our  fathers  would  have  been  of  little 
worth  if,  under  the  constitution  they  framed,  there  had  not 
grown  up  and  flourished  a  people  who  were  also  fit  to  deal  with 
the  great  and  fundamental  constitutional  principles  of  the  state. 
The  men  who  entered  upon  the  untried  field  of  providing  by 
written  enactment  what  were  the  boundaries  and  limits  of  con- 
stitutional power  and  constitutional  authority  in  the  state  have 
left  children  who,  after  a  hundred  years  of  trial,  need  not  fear 
to  approach  and  to  deal  with  the  same  great  problems.  But  they 
must  bring  to  them  the  same  wisdom  and  courage  and  virtue. 
They  must  dare  to  tell  the  people  plain  truths.  They  must  pos- 
sess the  wisdom  of  deliberate  action,  and  arise  to  the  austere  vir- 
tue of  self-restraint. 

Mr.  President,  wherever  there  can  be  found  an  expression 
of  admiration  for  the  American  constitution  in  the  works  of  any 
great  writer  or  thinker  at  home  or  abroad  it  will  be  found  that 
the  admiration  is  based  upon  that  part  of  its  mechanism  which 
secures  the  deliberate  and  indirect  action  of  the  popular  will  in- 
stead of  its  immediate,  rapid,  inconsiderate,  and  direct  action. 


48  ELECTION    OF 

The  parts  of  it  which  :ire  everywhere  the  most  praised  and  by 
which  its  framers  sought  especially  to  commend  it  to  the  con- 
fidence of  the  people  were  the  constitution  of  the  Senate  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  great  .function  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  not  merely  or 
chiefly  to  afford  a  learned,  able,  and  impartial  tribunal  for  the 
determination  of  controversies  between  private  parties  upon  the 
principles  of  ordinary  municipal  law ;  but  it  is  the  function  of 
keeping  the  national  and  state  legislatures  alike  within  the  ap- 
pointed limits  of  their  authority.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  restraint 
upon  the  people's  will  when  expressed  in  the  form  of  legislation 
by  the  people's  representatives,  whether  that  will  undertake  an 
encroachment  upon  the  individual  and  natural  rights  of  the 
citizens  or  upon  the  domain  of  other  appointed  constitutional 
authorities.  "It  is,  indeed,"  said  Daniel  Webster,  "a  great 
achievement ;  it  is  the  master  work  of  the  world,  to  establish 
governments  entirely  popular  on  lasting  foundations." 

I  do  not  propose  to  take  any  time  in  commending  the  ex- 
cellencies of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  I  do  not 
think  it  worth  while  to  cite  to  ears  to  which  they  are  familiar 
the  praise  of  foreign  statesmen  or  philosophers,  of  Gladstone, 
or  of  De  Tocqueville,  or  of  Bryce.  These  compliments  are 
trifling  and  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  great  fact  that 
the  American  people  are  satisfied  with  it,  and  that  they  would 
reject  with  swift  and  unanimous  indignation  any  proposition 
which  they  thought  would  change  it  in  its  essence. 

I  think  it  can  be  established  to  their  satisfaction  that  the  pro- 
posed change  in  the  method  of  electing  senators  is  in  itself  a 
change  in  principle  and  essence  of  the  most  vital  character,  and 
that  its  logic  will  lead  to  other  changes  equally  vital  and  essential. 
And  for  that  reason  I  have  no  apprehension  of  the  success  of 
this  scheme  when  deliberately  considered  and  discussed. 

I  am  not  afraid  to  say  to  the  American  people  that  it  is  dan- 
gerous to  trust  any  great  power  of  government  to  their  direct 
or  inconsiderate  control.  I  am  not  afraid  to  tell  them  not  only 
that  their  sober  second  thought  is  better  than  their  hasty  action, 
but  that  a  government  which  is  exposed  to  the  hasty  action  of 
a  people  is  the  worst  and  not  the  best  government  on  earth.  No 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  49 

matter  how  excellent  may  be  the  individual,  the  direct,  immediate, 
hasty  action  of  any  mass  of  individuals  on  earth  is  the  pathway 
to  ruin  and  not  to  safety.  It  is  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  when 
James  Madison,  the  great  advocate  of  the  rights  of  the  people  in 
his  time,  one  of  the  foremost  among  the  framers  of  our  con- 
stitution, first  said  it,  "That,  although  every  Athenian  citizen 
might  be  a  Socrates,  every  Athenian  assembly  would  still  be  a 
mob." 

Our  fathers  were  profound  students  of  history.  They  found 
that  no  republic,  although  there  had  been  many  examples  of 
other  republics,  ever  lasted  long  without  a  senate.  The  term 
senate  implied  to  their  minds,  as  to  ours,  a  body  of  men  of 
mature  age  and  of  a  tenure  of  office  which  was  removed  from 
all  temptation  of  being  affected  by  temporary  currents  of  public 
sentiment.  The  word  senate  is  a  misnomer  when  applied  to  any 
legislative  body  of  whom  these  things  are  not  true. 

My  friend  from  Oregon  said  the  other  day  that  the  framers 
of  the  constitution  distrusted  the  people.  He  said  that  one  of 
them  who  declared  in  the  convention  that  legislation  ought  to  be 
re-moved  as  far  as  possible  from  the  immediate  action  of  the 
people  would  be  remanded  to  private  life  nowadays  with  a 
promptness  that  would  be  almost  grotesque.  Why,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, that  senator  represents  a  state — one  of  the  new  states  of 
the  union — that  has  incorporated  the  doctrine  of  that  utterance 
into  every  department  and  arrangement  of  her  constitution  more 
completely,  I  think,  than  any  other  state  in  the  American  union. 
The  senator  overlooks  what  the  author  of  the  utterance  with 
which  he  finds  fault  had  so  profoundly  studied — the  difference 
between  the  immediate  action  of  the  people  upon  legislation  and 
administration  and  the  expression  of  the  sober  and  deliberate 
will  of  the  people  through  instrumentalities  whose  own  sobriety 
and  deliberation  are  thoroughly  secured. 

Does  my  friend  really  think  that  the  authors  of  the  opening 
sentences  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  who  rested  their 
cause  on  those  sublime  and  eternal  truths  in  their  great  contro- 
versy with  the  mother  country,  who  placed  those  truths  at  the 
very  foundation  of  their  new  goverment,  who  pledged  their  lives 
and  fortunes  and  sacred  honor  to  maintain  them,  distrusted  the 


So  ELECTION    OF 

people?  They  trusted  the  people  when  they  made  those  great 
declarations  of  natural  right.  They  trusted  the  people  when  they 
declared  the  equal  right  of  every  human  being  without  exception 
of  race  or  color  or  nationality  or  rank  or  fortune.  But  they 
trusted  them  also  with  as  profound  and  implicit  a  trust  when 
they  submitted  to  them  constitutions,  both  state  and  national,  filled 
with  restraints  which  alike  secure  minorities  and  individuals 
against  injustice  and  oppression  from  majorities,  and  secure  the 
whole  people  against  their  own  hasty  and  inconsiderate  action. 

No,  Mr.  President,  it  is  not  because  the  f ramers  of  our  con- 
stitution distrusted  the  people;  it  is  because  they  trusted  the 
people  that  they  confidently  asked  their  adoption  of  a  constitu- 
tion which  compelled  them  to  deliberation,  to  sober  thought,  to 
delegated  power,  to  action  through  selected  agencies  and  instru- 
mentalities, to  thinking  twice  before  acting  once.  It  was  not 
Madison  or  Hamilton,  it  was  the  people  of  the  United  States 
who  ordained  and  established  the  constitution. 

I  have  no  respect  for  the  notion  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  need  to  be  flattered  or  cajoled,  or  that  they  are  impatient 
of  the  necessary  restraints  of  constitutional  liberty.  Truth, 
frankness,  and  courage  are  the  avenues  to  their  confidence.  There 
is  but  one  way  to  discover  what  will  be  popular  in  this  country, 
and  that  is  to  discover  what  is  right.  There  is  but  one  road 
to  the  enjoyment  of  the  confidence  of  the  people,  and  that  is  to 
counsel  them  to  wise,  honest,  and  safe  policies.  The  public  man 
who  appeals  to  temporary  opinion  or  who  flatters  temporary  pas- 
sion will  find  his  hold  upon  power  as  temporary  and  shortlived 
as  are  the  instrumentalities  by  which  he  seeks  to  obtain  it. 

It  has  been  said  in  this  discussion  that  the  constitution  needed 
amendment  at  once.  This  is  true ;  but  all  amendments  were  in 
the  direction  of  placing  checks  on  the  power  of  the  people  and 
declaring  that  there  were  certain  things  the  people  should  not  be 
permitted  to  do.  The  great  statesmen  who  framed  the  constitu- 
tion placed  in  it  certain  checks  and  safeguards  against  the  popu- 
lar will.  The  greater  people  to  whom  they  submitted  it  perfected 
it  by  inserting  other  safeguards  still. 

I  stated  just  now  that  the  term  "senate"  implied  to  the  appre- 
hension of  every  studious  man  certain  essential  conditions ;  but 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  51 

the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  as  established  by  our  constitu- 
tion, implied  something  more  than  this. 

First,  our  fathers  wished  to  secure  a  dual  legislative  assembly. 
With  the  exception  of  Dr.  Franklin  and  his  associates  in  the 
Pennsylvania  delegation,  who  are  understood  to  have  cast  a 
formal  vote  out  of  deference  to  him,  it  was  thought  best  to  pro- 
vide a  dual  representative  assembly.  Every  act  of  the  legislature 
was  to  be  twice  considered  and  have  the  approbation  of  two  dif- 
ferent, separate  houses. 

Second,  these  two  houses  were  to  have  a  different  constitu- 
ency. So  every  proposed  law  must  run  the  gauntlet  of  two  di- 
verse interests  and  be  judged  from  at  least  two  points  of  view. 
Every  state  in  the  construction  of  its  legislature  has  maintained 
these  two  principles.  The  American  people,  I  suppose,  are  flow 
agreed  upon  them  with  substantial  unanimity. 

Third,  the  Senate  is  expected  to  represent  the  equality  of  th-^ 
states.  This  is  the  one  principle  which  would  never  have  been 
yielded  by  a  majority  of  the  states  when  the  constitution  was 
made,  and  which  has  been  made  eternal  as  far  as  possible  by  the 
provision  that  it  shall  not  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  every 
state. 

Fourth,  the  Senate  was  to  represent  deliberation  in  the  ex- 
pression of  the  popular  will  by  the  length  of  the  term  of  office  of 
senators  and  by  its  removal  from  the  direct  popular  vote  in  the 
method  of  choice.  It  is  this  point  at  which  the  Senate  is  now 
attacked. 

The  constitution  of  the  Senate  secures  the  applications  of  all 
these  principles  in  the  four  great  constitutional  functions  of  the 
national  government — in  legislation,  in  the  making  of  treaties, 
in  the  appointment  of  the  great  executive  officers,  and  in  im- 
peachment. The  last  of  these  powers  has  happily  not  often  been 
resorted  to  in  our  history,  but  was  regarded  by  the  framers  of 
the  constitution  as  essential  for  the  security  of  the  whole.  As 
James  Monroe  well  said : 

The  right  of  impeachment  and  of  trial  by  the  legislature  is  the 
mainspring;  of  the  great  machine  of  government.  It  is  the  pivot 
on  which  it  turns.  If  preserved  in  full  vigor  and  exercised  with 
perfect  integrity.  «>vory  branch  will  perform  its  duty. 

Each  of  these  the  Senate  shares  with  other  departments  of 


52  ELECTION   OF 

»  the  government,  and  to  each  of  them  it  contributes  the  great 
and  conservative  principle  which  our  fathers  thought  essen- 
tial to  secure  to  all  generations  and  amid  all  popular  temptations 
and  excitements  the  government  they  framed  against  the  evils 
by  which  all  former  republics  had  perished. 

The  constitution  also  carefully  provides  in  the  case  of  the 
Senate,  as  in  the  case  of  the  House,  that  the  manner  of  the 
election  shall  be  prescribed  by  the  authority  of  the  nation  for 
whom  the  persons  selected  are  to  legislate. 

It  will  be  seen,  I  think,  very  clearly  that  the  change  pro- 
posed destroys  the  essential  character  of  the  Senate  in  each  of 
these  particulars. 

It  substitutes  a  direct  election  by  the  people  for  an  election 
by  the  legislature. 

For  a  selection  by  public  officers  to  whom  the  great  public 
duty  of  state  legislation  is  intrusted  there  is  to  be  a  selection 
and  nomination  by  conventions  composed  of  persons  without 
other  responsibility.  This,  in  most  cases,  will  be  the  mode  in 
which  the  majority,  practically,  will  make  its  choice. 

For  a  selection  by  men  who  are  themselves  selected  under 
strict  legal  provisions  there  is  to  be,  therefore,  practically  a  selec- 
tion by  men  who  are  not  chosen  in  pursuance  of  any  law. 

Instead  of  selection  by  men  under  oath  of  office  there  must 
be  a  choice  by  men  upon  whom  no  oath  is  imposed. 

For  a  selection  by  men  of  whose  action  there  is  a  record 
the  choice  is  practically  to  be  made  by  men  of  whom  no  record 
exists. 

For  a  choice  in  a  manner  prescribed  by  national  authority, 
selection  will  be  made  by  men  who  may  act  by  proxy. 

For  a  choice  by  a  permanent  body  there  must  be  a  choice  by  a 
body  lasting  but  a  day. 

For  a  choice  in  a  manner  prescribed  by  national  authority, 
there  must  be  a  choice  in  a  manner  prescribed  in  no  authority 
whatever. 

For  a  choice  by  a  body  acting  by  majorities,  there  must  be 
substituted,  in  the  end,  a  choice  by  a  plurality. 

For  a  choice  by  a  body  representing  all  localities  in  a  state 
where  different  local  interests  are  fairly  represented,  there  must 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  53 

be  a  choice  by  sheer  force  of  numbers,  where  the  popular  masses 
in  great  cities  will  have  an  undue  and  disproportionate  weight. 

Instead  of  representing  different  constituencies  to  secure  the 
different  interests  in  legislation,  the  Senate  and  the  House  are 
to  represent  constituencies  of  the  same  kind,  differing  only  in 
size. 

From  the  changfe  in  the  manner  of  election  will  surely  and 
inevitably,  in  my  judgment,  follow  the  destruction  of  the  equal- 
ity of  the  states  in  the  Senate.  It  is  true  the  constitution  now 
provides  that  no  state  shall  be  deprived  of  its  equal  vote  in  the 
Senate  without  its  consent.  But  this  provision  relates  to  a 
Seriate  to  be  constitutional  and  selected  in  the  old  constitutional 
manner,  and  will  never  be  long  tolerated,  in  my  judgment,  by  the 
large  states  under  the  proposed  arrangement. 

The  state  legislatures  are  the  depositories  of  the  sovereignty 
of  the  states.  They  are,  in  theory,  and  I  believe  in  general  in 
fact,  composed  of  the  picked  and  chosen  men  of  the  communities 
from  which  they  come.  The  men  who  make  up  the  state  legisla- 
tures are  chosen  by  their  neighbors.  They  are  chosen  by  men 
who  know  them  or  can  know  them.  There  have  been  excep- 
tions, but  in  general  they  have  been  honest,  wise,  faithful,  and 
just.  The  pages  of  the  statute  books  of  the  forty-four  com- 
monwealths are  in  general  without  a  stain.  They  can  be  read 
by  the  patriot  without  a  blush.  I  am  not  afraid  to  compare  them 
with  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  Parliaments  through  which,  for 
eight  hundred  years,  the  freedom  of  England — 

Has   broadened   slowly  down. 
From  precedent  to  precedent. 

There  have  been  many  things  we  might  well  wish  were  other- 
wise. In  the  chambers  where  all  men  are  equally  represented, 
what  is  worst  as  well  as  what  is  best  of  humanity  will  some- 
times find  its  representative.  The  ambition,  the  love  of  power, 
the  party  spirit,  the  private  greed,  the  popular  passion,  injustice, 
and  tyranny  will  occasionally  appear  there  as  elsewhere.  In 
what  spot  in  human  history  are  they  not  found?  But  I  am 
willing  to  take  the  legislation  of  any  American  state  which  is 
a  quarter  of  a  century  old  and  compare  it  with  the  legislation 
of  any  government  possessing  a  legislature  in  any  period  of  its 


54  ELECTION    OF 

history.  Why,  in  the  British  House  of  Commons  Disraeli  said 
that  long  after  the  close  of  the  American  war,  and  within  the 
memory  of  men  who  heard  him,  a  member  of  the  government 
stood  below  the  gangway  at  the  final  adjournment  of  the  Parlia- 
ment and  gave  a  £500  note  to  every  member  who  had  supported 
the  administration. 

You  and  I  can  well  remember  when  bribery  was  a  common 
and  necessary  method  of  getting  a  seat  in  the  English  House 
of  Commons.  But  ( English  constitutional  liberty  and  English 
constitutional  government  have  not  proved  a  failure. 

Do  you  propose  to  strip  the  state  legislatures  of  any  other 
function  of  their  sovereignty?  Can  you  not  trust  the  men  who 
make  all  the  laws  upon  which  the  safety  of  property,  the  mar- 
riage relation,  the  security  of  the  home,  the  administration  of 
the  schools,  taxation,  freedom  of  religion,  the  punishment  of 
crime,  and  everything  else  which  enters  into  the  comfort  and 
honor  of  private  life  are  depending  with  the  choice  of  senators 
because  my  honorable  friend  from  Illinois  thinks  that,  in  the  ex- 
perience of  the  people  of  ^hat  excellent  state,  the  selection  of  sen- 
ators under  existing  conditions  has  been  unsatisfactory? 

What  is  the  alternative,  and  what  must  be  the  alternative? 
What  is  the  alternative  proposed?  What  must  be  the  necessary 
and  only  alternative  that  can  be  proposed  for  the  exercise  of 
this  great  function  of  local  sovereignty?  The  state  legislature 
is  a  failure,  we  are  told,  and  is  not  fit  to  be  trusted  any  longer. 
Who  are  to  nominate  our  senators?  To  whom  is  the  practical 
selection  to  be  intrusted?  Whatever  may  be  the  theory,  the  vot- 
ing population  of  the  state  of  New  York,  or  of  the  10.000,000 
who  within  the  lifetime  oi  some  of  us  will  dwell  within  the 
borders  of  that  imperial  commonwealth,  are  not  expected  to 
gather  together  and  put  in  nomination  a  senator  by  direct  ac 
tion.  No  one  hall  will  quite  hold  them,  even  were  it  as  flexi- 
ble and  expansive  as  the  court  room  when  naturalization  is  go- 
ing on. 

The  practical  choice  of  the  senator  must  be  made  by  nomi- 
nating conventions.  Are  not  these  bodies  quite  as  likely  to 
be  susceptible  to  mistakes  or  to  corrupt  manipulation  as  a  state 
legislature?  They  gather  together  at  midday,  chosen  by  no  con- 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  55 

stituency  whose  action,  or  even  the  freedom  or  purity  of  whose 
choice,  can  be  regulated  by  law.  The  men  who  gather  are  to 
perform  but  a  single  function,  to  which  there  is  attached  ordi- 
narily little  responsibility.  They  can  not  be  instructed  by  their 
constituents.  Their  functions  may  be  exercised  by  proxy.  They 
are  not  amenable  in  their  individual  action  to  a  sound  public 
opinion. 

There  is  no  record  of  the  individual  vote,  or  any  means  of 
correcting  a  mistake  or  fraud.  They  gather  in  the  morning,  and 
disperse  when  the  mists  of  evening  rise.  And  it  is  to  these 
bodies  that  the  choice  of  the  men  who  are  to  compose  what  we  are 
fond  of  calling  the  most  august  body  on  earth  is  practically 
and  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  to  be  committed.  It  is 
these  bodies  who  are  fitter  to  be  trusted  than  the  legislatures 
to  whom  all  the  dearest  interests  of  the  people  of  the  states  are 
committed. 

Cicero,  in  his  oration  for  Lucius  Flaccus,  attributes  the  de- 
cay of  Roman  and  the  destruction  of  the  Grecian  liberty  to  the 
substitution  of  the  turbulent  popular  assembly  for  the  delib- 
erative chamber  in  wi  Iding  the  political  power  of  the  state. 
He  has  left  his  terrible  picture  of  the  popular  assemblies  of  his 
time  as  a  pregnant  lesson  for  all  mankind. 

It  may  be  said  that  governors  and  state  officers  and  repre- 
sentatives in  Congress  are  selected  in  this  way  now.  That  is 
true.  But  have  all  nominations  of  governors  and  representatives 
in  Congress  been  on  the  whole  more  satisfactory  to  the  people 
than  the  selection  of  senators  for  one  hundred  years?  I  think- 
that  when  any  one  of  us  wishes  to  arouse  the  state  pride  of  the 
people  he  represents  by  enumerating  the  great  men  who  have 
adorned  their  history  we  find  that  the  names  of  the  men  who 
have  sat  in  these  seats  arise  to  our  lips  quite  as  naturally  as 
the  names  of  the  governors  or  the  representatives  in  Congress, 
however  illustrious. 

When  my  colleagues  here  or  my  colleagues  in  the  other  house 
wish  to  stir  the  hearts  of  a  Massachusetts  audience  they  are 
quite  as  likely  to  speak  of  Webster,  and  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
of  Charles  Sumner,  of  Rufus  Choate,  or  George  Cabot,  and  of 
Edward  Everett  and  John  Davis  as  of  anyone  in  our  list  of 


56  ELECTION    OF 

governors,  excellent  as  that  list  has  been.  Is  there  any  other 
state  of  which  the  same  is  not  true?  And  nearly  every  one  of 
the  great  men  who  have  been  elected  to  the  House  by  the  choice 
of  the  people  has  also  sat  in  the  Senate.  The  people  who  by  any 
constitutional  method  of  choice  will  in  any  generation  send  to 
this  chamber  an  ignoble  or  unworthy  senator  will,  I  will  ven- 
ture to  say,  be  found  to  have  at  the  same  time  no  better  tim- 
ber in  their  executive  chair  or  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
It  is  a  little  difficult  for  a  member  of  this  body,  without 
some  violation  of  good  taste  or  self-assertion,  to  state  what  we 
all  think  of  the  character  which  the  Senate  has  maintained  from 
the  beginning  of  the  government  and  of  its  title  to  the  con- 
fidence of  the  people.  But  I  am  not  afraid  or  ashamed  to  in- 
vite a  comparison  of  the  men  who  have  sat  in  these  seats  and 
represented  my  own  commonwealth,  down  to  the  date  when  the 
present  senators  took  their  places,  with  any  line  of  dukes,  bar- 
ons, or  princes,  or  emperors,  or  popes  who  have  successively 
filled  the  seats  of  any  legislature  or  the  executive  chair  of  any 
commonwealth,  whether  these  persons  held  their  titles  by  vir- 
tue of  the  noble  descent  or  royal  favor  or  of  the  favor  of  the  peo- 
ple themselves. 

1  do  not  believe  the  people  of  Massachusetts — and  the  same 
challenge  may  be  given  with  confidence  in  behalf  of  any  other 
American  state  that  has  a  history — will  accept  this  invitation  to 
change  the  method  of  choosing  the  senators,  which  depends,  as 
I  have  said,  not  only  upon  the  claim  that  the  legislatures  are  un- 
fit to  be  trusted  with  this  duty,  which  is  one  among  the  chief - 
est  functions  of  sovereignty,  but  that  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  has,  upon  the  whole,  been  a  failure. 

I  do  not  believe  the  people  of  Massachusetts  are  quite  ready 
to  discredit  their  own  general  court  with  its  two  hundred  and 
sixty  years  of  legislative  history,  and  give  their  confidence  in- 
stead to  a  political  convention  which  gathers  in  the  morning 
and  disperses  when  the  mists  of  evening  arise,  whose  members 
are  without  an  oath  of  office,  without  a  record,  without  legal 
restraint  upon  their  election,  who  have  no  accountability  to 
their  representatives,  or  to  anybody,  without  even  the  require- 
ment that  thev  shall  be  citizens. 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  57 

And  I  do  not  believe  that  they  are  quite  prepared  to  say 
that,  on  the  whole,  they  are  ashamed  of  the  senators  who,  by 
the  free  choice  of  their  legislatures,  have  for  a  hundred  years 
represented  them  in  this  great  national  council. 

It  is  a  poor,  cheap  flattery  of  trie  people,  this  notion  that 
suffrage  is  to  be  deified  and  that  the  results  of  suffrage  are  to 
be  degraded ;  that  the  people  have  all  wisdom  and  all  honesty, 
but  that  their  trusted  agents  are  to  be  bought  or  cajoled.  Will  it 
not  be  the  same  people  who  choose  the  senators  and  who  choose 
the  legislatures?  Is  there  any  evil  influence  which  will  oper- 
ate upon  the  legislature  which  will  not  operate  with  like  effect 
upon  the  convention  ? 

But  it  is  said  that  the  choice  of  a  nominating  convention 
is  but  the  first  step ;  any  mistake  it  may  make  will  be  corrected 
by  the  people.  But,  Mr.  President,  except  in  most  extreme  cases, 
the  correction  must  be  worse  than  the  evil  which  is  to  be  cured. 

At  what  cost  are  the  people  to  vote  down  the  nomination 
made  by  the  convention  of  the  party  which  is  in  the  majority 
because  of  their  disapproval  of  a  man  who  is  its  candidate  for 
the  senate?  Of  course,  the  plurality  system  will  be  applied  to 
this,  as  to  every  popular  election.  The  people,  then,  must  man- 
ifest their  disapproval  of  an  unworthy  candidate  regularly  nom- 
inated only  by  transferring  their  support  to  the  candidate  of 
another  party.  It  is  not  likely  that  any  man  who  would  get 
the  nomination  of  his  party  convention  will  be  so  unpopular 
that  substantially  the  whole  membership  of  his  party  will  refuse 
to  support  him.  What  will  happen  will  be  the  choice  of  the 
candidate  of  another  party. 

Now,  what  does  this  mean?  It  means  that  the  people  of  a 
state  are  to  give  their  support  to  doctrines,  measures,  policies, 
political  principles  of  which  they  disapprove  solely  because  of 
their  opinion  as  to  the  individual  character  of  the  man  who 
represents  them.  We  have  a  party  in  Massachusetts  who  think 
a  protective  tariff  a  monopoly,  extortionate,  robbery,  and  plun- 
der of  the  many  for  the  benefit  of  the  few.  They  think  it  op- 
erates grievous  and  intolerable  injustice  in  its  application  to  the 
individual  citizen,  and  that  its  effect  upon  the  national  welfare 
is  immoral,  evil,  disastrous. 


58  ELECTION   OF 

And  yet  if  any  of  them  happen  to  think  that  a  man  nominat- 
ed by  their  party  to  represent  these  opinions  is  not  a  good  man, 
they  are  to  send  to  Washington  a  man  who  supports  all  of  these 
things  simply  because  of  their  opinions  as  to  an  individual  char- 
acter. They  must  prefer  a  man  who  makes  his  country  the 
instrument  of  robbers,  monopolists,  plunderers,  and  evil  man- 
agers of  finances,  who  is  amiable  and  honest  in  private,  over  a 
dishonest  and  unamiable  man  who  will  put  an  end  to  all  this 
iniquity. 

In  other  words,  the  correction  of  the  mistakes  made  by  the 
political  convention  is  only  to  be  made  at  the  cost  of  destroy- 
ing the  character  of  the  country  because  of  the  character  of  the 
candidate.  The  amiable  man  who  has  no  objection  to  dishon- 
est and  fraudulent  elections  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  unamiable 
man  who  wants  honesty  and  fairness  in  elections.  I  have  no 
doubt  but  that  in  extreme  cases  a  man  may  be  nominated  by 
mistake,  by  deception,  by  public  indifference,  as  a  candidate  of 
my  party,  whose  personal  character  is  such  that  it  would  be  my 
duty  to  refuse  him  my  support,  whatever  happened.  But  those 
cases  will,  I  believe,  be  extremely  rare,  and  if  the  disease  to  be 
remedied  be  wholly  evil,  the  remedy  itself  is  almost  as  bad. 

Mr.  President,  the  experience  of  our  first  century  has,  it 
seems  to  me,  most  amply  vindicated  the  constitutional  purpose, 
which  resulted  in  the  Senate.  It  is  not  expedient  to  have  two 
houses  both  directly  dependent  on  the  popular  will.  I  would 
not  speak  with  disrespect  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  Every 
American  who  knows  the  history  of  his  country  must  feel  a  just 
pride,  in  that  great  assembly,  which  has  been  and  will  hereafter 
be  the  direct  representative  of  the  people's  will.  The  names  of 
its  great  leaders — of  Clay,  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  and  of  Thad- 
deus  Stevens — rise  to  the  lips  when  we  would  stir  in  the  hearts 
of  any  American  assembly  the  emotion  of  national  pride  or  the 
love  of  constitutional  liberty. 

If  there  be  anything  in  its  conduct  which  at  any  time  im- 
presses the  thoughtful  observer  unpleasantly,  I  think  he  will  ad- 
mit that,  on  the  whole,  it  bears  comparison  with  the  French  As- 
sembly, or  the  great  representative  body  of  Germany,  or  even 
with  the  British  House  of  Commons.  But  the  constitution  of  that 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  59 

House  has  compelled  it  to  resort  to  many  devices  and  to  sub- 
mit to  many  inconveniences.  We  should  all  be  sorry  if  we  are 
compelled  to  submit  to  them  in  the  Senate.  The  freedom  of  de- 
bate in  the  House  of  Representatives  is  gone.  What  I  some- 
times think  is  even  of  more  importance,  the  freedom  of  amend- 
ment is  gone  also. 

Both  these  great  essentials  to  wise  and  honest  legislation  ex- 
ist only  to  a  very  limited  extent,  and  then  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
majority.  It  is  here  only  that  the  freedom  of  debate  is  secure. 

From  all  this  has  grown  up  the  most  pernicious  of  uncon- 
stitutional practices,  that  of  filibustering,  which  was  introduced 
originally  to  prevent  hasty  or  arbitrary  action  by  the  majority, 
but  is  now  used  to  prevent  or  overthrow  the  rule  of  the  major- 
ity altogether.  So  that  the  course  of  legislation  in  that  House 
to-day  is  this :  A  few  great  measures,  to  which  the  party  in  the 
majority  is  agreed,  are  carried  through  by  special  rules  adapted 
for  the  purpose,  the  minority  being  deprived  of  all  rights  of  rea- 
sonable debate  or  reasonable  amendment. 

All  other  measures,  however  important,  however  salutary, 
however  much  desired  by  the  majority  of  the  House  and  a  ma- 
jority of  the  people,  are  at  the  mercy  of  a  small  and  resolute 
minority.  .In  the  last  House  the  antioption  bill,  which  I  regard- 
ed as  an  evil  and  pestilential  measure,  and  the  bankruptcy  bill, 
which  I  regarded  as  a  wise  and  sanitary  measure  met  the  same 
fate  in  spite  of  the  desire  of  a  clear  and  large  majority  of  that 
body  for  their  passage.  This  condition  of  things  is  unrepubli- 
can  and  undemocratic,  and  if  continued  long  must  result  in  the 
overthrow  of  republican  government  itself. 

Another  evil  of  like  character  and  of  equal  magnitude  has 
grown  up  from  the  necessities,  or  the  fancied  necessities,  in  the 
transaction  of  business  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

The  question  whether  an  important  measure  shall  be  submit- 
ted to  the  House  for  consideration  has  to  be  determined,  not  by 
individual  members,  not  by  chosen  committees,  not  by  the  major- 
ity of  the  House  itself,  nor  even  by  its  unanimous  consent  in 
many  instances,  but  by  the  will  of  the  presiding  officer  alone.  He 
determines,  at  his  sole  volition,  what  members  shall  be  recog- 
nized and  what  measures  the  House  shall  be  asked  to  consider. 


60  ELECTION   OF 

It  is  notorious  that  many  measures  of  vast  importance,  many 
measures  of  relief  demanded  by  justice  and  by  the  national  good 
faith,  abide  session  after  session  and  Congress  after  Congress, 
having  received  the  support  of  this  body,  and  which  would 
have  received  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  other  if  they  could 
be  taken  up,  which  never  can  be  heard  in  that  House  because 
of  the  refusal  of  its  presiding  officer  to  submit  them. 

Now,  Mr.  President,  habits  like  this  in  the  conduct  of  legis- 
lation do  not  grow  up  and  keep  their  place  without  some  grave 
public  reason,  or  at  least  some  grave  public  necessity.  It  may 
be  that  a  body  which  represents,  as  does  that  House,  a  tem- 
porary and  sometimes  fleeting  popular  purpose  requires  such  re- 
straints and  chains  and  fetters  as  these  for  the  public  safety.  I 
think  we  may  well  pause  before  we  give  to  this  body  a  charac- 
ter which  will  require  such  obstacles  to  be  placed  in  the  path 
of  its  free  action.  The  time  may  come — some  of  us  thought  that 
it  was  near  at  hand — when  it  may  be  necessary  to  introduce  even 
here  a  rule  for  a  limited  and  carefully  guarded  cloture  in  debate, 

Every  member  of  this  body  would  regard  that  as  a  most  pain- 
ful necessity.  If  that  time  ever  comes,  it  will  be  because  rules 
established  for  the  protection  of  freedom  of  action  in  the  Senate 
have  been  abused  to  prevent  and  subvert  it.  But  I  hope  and 
believe  the  time  will  never  come  when  any  question  will  be  tak- 
en in  this  Senate  in  regard  to  which  every  senator  shall  not  have 
an  opportunity  to  express  fully  and  freely  his  opinion  in  debate, 
and  in  regard  to  which  he  shall  not  have  the  fullest  opportunity 
to  offer  amendments  as  seems  to  him  desirable. 

I  suppose  there  have  been  a  few  instances  of  corruption  of 
state  legislatures  in  the  election  of  senators.  In  a  few  cases  such 
attempts  have  been  exposed  and  failed  in  the  legislatures  them- 
selves. In  a  few  cases  they  have  been  detected  here.  In  very 
few,  indeed,  they  have  probably  been  successful.  I  thought  the 
Senate  touched  its  low-water  mark  when  a  few  years  ago  it  re- 
fused to  investigate  one  of  them.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  sup- 
pose that  nominating  conventions  will  be  much  more  easily  dealt 
with,  or  that  popular  elections  have  been  or  will  hereafter  be  any 
more  exempt  from  such  influences.  Have  popular  elections  in 
ancient  republics,  or  in  England,  or  here  been  freer  from  corrup- 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  61 

tion  than  elections  through  delegated  and  chosen  assemblies?  Mr. 
President,  there  will  never,  for  any  length  of  time,  be  venal  leg- 
islatures without  a  corrupt  people  behind  them. 

Besides,  there  are,  unhappily,  other  modes  of  destroying  the 
freedom  of  elections,  to  which  popular  elections  are  exposed, 
from  which  legislative  assemblies  are  free.  The  great  prize  of 
the  office  of  senator  is,  if  this  amendment  be  adopted,  to  be 
added  to  the  temptations  which,  unless  many  a  report  in  the 
other  House  be  without  foundation,  have  induced  in  very  many 
instances  in  our  history  false  counts,  fraudulent  naturalization, 
personation  of  voters,  fraudulent  residences,  forged  returns,  in- 
timidation, and  mob  violence.  These  attend  elections  in  great 
cities  and  in  states  where  race  differences  still  add  their  bitter- 
ness to  the  struggle  for  political  power. 

There  have  been,  it  is  estimated,  more  than  three  hundred  and 
twenty  contested-election  cases  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
They  have  been  the  scandal  and  reproach  of  our  political  history. 
Excepting  a  very  few  creditable  examples,  they  have  been  de- 
cided for  partisan  considerations,  as  like  cases  were  decided  in 
the  British  House  of  Commons  until  jurisdiction  was  transferred 
to  the  judges. 

I  suppose  it  is  not  intended  to  take  from  the  Senate  the 
power  to  judge  of  the  election  of  its  own  members.  Until  now 
the  contested-election  cases  in  the  Senate  have  in  general  de- 
pended upon  constitutional  or  legal  questions,  or  upon  facts  easily 
ascertained  and  established.  But  if  this  change  be  made,  the 
Senate,  in  every  close  election,  must  undertake  investigations 
which  will  range  over  an  entire  state.  A  contest  in  New  York, 
or  Pennsylvania,  or  Illinois,  or  Ohio  may  put  in  issue  the  legal- 
ity of  every  vote  cast  in  a  state  of  three  million,  or  five  million, 
or  perhaps,  within  a  generation,  of  ten  million  people.  There 
will  never  be  a  close  election  without  a  contest  here.  Unless 
human  nature  shall  change,  the  result  of  these  contests  will  de- 
pend on  partisan  considerations  and  will  shake  public  confi- 
dence in  the  Senate  to  its  very  foundation. 

Let  no  man  deceive  himself  into  the  belief  that  if  this  change 
be  made  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  will  long  endure.  An- 
other legislative  system  will  take  the  place  of  that  which  our 


62  ELECTION   OF 

fathers  devised  for  us,  and  which  for  a  hundred  years  has  been 
the  admiration  of  mankind.  The  method  of  election  is  indispen- 
sable to  secure  the  peculiar  quality  of  the  body  to  be  elected. 
The  change  will  lead  to  an  attempted  overthrow  of  the  equality 
of  the  Senate. 

The  states  never  consented  to  perpetual  equality  in  a  Senate 
made  up  in  any  other  way  or  on  any  other  principle  of  selection. 
They  never  agreed  that  there  should  be  forever  between  New 
York  and  Maine  an  equality  in  a  legislative  chamber  which  is 
only  a  house  of  representatives  made  up  of  differently  constituted 
districts.  In  twenty  years  the  state  of  New  York  will  have  ten 
millions  of  people,  with  a  vote  for  every  five  persons.  Do  you 
think  they  will  long  endure  to  submit  to  equality  in  legislation, 
in  the  making  of  treaties,  in  the  appointment  of  great  executive 
officers,  in  ^  the  power  to  punish  and  remove  great  offenders, 
in  the  making  of  war,  and  in  the  making  of  peace,  with  the 
8,000  voters  of  dwindling  Nevada,  when  the  two  states  are  simply 
two  representative  districts,  whose  only  difference  is  that  one  is 
two  hundred  and  fifty  times  as  large  as  the  other? 

New  York  submits  to  this  loyally  to-day.  She  has  pledged 
her  eternal  allegiance  to  the  constitution.  She  can  not  change 
it  without  the  consent  of  every  other  state.  It  is  so  nominated 
in  the  bond,  and  is  the  price  she  pays  for  being  the  Empire 
State  of  an  imperial  nation.  She  can  not  escape  it  without  a 
revolution.  But  open  to  her  this  door.  Tell  her  that  the  Sen- 
ate, as  Hamilton  and  Jay  conceived  it,  is  gone.  Tell  her  that 
it  is  no  longer  to  be  made  up  of  chosen  men,  selected  by  chosen 
men,  to  be  removed  one  degree  from  public  impulse  and  passion, 
and  representing  the  deliberate,  sober,  and  instructed  will  of  the 
people.  She  will  tell  you  that  her  constitutional  obligation  has 
gone  also  and  that  the  equality  of  the  states  in  the  Senate  may 
henceforth  be  abolished  or  modified  like  other  provisions  of  the 
instrument.  "I  never  promised,"  she  will  tell  you,  "to  submit  to 
it  forever  under  your  new  arrangement."  "Non  in  haec  foedera 
veni"  or,  as  my  great  predecessor  on  this  floor  used  to  translate 
it:  "I  made  no  such  bargain,  and  I  stand  no  such  nonsense." 

Various  methods  of  electing  senators  were  proposed  and  thor- 
oughly discussed  in  the  convention,  but  the  vote  for  the  present 


UNITED   STATES   SENATORS  63 

method  was  at  last  unanimous.  I  think  the  suggestion  of  an- 
other method  of  choice  is  of  quite  recent  origin  and  is  more 
the  outcome  of  circumstances  that  are  not  only  recent,  but  will 
be  temporary.  Chancellor  Kent,  volume  I,  page  225,  says: 

The  election  of  the  Senate  by  the  state  legislatures  is  also  a 
recognition  of  their  separate  and  independent  existence,  and  ren- 
ders them  absolutely  essential  to  the  operation  of  the  national  gov- 
ernment. 

The  Federalist,  number  62,  written  by  Hamilton,  says: 
It  is  equally  unnecessary  to  dilate  on  the  appointment  of  senators 
by  the  state  legislatures.  Among  the  various  modes  which  might 
have  been  devised  for  constituting  this  branch  of  the  government, 
that  which  has  been  proposed  by  the  convention  is  probably  the 
most  congenial  with  the  public  opinion.  It  is  recommended  by  the 
double  advantage  of  favoring  a  select  appointment  and  of  giving 
to  the  state  government  such  an  agency  in  the  formation  of  the 
federal  government  as  must  secure  the  authority  of  the  former,  and 
may  form  a  convenient  link  between  the  two  systems. 

Hamilton  adds  in  the  same  number  of  the  Federalist  : 

In  this  spirit  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  equal  vote  allowed  to 
each  state  is  at  once  a  constitutional  recognition  of  the  portion  of 
sovereignty  remaining  in  the  individual  states  and  an  instrument  for 
preserving  that  residuary  sovereignty.  So  far  the  equality  ought  to 


be  no  less  acceptable  to  the  large  than  to  the  small  states,  since  they 
are  not  less  solicitous  to  guard  by  every  possible  expedient  again 
an  improper  consolidation  of  the  states  into  one  simple  republic. 


The  convention  which  framed  the  constitution,  after  some 
consideration,  unanimously  rejected  the  plan  of  choosing  senators 
by  the  people,  and  unanimously  adopted  the  present  system. 
Judge  Story  (constitution,  section  704)  mentions  as  one  of  the 
reasons  that  this  "would  increase  public  confidence  by  securing 
the  national  government  from  any  encroachments  on  the  powers 
of  the  states." 

This  idea  deserves  to  be  dwelt  upon.  The  state  legislatures 
are  the  bodies  of  men  most  interested  of  all  others  to  preserve 
state  jurisdiction  —  more  than  the  governors,  who  may  be  ex- 
pected to  aspire  to  national  employments.  It  is  well  that  the 
members  of  one  branch  of  the  legislature  should  look  to  them 
for  their  re-election,  and  it  is  a  great  security  for  the  rights  of 
the  states.  The  state  legislatures  will  be  made  up  of  men  whose 
duty  will  be  the  administration  of  the  state  authority  of  their 
several  state  interests  and  the  framing  of  laws  for  the  government 
of  the  state  which  they  represent.  The  popular  conventions, 
gathered  for  the  political  purpose  of  nominating  senators,  may 
be  quite  otherwise  composed  or  guided.  Here,  in  the  state  legis- 


64  ELECTION    OF 

lature,  is  to  be  found  the  great  security  against  the  encroach- 
ment upon  the  rights  of  the  states. 

How  many  instances  there  have  been  in  our  history  in  which 
an  immediate  popular  vote  would  have  led  to  disastrous  conse- 
quences, but  the  sober  second  thought  of  the  people  has  led  to 
the  path  of  safety.  Mr.  Madison  said  in  the  constitutional  con- 
vention (see  Madison  Papers,  vol.  2,  p.  847)  : 

If  the  opinions  of  the  people  were  to  be  our  guide,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  say  what  course  we  ought  to  take.  No  member  of  the 
convention  could  say  what  the  opinions  of  his  constituents  were  at 
this  time,  much  less  could  he  say  what  they  would  think  if  possessed 
of  the  information  and  lights  possessed  by  the  members  here;  and 
still  less  what  would  be  their  way  of  thinking  six  or  twelve  months 
hence. 

Suppose    that    if,    instead    of    action    through    a    convention, 

the  adoption  of  the  constitution  itself  had  been  submitted  to  a 
direct  popular  vote,  it  would  have  been  rejected  by  a  majority  of 
the  states,  certainly  by  the  states  of  Connecticut,  Massachusetts, 
New  York  and  Virginia,  the  four  great  states  without  whose  co- 
operation the  establishment  of  national  government  would  have 
been  impossible.  How  many  times  great  waves  of  delusion  have 
swept  over  the  land,  whose  force  was  broken  by  the  sober  dis- 
cussions of  deliberative  assemblies.  The  great  anti-Masonic  move- 
ment of  1835,  the  Know-Nothing  movement  of  1854  and  the 
years  that  followed  are  but  two  out  of  many  examples. 

Neither  Charles  Sumner  nor  Salmon  P.  Chase  could  have 
been  elected  by  a  popular  vote  when  they  were  first  chosen.  Mr. 
Sumner  certainly  would  have  gone  down  before  the  Know- 
Nothing  movement,  which  he  so  bravely  breasted,  if  the  question 
of  his  re-election  had  been  submitted  to  a  popular  vote  in  Massa- 
chusetts in  1855.  It  is  quite  doubtful  if  Mr.  Webster  himself 
would  have  been  chosen  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  people  of  Massa- 
chusetts at  any  time  after  1850. 

It  is  the  purpose  and  the  effect  of  this  constitutional  amend- 
ment to  overthrow  state  autonomy  in  two  particulars,  in  regard 
to  which  the  state  is  to  be  bound  and  fettered  for  all  time  unless 
two-thirds  of  the  two  Houses  of  Congress  and  three-fourths  of 
the  states  shall  hereafter  consent  to  retrace  their  steps. 

First,  the  states,  in  many  instances,  distribute  their  political 
power  evenly.  The  people  are  representated  in  the  state  legisla- 
tures by  their  neighbors  and  associates,  by  men  whom  they  know 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  65 

and  whom  they  respect  and  who  represent  the  local  feeling. 

This  proposed  amendment  requires  the  voice  of  the  state  to 
be  uttered  by  masses  of  its  citizens,  and  removes  political  power 
to  the  great  masses  who  are  collected  in  our  cities.  Chicago  is 
to  cast  the  vote  of  Illinois,  Baltimore  of  Maryland,  New  York- 
City  of  the  state  of  New  York,  and  Cincinnati  of  Ohio.  The 
farmer  class,  which  now  have  their  just  weight,  will  be  out- 
weighed by  the  dwellers  of  the  great  towns  where  the  two  ex- 
tremes meet — great  wealth  and  great  poverty — and  combine  to 
take  possession  of  the  affairs  of  the  government. 

Second,  plurality  must  take  the  place  of  the  majority.  The 
opportunity  for  third  parties  to  have  a  just  and  reasonable  weight 
will  be  destroyed. 

Besides,  there  will  be  larger  opportunities  for  fraud  and 
crime  in  elections.  These  will  be  easy  to  commit  and  hard  to  be 
inquired  into. 

Mr.  President,  a  people  has  always  a  distinct  individual  char- 
acter. A  city,  a  state,  a  nation,  is  very  human.  It  has  its  hopes, 
its  fears,  its  passions,  its  tastes,  its  prejudices,  its  resentment, 
its  affection,  its  hasty  impulse,  its  sober  judgment,  its  deliberate 
will.  We  attribute  to  it  the  moral  qualities  of  patience,  endur- 
ance, and  self-sacrifice.  These  qualities  are  made  up  of  the  pre- 
vailing temper  of  the  men  and  women  who  possess  them,  but 
they  are  of  a  higher  standard  than  is  attained  by  any  individuals 
except  the  best. 

The  Spartan  or  the  Swiss  or  the  American  quality  is  as 
\vell  known  and  as  individual  and  distinct  as  that  of  the  great 
heroes  of  history.  It  is  this  trait  that  causes  the  affection  which 
we  feel  for  our  country.  We  love  it  with  an  individual  love. 
We  cherish  it  with  a  supreme  affection.  Men  die  for  it  as  they 
would  die  for  wife  or  parent  or  children.  It  is  therefore  no 
dishonor  to  the  American  people  that  we  demand  that  in  the 
conduct  of  their  great  affairs  they  shall  do  what  every  wise  man 
and  every  good  man  and  every  brave  man  is  expected  to  do  in 
the  conduct  of  his  own. 

It  is  no  affront  to  the  American  people  to  require  that  they 
shall  be  asked  to  secure  that  deliberation,  that  caution,  that  put- 
ting aside  of  hasty  impulse  and  passion  in  their  important  affairs 


66  ELECTION    OF 

that  every  wise  man  practices  in  his  own.  The  republic  is  no 
mushroom  growth.  It  is  an  oak  which  adds  ring  to  ring  through 
many  a  summer's  heat  and  winter's  cold.  Its  glorious  gains  come 
slowly  that  they  may  come  surely.  The  deliberate  will  of  the 
people  is,  however,  sure  and  certain  of  accomplishment.  -  What- 
ever the  American  people  have  thoughtfully,  wisely,  and  pa- 
tiently considered  and  designed  and  resolved  upon,  that  result 
is  sure  to  be  accomplished.  And  our  present  constitutional  forms 
and  mechanisms  have  always  proved  abundantly  sufficient  for  its 
accomplishment.  And  it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  the 
great  beginnings  of  popular  movements  for  liberty  have  been  in 
the  Senate. 

Mr.  President,  it  is  not  true  that  the  Senate,  in  the  sober 
judgment  of  the  American  people,  has  failed  to  meet  the  just 
expectations  of  the  generation  who  framed  and  adopted  the 
constitution.  It  has  responded  quite  as  speedily  and  quite  as 
directly  to  the  sober  conclusion  of  the  popular  judgment  and 
to  the  settled  desires  of  the  popular  heart  as  has  the  other  House 
or  as  has  any  state  legislature. 

It  has  originated  far  more  than  its  proportion  of  the  great 
measures  in  our  legislative  history,  for  the  benefit  of  the  people, 
which  are  found  in  our  statute  books. 

It  has  resisted  what  is  evil,  but  it  has  also  initiated  and  ac- 
complished what  is  good.  This  was  never  more  true  than  in  re- 
cent years.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say — and  I  assert  it  without 
fear  of  successful  contradiction — that — 

If  any  private  citizen  wants  justice; 

If  any  executive  officer  wants  to  improve  administration; 

If  any  man  desire  new  and  wholesome  laws ; 

If  any  man  wants  the  public  mind  awakened  by  discussion — 
he  seeks  and  he  finds  what  he  desires  in  the  Senate.  Why,  even 
the  friends  of  this  amendment  to  the  constitution  come  here 
for  its  first  serious  discussion. 

It  is  said  the  recent  elections  of  senators  in  states  lately  ad- 
mitted have  been  attended  with  some  occurrences  that  tend  to 
bring  the  present  method  of  choosing  them  into  disrepute.  There 
has  been  no  investigation  into  this  matter.  No  man  here  can 
say  how  much  truth  there  may  be  in  these  reports,  in  the  charges 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  67 

of  suspicions  which  appear  in  the  columns  of  the  newspapers. 
The  fact  that  those  elections  have  resulted  in  a  way  some  of 
us  do  not  like  is  of  little  importance. 

The  only  questions  are  whether  whatever  evil  may  have  at- 
tended them  is  likely  to  be  permanent,  and  whether  the  same 
evils  would  not  have  existed  if  the  choice  had  been  by  popular 
election,  and  have  not  existed  to  an  equal  degree  in  the  choice  of 
governors  and  representatives  in  Congress.  When  we  consider 
the  circumstances  of  these  new  communities,  it  is  astonishing 
and  gratifying  that  they  have  done  so  well.  It  seems  to  me  that 
the  inauguration  of  their  governments  was  creditable  to  them. 
Their  population  is  spread  over  large  spaces  of  territory. 

The  people  of  the  different  parts  of  the  new  states  are  un- 
known to  each  other,  and  the  representative  or  senator  in  the 
state  legislature  is  frequently  little  known  to  his  constituents. 
Mingled  with  the  honest  and  enterprising  men  who  have  chosen 
their  residences  in  the  honorable  ambition  to  achieve  fortune 
for  themselves,  to  perform  every  duty  of  good  citizenship,  to 
build  on  sure  foundations  states  of  the  best  kind,  are  adventurers, 
criminals,  men  from  all  parts  of  this  continent,  and  from  Europe 
and  Asia,  some  of  whom  have  left  that  country  for  their  coun- 
try's good.  They  are  not  worse  than  other  communities  in  this 
respect,  but  they  have  less  opportunity  to  know  each  other.  They 
will  compare  most  favorably  with  the  dense  populations  of  some 
Eastern  cities.  But  the  people  of  this  class  are  there. 

These  communities  are  called  upon  to  take  upon  themselves 
the  great  function  of  government  under  circumstances  which 
would  have  rendered  success  impossible  to  our  ancestors  at 
Plymouth  or  Boston  or  New  Haven  or  Philadelphia.  Suppose 
that,  added  to  the  chosen  and  venerable  men  who  founded  the 
old  thirteen  states,  there  had  come  across  the  sea  adventurers 
from  all  Europe;  suppose  that  on  the  first  organization  of  their 
legislative  bodies  had  depended  the  political  ascendency  of  one  or 
the  other  of  the  contending  factions  who  were  struggling  for  the 
political  control  of  all  Europe;  suppose  that  every  passion  and 
ambition  and  jealousy  and  evil  desire  which  entered  into  such 
a  controversy  had  followed  them  into  their  new  domains  and 
had  blazed  even  more  fiercely  among  them;  suppose  men  of 


68  ELECTION    OF 

large  wealth  were  ready  to  corrupt  them  to  the  service  of  their 
own  personal  ambitions;  suppose  members  or  emissaries  of  the 
national  committees  of  great  parties  had  seated  themselves  with 
their  money  bags  at  their  gates— is  it  likely  that  the  Puritans  at 
Plymouth,  or  the  Cavaliers  of  Jamestown,  or  the  Quakers  of 
Philadelphia  would  have  succeeded  any  better  in  founding  their 
states  than  our  countrymen  and  brethren  in  the  far  west?  But 
ali  these  things  will  pass  by.  The  people  will  come  to  know 
each  other.  They  will  understand  their  permanent  interests. 
Combinations  of  dishonest  men  will  be  powerless  before  the 
honesty  and  intelligence  of  the  people.  Property  will  increase. 
Every  honest  and  industrious  man  will  get  his  share,  and  the 
interests  of  property  will  have  their  due  and  just  influence.  The 
people  will  choose  legislators  whom  they  are  willing  to  trust 
with  their  local  concerns,  and  so  fit  to  be  trusted  to  select  the 
men  who  are  to  wield  their  share  of  national  power. 

I  do  not  think  the  American  states  that  have  come  into  the 
union  within  the  last  twenty-five  years  have  any  reason  to 
shrink  from  a  comparison  with  any  others  in  respect  to  the  hon- 
esty, the  capacity,  the  industry,  the  fidelity,  or  the  wisdom  of 
the  men  who  have  represented  them  in  the  national  councils. 
While  I  have  differed  with  them,  or  with  most  of  them,  upon 
some  very  important  questions,  I  believe  that  if  we  had  had  a 
Senate  and  a  House  composed  wholly  of  the  representatives  of 
these  new  states  our  national  legislation  would  have  gone  on 
well,  and  would  have  been,  in  general,  acceptable  to  the  people 
of  the  whole  country. 

The  argument  of  the  able  senator  from  Illinois,  which  I 
have  read  with  much  care,  is  summed  up  in  three  propositions : 

First.  That  the  people  of  Illinois  believe  that  under  existing 
conditions  the  election  of  senators  by  their  state  legislatures  has 
failed  of  satisfactory  results. 

Second.  The  framers  of  the  constitution  did  not  properly 
estimate  the  intelligence  and  capacity  of  the  then  people  of  the 
several  states.  Most  of  the  members  of  the  convention  were 
themselves  still  under  the  influence  of  inherited  aristocratic  ideas, 
and  were  without  experience  of  the  successful  workings  of  popu- 
lar institutions. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  69 

Third.  The  legislature  of  Illinois  before  1847  was  omnipo- 
tent and  abused  its  great  powers.  The  constitution  of  1847  de- 
prived the  legislature  of  its  electoral  powers  and  conferred  ihe 
election  of  governor  and  judges  upon  the  people.  The  names 
of  the  illustrious  men  who  have  since  composed  the  supreme 
court  of  Illinois,  elected  by  the  people,  have  justified  the  highest 
hopes  of  those  who  favored  the  innovation. 

I  have  stated  these  propositions  in  the  senator's  own  lan- 
guage. They  contain  his  entire  argument.  Let  us  look  at  them. 
"The  election  of  senators  in  Illinois  under  existing  conditions," 
says  the  senator,  "has  failed  of  satisfactory  results."  He  invites 
us  to  a  contrast  with  the  results  obtained  by  popular  elections 
since  1847,  under  which  governors  and  illustrious  judges  have 
been  chosen  by  the  people. 

The  senators  of  Illinois  in  1847  were  Stephen  A.  Douglas 
and  Sidney  Bre.ese.  Does  the  senator  doubt  that  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  would  have  been  chosen  by  the  people  of  Illinois,  if 
the  question  had  been  submitted  to  them,  on  every  occasion  when 
he  was  chosen  by  the  legislature? 

Mr.  PALMER.  Will  the  senator  allow  me  to  answer  that 
question  ? 

Mr.  HOAR.     Certainly. 

Mr.  PALMER.  Judge  Douglas  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
chosen  by  the  people  at  any  time  except  at  his  last  election, 
when  the  popular  vote  was  against  him. 

Mr.  HOAR.  I  do  not  so  understand  it.  Was  not  Sidney 
Breese,  successively  justice  and  chief  justice,  one  of  the  most 
illustrious  of  the  illustrious  men  whom  the  senator  says  the 
people  of  Illinois  elected  to  the  bench?  They  were  succeeded 
by  James  Shields,  the  gallant  soldier  of  Irish  birth,  who  repre- 
sented three  states  in  this  body,  and  by  William  A.  Richardson. 
Will  it  be  claimed  that  either  of  these  eminent  men  would  not 
have  been  chosen  if  the  people  could  have  chosen  them?  Next 
came  Lyman  Trumbull  and  Richard  Yates.  Trumbull  was  elected 
by  the  people  to  the  supreme  bench  in  1848  and  Yates  was  gov- 
ernor. Then  came  Richard  Oglesby,  three  times  chosen  gov- 
ernor, and  John  A.  Logan,  the  most  illustrious  volunteer  soldier 
of  the  war  and  the  favorite  candidate  of  Illinois  for  the  presi- 


70  ELECTION   OF 

dency.  I  do  not  think  we  have  quite  yet  reached  the  ''failure 
under  existing  conditions." 

Next  we  have  David  Davis,  three  times  chosen  judge  by  the 
people,  who  came  at  last  to  the  Senate  from  the  bench  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  where  Abraham  Lincoln 
had  placed  him.  Can  the  senator  from  Illinois  place  his  ringer 
upon  one  of  this  illustrious  line,  who  did  grace  and  honor  to  the 
Senate,  who  was  not  among  the  foremost  citizens  of  his  noble 
state  or  who  would  not  have  been  chosen  if  the  choice  had  been 
by  the  people?  Then  comes  Cullom,  the  friend  and  pupil  of 
Abraham  Lincoln,  twice  governor  by  the  choice  of  his  fellow 
citizens,  as  he  has  been  twice  senator  by  the  choice  of  the  legis- 
lature. Has  the  senator  yet  reached  the  period  for  his  argument 
that  the  legislative  selection  of  senator  is  on. a  lower  level  than 
the  choice  of  the  people  for  governor  or  for  judge? 

There  remains  to  be  considered  the  case  of  the  senator  him- 
self. I  might  otherwise  feel  a  delicacy  in  discussing  it.  But  the 
facts  strongly  support  my  argument,  and,  as  stated  in  his  ample 
autobiography,  are  so  highly  creditable  to  him,  that  I  must  be 
pardoned  for  alluding  to  them.  After  a  career  of  brilliant  civil 
and  military  service,  and  after  having  been  tried  for  four  years 
in  the  office  of  governor,  he  was  nominated  for  governor  again 
in  1888.  The  ungrateful  people  of  Illinois  defeated  him  by  a 
majority  of  38,000  on  a  direct  popular  vote. 

Mr.  PALMER.  I  ask  pardon.  Will  the  senator  please  state 
again  the  majority? 

Mr.  HOAR.     Thirty-eight  thousand  in  1888. 

Mr.  PALMER.  My  colleague  [Mr.  CULLOM]  will  furnish 
different  figures. 

Mr.  HOAR.  I  have  taken  the  figures  very  carefully,  taking 
the  votes  of  all  other  parties. 

Mr.  CULLOM.  As  my  colleague  [Mr.  PALMER]  has  referred 
to  me,  I  will  state  that,  so  far  as  the  two  prominent  candidates 
were  concerned,  my  colleague  and  his  opponent,  Governor  Fifer, 
my  colleague  was  defeated  for  governor  by  about  12,500  votes, 
if  I  remember  correctly. 

Mr.  HOAR.  At  any  rate,  it  is  enough.  The  people  of 
Illinois  defeated  him  by  12,500,  without  counting  the  third  party 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  71 

or  the  fourth  party  vote ;  and  then  he  was  elected  senator  by  the 
legislature.  The  people  of  Illinois  elected  a  legislature  whose 
majority  was  originally  opposed  to  him.  But  on  conference  and 
comparison  of  views  he  was  finally  selected. 

Now,  if  the  senator  from  Illinois  means  to  affirm  that  this, 
the  latest  result  of  choosing  senators  in  Illinois  by  the  legis- 
lature, is  unsatisfactory  to  the  people,  we  who  know  the  value 
of  his  service  must  be  permitted  respectfully  to  dissent. 

The  senator  from  Oregon  [Mr.  MITCHELL]  has  brought  to  the 
discussion  of  this  interesting  question  the  great  industry  and  the 
great  ability  which  always  characterize  his  contributions  to  our 
debates.  I  have  carefully  read  his  argument  of  April  22,  1890. 
I  think  he  summed  up  in  that  all  the  chief  reasons  for  this 
change.  He  begins  with  a  history  of  the  proceedings  of  the  con- 
vention which  framed  the  constitution,  so  far  as  they  deal  with 
this  subject.  As  I  have  already  observed,  he  imputes  to  that 
convention  and  to  its  members  a  distrust  of  the  people.  I  differ 
from  him  in  that  opinion,  as  I  do  from  the  senator  from  Illinois 
[Mr.  PALMER],  who  utters  the  same  opinion. 

I  think  the  members  of  the  convention  exhibited  a  sublimer 
trust  in  the  people  than  any  other  body  of  men  who  have  been 
gathered  together  in  human  history.  They  were,  some  of  them, 
the  same  men  who  signed  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in 
1776.  They  were  inspired  by  the  same  faith  that  inspired  the 
Congress  which,  as  its  final  act,  ordained  that  great  security  of 
freedom — the  Ordinance  of  1787.  They  were  laying  the  deep 
foundations  of  what  was  hoped  would  be  an  eternal  structure. 
Every  stone,  every  beam,  every  rafter,  was  laid  in  confidence 
of  the  wisdom  and  the  justice  of  the  people  and  their  eternal 
capacity  for  self-government.  Trust  in  the  people  was  with 
them  an  article  of  profoundest  religious  faith.  They  derived 
the  great  doctrine  of  human  equality,  which  they  placed  in  the 
forefront  of  the  Declaration  which  made  us  a  nation,  from  the 
word  of  the  Creator  of  mankind  himself,  as  they  read  and  in- 
terpreted it. 

But,  as  I  have  already  said,  their  confidence  in  the  people 
was  like  the  confidence  we  feel  in  a  wise,  just,  and  righteous 
man.  capable  of  self-government  and  understanding  and  self- 


72  ELECTION    OF 

restraint,  who  in  the  great  actions  of  life  exercises  for  himself 
deliberation,  reflection,  self-control  It  was  the  immediate  action 
of  the  people  which  they  deprecated.  It  was  final  and  absolute 
self-control  and  self-government  which  they  ordained  and  se- 
cured. 

The  senator  from  Oregon  said  that  the  constitution  these 
men  ordained  has  required  amendment.  He  is  amazed  that  the 
amendments  were  not  understood  and  incorporated  in  the  con- 
stitution by  the  men  who  originally  framed  it.  But  the  senator 
has  failed  to  see  that  every  one  of  these  amendments,  from  the 
first  to  the  fifteenth,  is  an  amendment  in  the  direction  of  putting 
new  control  upon  the  immediate  and  direct  action  of  majorities. 
Every  one  of  them  secures  the  rights  of  the  people  by  a  restraint 
upon  their  power.  Every  one,  with  a  single  exception  in  the 
change  of  the  method  of  electing  the  president — adopted  after 
the  election  of  Mr.  Jefferson — both  the  original  twelve  and  the 
three  that  have  been  adopted  in  our  time,  are  simply  declarations 
of  those  things  which,  for  the  welfare  of  the  whole  people,  no 
majority  under  our  constitution  shall  be  permitted  to  do. 

The  senator  goes  on  to  announce,  as  the  foundation  of  his 
argument,  the  principle  that  no  system  can  be  properly  termed 
free  or  popular  which  deprives  the  individual  voter  of  his  right 
to  cast  his  vote  directly  for  the  man  of  his  choice  for  any  office, 
whether  it  be  a  state  officer,  member  of  the  national  House  of 
Representatives,  United  States  senator,  or  president.  And  the 
logic  of  his  position  compels  him  to  avow  this  doctrine.  So 
that,  if  the  people  go  with  him,  this  amendment  must  be  fol- 
lowed by  others,  under  which  the  United  States  judiciary  ami 
the  president  and  the  vice-president  are  to  be  chosen  by  the  ac- 
tion of  a  direct  popular  majority.  This  may  be  sound  policy;  but 
when  it  is  established,  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  is 
gone. 

The  senator  further  adds  that  in  his  judgment  lodging  this 
power  in  the  state  legislatures  tends  to  the  election  to  the  legis- 
lature of  a  man  solely  because  of  his  opinions  as  to  election  of  a 
senator,  and  the  "question  as  to  his  qualifications  for  the  busi- 
ness of  the  general  legislature,  or  the  views  he  entertains  with 
reference  to  the  great  material  interests  of  the  state — internal 


UNITED  STATES  SENATORS  73 

improvements,  assessments,  taxes,  revenues,  corporations,  appro- 
priations, trusts,  municipal  affairs,  salaries  and  fees  of  officers, 
civil  and  criminal  code,  apportionment,  and  other  like  important 
subjects — are  wholly  lost  sight  of." 

I  can  only  oppose  to  this  opinion  of  my  honorable  friend  my 
own  opinion  that  this  is  a  very  important  consideration  in  favor 
of  the  present  system.  I  think  that  it  is  best  to  commit  this  great 
function  of  choosing  the  members  of  this  body  to  the  deliberate 
itncl  careful  judgment  of  meit  who  are  trusted  with  every  other 
legislative  function  of  sovereignty,  and  not  to  adopt  a  method 
which  in  practice  will  commit  it  to  men  whom  the  people  trust 
with  nothing  else. 

Mr.  President,  if  you  take  from  the  men  who  now  represent 
the  sovereignty  of  the  state  in  all  its  domestic  relations  the  right 
to  choose  the  men  who  are  to  exercise  its  share  of  national  legis- 
lation, you  will  diminish  their  weight  and  character.  You  will 
get  for  the  discharge  of  both  duties  men  less  fitted  to  be  trusted 
with  either. 

The  senator  from  Oregon  says  that  he  finds,  as  a  chief  reason 
for  promoting  the  change — that  he  finds  everywhere  discontent 
and  unrest.  If  he  means  that  he  finds  everywhere  discontent 
\\ith  the  present  method  of  choosing  senators,  or  with  the  existing 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  or  even  among  thoughtful 
men  with  the  Senate  itself,  I  must  express  my  dissent  from  his 
opinion.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  any  intelligent  assem- 
blage of  American  people  will  unite  as  readily  and  enthusiastically 
in  praise  of  their  national  constitution  as  at  any  time  since  it 
went  into  operation.  I  believe,  if  called  upon  to  declare  what  it 
is  in  the  constitution  they  especially  value,  they  would  now, 
as  ever,  state  that  among  the  chief  titles  to  their  regard  are  the 
Senate  and  the  national  judiciary. 

If  the  senator  means  that  there  is  a  general  feeling  of  dis- 
satisfaction with  existing  conditions,  that  our  social  life  is  dis- 
turbed, that  the  classes  in  society  are  getting  into  conflict  with 
each  other,  that  the  people  are  in  that  frame  of  mind  which 
precedes  a  great  revolution — while  I  think  he  exaggerates  very 
much  the  state  of  feeling,  so  far  as  he  is  right  I  think  he  urges 
an  especial  reason  for  not  changing  the  constitution  to-day. 


74  ELECTION    OF 

Certainly  such  a  change  should  be  made  soberly,  quietly,  de- 
liberately, and  by  men  who  can  look  through  the  history  of  a 
century,  and  not  look  merely  at  the  fleeting  and  passing  evils. 

I  have  read  also  with  great  attention  the  argument  upon  this 
subject  by  the  accomplished  and  thoughtful  senator  from  In- 
diana [Mr.  TURPIE].  He  thinks  that  neither  of  the  three  de- 
partments of  the  national  government  is  now  controlled  by  the 
people.  If  he  means  that  the  choice  of  neither  is  directly  con- 
trolled by  the  people,  I  would  remind  him  that  not  only  one  of 
our  two  legislative  branches  is  the  direct  popular  choice  ac- 
cording to  numbers,  but  that  action  of  the  electoral  colleges  is, 
in  fact,  a  direct  expression  of  the  popular  will.  So  that  the 
House  of  Representatives,  which  shares  equally  with  the  Senate 
in  power  of  affirmative  legislation,  and  the  President,  with  his 
executive  and  treaty-making  powers  and  his  veto  upon  all  legis- 
lative action,  are  the  result  of  direct  popular  choice. 

If  he  means  that,  when  our  three  departments  of  govern- 
ment are  chosen,  their  action  should  be  the  result,  not  of  the 
individual  conscience  and  judgment  of  the  legislature,  of  the 
executive,  or  of  the  judge,  but  should  respond  to  the  present 
and  instant  pulsation  of  the  popular  heart,  I  answer  that  I  think 
he  is  wrong  in  desiring  a  government  so  constructed  or  admin- 
istered. 

If  the  senator's  doctrine  be  sound,  it  seems  to  me  it  should 
be  applied  everywhere ;  that  the  people  should,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, deliberate  for  the  legislature,  execute  for  the  officer,  and 
decide  for  the  judge.  If,  as  I  believe,  that  be  the  worst  and 
not  the  best  theory  of  government  on  earth,  the  doctrine  should 
be  applied  nowhere. 

Mr.  President,  the  senator  from  New  Hampshire  [Mr. 
CHANDLER]  well  said  that  this  is  the  first  change  ever  seriously 
proposed  in  the  framework  of  our  national  government.  All  the 
other  amendments  have  been  restraints  upon  the  people's  will 
to  secure  the  people's  rights.  The  amendment  in  the  time  of 
Mr.  Jefferson  only  required  the  designation  by  the  electoral 
college  of  the  offices  to  be  heJd  by  the  persons  for  whom  their 
votes  were  cast ;  a  change  shown  to  be  necessary  by  the  expe- 
rience in  the  famous  contest  between  Jefferson  and  Burr. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  75 

Never  before  has  there  been  proposed,  so  far  as  I  know, 
a  change  which  is  to  affect  the  great  balance  of  political  power 
which  our  fathers  adjusted  with  so  much  care.  I  quite  agree 
with  the  senator  from  Oregon  that  the  principle  of  this  change 
will  lead  to  the  choice  of  the  President,  the  choice  of  the  sena- 
tors, and  in  the  end  to  the  choice  of  the  judges  by  the  mere 
brutal  force  of  numbers.  I  do  not  agree  with  him  in  thinking 
such  a  change  is  desired  by  the  American  people.  When  it  shall 
be  accomplished,  the  American  constitution  is  gone. 

Mr.  President,  I  have  no  respect  for  the  habit  which  has 
long  since  grown  up  of  undervaluing  the  character  of  American 
legislative  assemblies.  Since  our  government  went  into  action 
it  has  been  the  habit  of  thoughtless  persons  or  of  persons  who 
in  their  own  lives  have  had  no  experience  in  public  respon- 
sibilities— the  habit  has  even  crept  into  grave  histories — to  decry 
and  disparage  the  Continental  Congress.  The  men  who  made 
•up  that  illustrious  body  began  their  services  with  the  great 
state  papers  which  commanded  the  admiration  of  Chatham,  who 
declared  that  although  he  had  read  Thucydides  and  was  familiar 
with  the  master  minds  of  the  past,  in  his  judgment  they  equaled 
anything  in  antiquity. 

These  papers — the  address  to  the  King,  the  address  to  the 
British  people,  and  the  address  to  the  people  of  Ireland — were 
followed  by  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  It  was  the  same 
Continental  Congress  whose  wisdom  selected  Washington  for 
the  command  of  our  armies  and  Franklin  and  John  Adams  for 
our  diplomatic  agents  abroad.  It  was  the  same  Continental 
Congress  which  stood  faithfully  by  Washington  during  the  seven 
years  of  the  Revolutionary  war,  which  ended  its  labors  with 
the  great  Ordinance  in  1787,  and  whose  members  composed  in 
large  part  the  body  which  framed  the  constitution  itself. 

Of  the  thirty-nine  men  who  signed  the  constitution,  eighteen 
signed  the  Declaration.  Ellsworth,  who  signed. the  Declaration, 
was  absent  when  the  constitution  was  completed.  Gerry,  who 
signed  the  Declaration,  refused  to  sign  the  constitution.  The 
failure,  if  there  were  any  failures  in  the  conduct  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary war,  was  the  failure  of  the  American  states,  who  were 


76  ELECTION    OF 

too  jealous  to  part  with  their  own  power  or  to  establish  and  trust 
the  necessary  agencies  for  their  own  protection  and  safety. 

The  legislature  of  my  own  state  has  had  two  hundred  and 
sixty  years  of  illustrious  history.  During  my  life,  while  the 
legislature  has  been  in  session,  it  has  been  the  target  for  the 
sneers  of  critics  and  of  the  press.  But  every  session  has  ended 
its  own  term  of  laborious  service,  completing  a  record  in  which 
always  is  to  be  found  some  new  and  valuable  legislation  for 
humanity,  for  labor,  for  education,  for  administration  of  jus- 
tice, which  is  alike  beneficial  to  their  own  constituencies  and 
an  example  to  the  people  of  other  commonwealths. 

I  am  neither  afraid  nor  ashamed  to  compare  the  statute 
book  in  which  is  found  the  essence  of  the  history  of  Massa- 
chusetts for  nearly  three  centuries  with  any  other  body  of  laws 
which  may  be  produced  by  any  other  commonwealth  or  by  any 
nation.  I  believe  the  men  who  have  done  this  work  have  per- 
formed also  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people  the  important  work 
of  selecting  their  representatives  in  the  national  Senate. 

Why,  it  is  said  the  Senate  has  not  responded  to  the  popular 
will.  When  has  it  failed  to  respond  to  the  popular  will  when 
the  popular  will  itself  had  become  settled?  The  gentlemen  who 
make  this  complaint  are  impatient.  They  must  remember  that 
the  Senate  has  to  act  for  the  interests  of  a  people  of  65,000,000 
and  for  a  nation  whose  life  is  to  be  measured,  not  by  years 
or  by  generations,  but  by  centuries.  Sessions  of  Congress, 
terms  of  presidential  office,  generations  of  men,  count  but  as 
minutes,  are  but  as  the  pulsation  of  an  artery  in  this  might}' 
national  life.  But  whenever  the  American  people  has  made  up 
its  mind,  when  its  judgment  is  formed,  when  its  will  is  deter- 
mined, that  will  is  sure  to  be  carried  into  effect.  Whether 
through  Senates  or  over  Senates,  through  courts  or  over  courts, 
through  presidents  or  over  presidents,  through  constitutions  or 
over  constitutions  the  irresistible  current  will  make  its  way. 

Mr.  President,  I  have  no  patience  with  the  spasms  of  dismay 
which  seem  now  and  then  to  affect  some  worthy  philosophers, 
and  the  effects  of  which  are  occasionally  seen  in  the  Senate 
chamber.  One  day  there  is  a  fear  that  a  few  speculators  in 
cotton  or  corn  will  diminish  the  price  to  the  seller  and  raise 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  77 

it  to  the  buyer;  and  so  we  are  asked  to  overthrow  and  sweep 
away  all  of  the  rights  of  the  states  by  a  single  legislative  act, 
and  a  majority  of  this  body  and  the  other  House  lose  their 
heads  and  are  taken  off  their  feet.  They  think  all  our  existing 
constitutional  resources  are  powerless  before  a  few  speculators. 
So,  because  a  few  millionaires  clink  their  money  bags  about 
our  state  legislative  halls,  it  is  proposed  to  overthrow  the  con- 
stitution of  our  fathers  and  build  up  a  pure  democracy  in  its 
place. 

The  American  people  have  dealt  with  dangers  that  were 
serious  before.  They  have  put  down  rebellion,  they  have  abol- 
ished slavery,  they  have  thrown  off  the  yoke  of  foreign  tyranny 
by  strictly  constitutional  processes,  and  with  the  weapons  in 
their  hands  that  have  served  them  so  well  in  the  past  they  have 
no  occasion  for  apprehension  of  these  new  dangers. 

Contempsi  Catilinea  yladios,  iiom  pertinescum  tuos. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  proud  of  their  history. 
It  is  a  touching  and  noble  story.  The  American  youth  knows 
something  of  the  annals  of  other  lands.  His  childhood  has  de- 
lighted in  the  half-fabulous  legends  by  which  they  explain  theii 
origin.  He  is  especially  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the 
older  republics  and  of  countries  where  constitutional  liberty  has 
in  other  years  found  its  home.  He  can  tell  you  something  about 
Solon  and  Lycurgus,  about  Romulus  and  the  she  wolf,  of  Numa 
in  his  cavern,  of  Tell  and  Winkelried,  of  Alfred  and  Edward, 
of  Agincourt  and  Cressy,  and  the  barons  who  wrung  Magna 
Charta  from  King  John. 

But'  he  better  loves  the  story,  with  which  no  romance  or 
fable  mingles,  upon  which  history  pours  its  full  and  blazing 
torchlight,  of  the  men  who  founded  these  states  of  ours  in 
Christian  liberty  and  law.  He  likes  better  to  hear  of  the  Pil- 
grim of  Plymouth,  of  the  austere  Puritan  of  Salem  and  New 
Haven,  of  the  liberty-loving  enthusiast  of  Rhode  Island,  of 
the  Quaker  of  Pennsylvania,  of  the  Catholic  of  Baltimore,  of 
the  adventurous  Cavalier  of  Jamestown.  He  knows  the  qual- 
ity of  the  woodsmen  who,  in  the  later  generations,  struck  their 
axes  into  the  forests  of  this  continent;  of  the  sailors  who  fol- 
lowed their  prey  from  the  Arctic  to  the  Antarctic  Sea.  He 


78  ELECTION    OF 

knows  how  his  country  has  spread  from  a  little  space  by  the 
side  of  the  Eastern  sea,  till  in  her  westward  march  the  gates 
of  the  East  become  visible  again,  and  she  has  added  to  her 
dominion  until,  as  my  late  colleague  said,  "before  the  sun  sets 
upon  Alaska  he  has  risen  upon  Maine."  He  knows  by  heart 
the  military  achievements  of  the  Revolution  and  the  great  sea 
fights  of  the  war  of  1812.  He  knows  what  this  country  has 
done  in  science  and  literature.  He  knows  what  her  inventive 
genius  has  added  to  the  world's  wealth  and  how  it  has  lifted 
the  burden  beneath  which  the  back  of  humanity  has  so  long  been 
bowed  and  bent. 

But  he  knows,  also,  something  of  that  which  makes  these 
great  achievements  permanent  and  secure.  He  knows  some- 
thing of  the  great  foundations  upon  which  the  structure  of  our 
constitution  is  reared.  He  knows  something  of  the  temperate 
restraints  of  American  liberty.  The  figures  of  great  judges  and 
of  great  senators  command  his  admiration  and  stir  his  en- 
thusiasm and  excite  his  sober  approbation  quite  as  much  as  any 
achievement  by  sea  or  any  military  glory  upon  land.  The  pro- 
found sagacity  of  Ellsworth,  whose  great  fame  in  the  beginning 
of  the  government  reached  the  people  even  from  within  the 
closed  doors  of  the  Senate  chamber ;  the  unequaled  wisdom  of 
Marshall,  without  whose  luminous  exposition  the  mechanism 
of  the  constitution  must  have  failed;  the  robust  sense  of  Taney; 
the  ripe  learning  and  lofty  patriotism  of  Bradley — these  will 
be  as  familiar  to  his  instructed  intelligence  as  the  name  of  any 
great  captain  or  admiral.  He  comes  of  a  race  of  political 
shipwrights,  and  he  knows  by  heart  below  and  aloft  the  whole 
structure  of  our  ship  of  state.  He  knows  to  the  fullest  depths 
of  its  meaning  what  the  flag  stands  for.  He  knows  how  to 
bend  the  sails  and  step  the  masts.  He  likes  only  too  well  the 
sound  of  the  guns.  But  he  has  found  out  that  it  is  not  the 
colors,  or  the  armament,  or  even  the  sail  that  makes  the  ship 
stanch  and  the  voyage  prosperous  and  secure.  It  is  the  tough 
resistance  of  the  mast,  the  strength  of  the  timbers,  the  fashion 
of  the  keel,  the  strength  below  the  water  line,  the  chain  and 
the  anchor  to  which  the  ship  of  state,  with  her  precious  freight, 
owes  her  safety. 


OF 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  79 

He  knows  what  master  laid  her  keel; 
What  workmen  wrought  her  ribs  of  steel; 
WTho  made  each  mast,  and  sail,  and  rope; 
What  anvils  rang,  what  hammers  beat, 
In  what  a  forge  and  what  a  heat 
Were  shaped  the  anchors  of  her  hope! 
He  fears  no  sudden  sound  or  shock, 
'Tis  of  the  wave,  not  of  the  rock; 
'Tis  but  the  flapping  of  the  sail, 
And  not  a  rent  made  by  the  gale! 

I  said  in  the  beginning  that  this  is  a  question  of  centuries 
and  not  of  years.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  men  who  framed 
the  constitution  that  they  so  understood  it.  If  they  had  taken 
counsel  of  their  own  recent  experience,  they  never  would  have 
ventured  to  appeal  to  the  people  of  their  own  generation  to 
establish  the  permanent  securities  of  the  constitution,  and 
would  never  have  ventured  to  trust  them  with  the  powers  which 
the  constitution  creates. 

The  six  years  which  followed  the  peace  of  1783  present  but 
a  sorry  story.  It  is  a  tale  of  feeble  government,  of  disaster, 
ot  discontent,  of  broken  faith,  of  depreciated  currency,  of  stay 
laws,  of  suffering  debtors,  of  cheated  creditors,  of  lawlessness, 
of  Shays's  rebellion,  and  of  popular  commotions  North  and 
South.  Some  of  our  best  friends  abroad  thought  it  was  all  over 
with  us,  and  that  the  best  thing  we  could  do  was  to  ask  George 
III  to  take  us  back  into  favor.  But  out  of  it  came  the  Ordi- 
nance of  1787,  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  design 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  conception  of  the  Senate,  the  great 
debate  upon  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  and  the  adoption 
of  the  constitution  by  the  unanimous  action  of  thirteen  states. 

We  have  had  one  great  civil  war.  But  yet  it  is  our  glory, 
as  it  is  the  glory  of  the  country  from  which  our  ancestors  came, 
that  we  determine  the  differences  which  cause  revolutions  else- 
where by  debate  and  not  by  arms.  We  reason  them  out,  and 
do  not  fight  them  out.  This  chamber  has  been  the  most  con- 
spicuous arena  of  these  conflicts.  Here  the  champions  have  en- 
countered and  measured  their  strength.  There  have  been  chief- 
tains in  the  Senate  chamber  whose  names  and  memory  the 
American  people  cherish  with  pride  and  gratitude,  as  they 
cherish  the  names  and  memory  of  the  men  who  marshaled 
the  forces  at  Saratoga  or  Yorktown,  or  New  Orleans,  or  Ap- 
pcmattox. 


8o  ELECTION    OF 

The  great  conquests  which  gave  the  union  and  constitution 
their  empire  over  the  reason  and  affection  of  our  countrymen 
have  been  achieved  here.  Here  Webster  hurled  the  weighty 
projectiles  of  his  irresistible  argument.  Here  the  voice  of  Clay 
taught  his  countrymen  North  and  South  the  great  lesson  of 
reconciliation.  Here  Calhoun  was  borne  in  his  dying  hours, 
his  great  heart  overcoming  the  weakness  and  infirmities  of  his 
sinking  body,  sitting,  as  his  colleagues  said,  like  "a  wounded 
eagle,  with  his  eyes  turned  to  the  heavens  to  which  he  had 
soared,  but  into  which  his  wings  could  never  carry  him  again." 
Here  the  blood  of  Sumner  was  shed — the  baptismal  water  of 
our  newer  liberty.  Here  Seward  summoned  his  countrymen 
to  that  irrepressible  conflict  from  whose  issue  the  vanquished 
gained  even  more  than  the  victors.  Victories  in  arms  are  com- 
mon to  all  ages  and  to  all  nations.  We  do  not  excel,  and  it  may 
be  we  do  not  equal,  other  people  in  these  things.  But  the  great- 
est victories  of  constitutional  liberty  since  the  world  began  are 
those  whose  battle  ground  has  been  the  American  Senate  and 
whose  champions  have  been  the  senators  who  for  a  hundred 
years,  while  they  have  resisted  the  popular  passions  of  the  hour, 
have  led,  represented,  guided,  obeyed,  and  made  effective  the  de- 
liberate will  of  a  free  people. 

Congressional  Record.  26:  7763-6.  July  20,  1894. 
Stephen  A.  Northway. 

It  is  expected  that  we  shall  get  abler  men  in  the  Senate 
under  the  proposed  system  of  election  than  now.  I  should  like 
to  know  how  any  improvement  can  be  expected  in  that  respect, 
because  at  present  three-fourths  of  the  senators  are  graduated 
from  this  body  [the  House]  and  were  the  election  made  by  the 
people,  the  other  portion  of  the  senators  might  be  supplied  by 
members  of  this  House  if  they  should  have  their  ambitions 
fulfilled.  I  should  like  to  know  why  the  Senate  would  be 
stronger  in  ability  if  senators  were  chosen  directly  by  the  people 
than  it  is  to-day. 

Unless  my  memory  misleads  me,  I  have  seen  as  many  news- 
paper charges  in  regard  to  members  of  Congress  having  bought 
their  way  into  this  body  as  I  have  seen  of  such  charges  affect- 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  81 

ing  senators — I  mean  as  many  in  proportion  to  the  greater  num- 
ber of  members  in  the  House. 

Do  you  suppose  that  if  they  are  Republicans  they  would  be 
able  to  hold  their  seats  by  fraud  with  Democrats  ready  to  at- 
tack them?  Do  you  suppose  that  senators  guilty  of  this  charge 
would,  if  Democrats,  be  permitted  to  hold  their  seats  there  with 
the  Republicans  ready  to  attack  them?  Such  charges  may  be 
made  for  political  purposes,  but  they  are  difficult  to  be  proved. 

Congressional  Record.  26:  7775-6.  July  20,  1894. 
William  J.  Bryan. 

We  all  recognize  that  there  is  a  reason  for  the  election  of 
senators  by  a  direct  vote  to-day  that  did  not  exist  at  the  time 
the  constitution  was  adopted.  We  know  that  to-day  great  cor- 
porations exist  in  our  states,  and  that  these  great  corporations, 
different  from  what  they  used  to  be  one  hundred  years  ago, 
are  able  to  compass  the  election  of  their  tools  and  their  agents 
through  the  instrumentality  of  legislatures,  as  they  could  not 
if  senators  were  elected  directly  by  the  people. 

We  are  told  that  we  must  not  change  the  constitution  be- 
cause it  is  a  sacred  instrument.  He  who  would  make  such  al- 
terations as  changed  conditions  necessitate  is  a  better  friend 
to  the  constitution  and  to  good  government  than  he  who  de- 
fends faults  and  is  blind  to  defects. 

Our  state  constitutions  are  frequently  changed,  and  neces- 
sarily so,  since  circumstances  change  from  year  to  year.  Penn- 
sylvania has  had  four  constitutions,  Missouri  four,  Texas  three, 
Virginia  five,  etc.  Each  generation  is  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment, and  must  suit  to  its  peculiar  needs  the  machinery  of  gov- 
ernment and  the  laws. 

Congressional  Record.  28:  1382-5.  February  6,  1896. 
David  Turpie. 

An  examination  of  our  internal  political  history  will  show 
that  ever  since  the  organization  of  parties,  at  the  close  of  the 
second  administration  of  Washington,  there  has  always  been  a 
third  party.  It  has  a  right  to  be  there,  but  it  is  owing  to  our 
present  imperfect  mode  of  choosing  senators  that  its  presence 


82  ELECTION   OF 

becomes  so  potential,  and  that  its  power  becomes  vital,  crucial, 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  small  number  of  voters  who  at  the 
polls  are  known  as  its  adherents. 

Whether  the  state  of  political  equilibrium  in  our  legislatures, 
now  so  frequent,  arises  from  the  presence  and  action  of  a  third 
party  or  from  the  personal  divisions  and  private  discussions 
in  one  or  the  other  of  the  principal  parties  there  represented,  the 
result  is  the  same — the  failure  to  choose,  or  the  compulsory 
choice  of  some  one  not  preferred  by  and  not  representative  of 
the  wishes  and  opinions  of  the  greater  number.  The  election 
of  United  States  senators  by  a  plurality  vote  of  the  people  would 
instantly  remove  this  growing  evil,  and  would  immediately  re- 
store and  perpetuate  the  legitimate  rule  of  the  majority  voting. 

Congressional  Record.  30: 169-73.  March  23,  1897. 

David  Turpie. 

The  pending  amendment  is  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
great  precedent  of  growth  and  advancement  set  forth  in  the 
preamble  of  the  constitution.  Our  purpose  is  to  form  a  more 
perfect  union  by  bringing  the  national  legislature  in  complete 
accordance  with  the  legislative  assemblies  of  the  states ;  to  estab- 
lish justice  by  granting  to  the  voters  of  the  states  that  equality 
of  suffrage  which  the  present  system  denies ;  to  perpetuate  the 
blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  posterity  by  a  further 
and  nobler  recognition  of  duties  and  rights  inherent  in  all  citi- 
zens, so  that  the  supremacy  of  the  people,  never  gainsaid,  so 
often  with  the  lips  confessed,  with  the  tongue  asserted  and 
maintained,  shall  at  last  be  and  become  a  vital  force,  a  living 
presence,  a  fact  accomplished,  in  the  government  of  the  re- 
public. 

Congressional  Record.  35:  3925-6.  April  10,  1902. 
Chauncey  M.  Depew. 

Now  the  Senate  cannot  go  behind  the  legislatures  of  the 
states  and  investigate  the  election  of  their  members,  but  with 
the  election  by  the  people  it  can  go  into  the  regularity  and  re- 
turns of  every  election  precinct  and  contests  of  senatorial  seats 
will  be  the  leading  work  of  every  session. 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  83 

Congressional  Record.  35:  3979-81.  April  n,  1902. 
Chauncey  M.  Depew. 

When  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  to  elect  senators 
by  the  people  of  the  state  doing  it,  then  the  men  who  cast  their 
manhood  vote  in  the  state  of  New  York  want  to  know  whether 
people  equally  entitled  with  themselves  have  cast  a  manhood 
vote  under  similar  circumstances  in  the  state  of  Mississippi. 

Notwithstanding  the  exceedingly  ingenious  and  the  exceed- 
ingly able  explanation  given  by  the  -senator  from  Mississippi, 
everybody  knows  that  there  is  no  fairness  in  the  tests  which  are 
provided  by  the  constitution  of  that  state  for  the  registration  of 
voters.  The  canvassing  board  are  all  of  one  party.  The 
canvassing  board  are  selected  for  one  purpose — to  prevent  the 
negro  from  voting,  no  matter  what  his  intelligence  may  be;  to 
prevent  the  negro  from  being  registered,  no  matter  what  his  in- 
telligence may  be 

And  what  is  the  device?  Twenty  or  fifty  or  one  hundred 
white  men  who  can  not  read,  who  can  not  write,  and  who  do 
not  know  whether  the  constitution  is  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  or  of  the  state  of  Mississippi  or  of  their  own 
bodies,  are  not  asked  the  question,  because  their  grandfathers 
voted.  That  qualifies  them  to  vote.  But  a  negro  comes  up 
who  is  a  graduate  of  Yale  College  and  who  does  understand  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  constitution  of  the 
state  of  Mississippi.  He  has  passed  through  Columbia  College 
or  Harvard  Law  School. 

This  registration  board  ask  him  if  he  can  read.  "Yes." 
"Can  you  write?"  "Yes."  "Do  you  understand  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States?"  "I  do;  I  have  learned  it  by  heart." 
''Do  you  understand  the  constitution  of  the  state  of  Mississippi?" 
"I  do;  I  know  it  by  heart."  "Well,  you  must  construe  it  intelli- 
gently. Construe  that  section";  and  that  construction  never  can 
satisfy  that  registration  board,  and  he  is  disfranchised.  That  is 
the  kind  of  a  vote  which  would  send  United  States  senators 
to  this  body.  That  is  the  kind  of  an  agitation  which  would  be 
precipitated  into  this  chamber.  That  is  the  kind  of  a  contro- 
versy which  would  take  up  the  whole  time  of  the  Senate  in  de- 
ciding who  were  entitled  to  vote. 


84  ELECTION    OF 

My  eloquent  friend  from  Mississippi  says  what  difference 
would  it  make,  because  substantially  the  same  people  would 
come  here  from  the  Southern  states  by  the  people  as  now  come 
here  by  the  action  of  our  legislature  and  our  primaries.  I  will 
tell  you  what  difference  it  would  make.  If  there  was  manhood 
suffrage  there  would  be  here  Republican  senators  from  Virginia ; 
there  would  be  Republican  senators  from  Kentucky  if  they  had 
a  proper  election  law  in  Kentucky.  If  there  was  manhood  suf- 
frage the  distinguished  senator  from  North  Carolina  [Mr. 
Pritchard],  who  has  been  sent  here  twice,  would  be  sent  here 
again. 

Congressional   Record.   35:6595,  6596.    June   n,   1902. 

George  G.  Vest. 

We  are  told  that  the  object  of  the  joint  resolution  is  to  re- 
move the  facility  with  which  corruption  may  be  used  in  the 
election  of  senators.  Mr.  President,  my  observation  and  ex- 
perience teach  me  that  where  corruption  can  be  used  corrupt 
men  will  always  find  a  way  to  use  it.  What  will  be  the  result 
if  the  joint  resolution  is  adopted  as  it  comes  from  the  House? 
Every  intelligent  man  in  this  country  knows  that  the  candidates 
for  United  States  senators  in  the  respective  states  will  be 
nominated  by  conventions,  and  every  intelligent  man  knows 
how  easily  conventions  will  be  influenced  by  improper  means  to 
make  nominations  which  the  party  represented  in  the  convention 
will  deem  it  their  duty  to  support. 

We  are  told  to-day  multimillionaires  can  buy  legislatures. 
Who  pretends  to  say  that  they  can  not,  especially  in  the  large 
cities,  buy  the  votes,  by  hundreds  and  thousands,  of  the  men  who 
will  by  direct  vote  elect  United  States  senators?  Who  pretends 
to  say  that  this  body  of  United  States  senators,  ninety  in  number, 
is  not  equal  in  integrity,  in  intelligence,  in  all  the  great  qualities 
of  a  representative  capacity  to  the  governors  of  the  respective 
states?  Who  does  not  know  that  the  governors  consider  it  a 
promotion  to  come  from  their  executive  office  to  this  body? 
Are  the  governors  more  honest,  more  intelligent,  more  fit  to 
represent  the  people  than  the  Senate  as  assembled  here?  Who 
says  it? 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  85 

Mr.  President,  those  governors  are  elected  by  direct  vote 
of  the  people.  And  yet  we  are  told  that  if  we  change  the  form 
of  election  we  get  rid  of  the  impurity  at  the  very  source  of 
all  legislative  power.  Who  believes  that  if  you  change  the  form 
of  election  you  get  rid  of  the  great  motive  power,  the  people, 
who,  if  corrupt  themselves,  will  surely  make  that  fact  mani- 
fest in  the  result  of  any  election? 

Now,  Mr.  President,  I  will  simply  say  that  all  this  issue  is  a 
plan  adopted  by  adroit  politicians,  in  my  opinion,  who  desire  to 
make  the  impression  upon  the  people  that  they  are  better  and 
purer  and  more  competent  to  choose  senators  than  the  men 
whom  they  may  elect  through  a  general  assembly  or  legislature 
of  the  state. 

I  should  like  some  senator  to  tell  me  how  the  people  of  a 
county  or  an  election  district  can  know  better  the  qualifications 
for  the  high  office  of  a  United  States  senator  of  a  multimillion- 
aire whom  they  have  never  seen,  and  \vhose  name  is  put  before 
them  by  a  convention  they  never  attended,  than  they  can  pass 
upon  the  qualifications  of  a  member  of  the  legislature. 

How  can  they  better  know  as  to  the  qualifications  of  such  a 
candidate  than  one  of  their  own  neighbors,  with  whom  they 
have  lived  for  years,  with  whose  antecedents  they  are  familiar, 
and  whom  they  know  to  be  honest,  intelligent,  and  acquainted 
with  their  interests?  But  we  are  told  that  the  question  of  the 
election  of  the  multimillionaire  with  his  millions  of  dollars,  ut- 
terly unknown  to  the  people,  is  to  be  passed  upon  by  them  in 
preference  to  this  neighbor,  whom  they  have  known  for  half  a 
century. 

I  repeat,  Mr.  President,  if  the  fountain  is  impure  the  stream 
will  be  impure.  You  can  not  evade  this  issue  by  the  form  of 
the  election. 

Constitutional  Convention 
Debates  on  the  Election  of  Senators  in  the  Federal  Convention 

of  1787. 

TUESDAY,  MAY  29111. 
In  convention, — *    *    * 
Mr.  RANDOLPH  then   opened  the  main  business: — *     *     * 


86  ELECTION    OF 

He   proposed,   as   comformable   to   his   ideas,    the    following 
resolutions,  which  he  explained  one  by  one: 


5.  Resolved,  that  the  members  of  the  second  branch  of  the 
national  legislature  ought  to  be  elected  by  those  of  the  first,  out  of 
a  proper  number  of  persons  nominated  by  the  individual  legislatures, 

to   be    the    age    of years    at   least;    to    hold    their    offices    for 

a  term  sufficient  to  ensure  their  independency;  to  receive  liberal 
stipends,  by  which  they  may  be  compensated  for  the  devotion  of 
their  time  to  the  public  service;  and  to  be  ineligible  to  any  of- 
fice established  by  a  particular  state  or  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  except  those  peculiarly  belonging  to  the  functions 
of  the  second  branch,  during  the  term  of  service;  and  for  the  space 
of after  the  expiration  thereof."  *  *  * 

Mr.  CHARLES  PINCKNEY  laid  before  the  House  the  draft  of 
a  federal  government  which  he  had  prepared,  to  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  free  and  independent  states  of  America : 


Article  IV 

"The  Senate  shall  be  elected  and  chosen  by  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates; which  House,  immediately  after  their  meeting,  shall  choose 

by  ballot  senators  from  among  the   citizens  and   residents   of 

New    Hampshire; from   among   those   of   Massachusetts;    

from  among  those  of  Rhode  Island; from  among  those  of  Con- 
necticut;    from  among  those  of  New  York; from  among 

those  of  New  Jersey;  from  among  those,  of  Pennsylvania;  — 

from  among  those  of  Delaware;  from  among  those  of  Mary- 
land;    from  among  those  of  Virginia;  from  among  those 

of  North  Carolina;  from  among  those  of  South  Carolina;   and 

from  among  those  of  Georgia.     The  senators  chosen  from  New 

Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  Connecticut,  shall 
form  one  class;  those  from  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Delaware,  one  class;  and  those  from  Maryland,  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  one  class.  The  House  of 
Delegates  shall  number  these  classes  one,  two,  and  three;  and  fix 

the  times  of  their  service  by  lot.     The  first  class  shall  serve  for 

years;    the   second    for years;    and    the   third    for  years. 

As  their  times  of  service  expire,   the  House  of  Delegates  shall  fill 

them  up  by  elections  for years;  and  they  shall  fill  all  vacancies 

that  arise  from  death  or  resignation,  for  the  time  of  service  re- 
maining of  the  members  so  dying  or  resigning.  Each  senator  shall 

be  years  of  age  at  least;  and  shall  have  been  a  citizen  of  the 

United  States  for  four  years  before  his  election;  and  shall  be  a 
resident  of  the  state  he  is  chosen  from.  The  Senate  shall  choose 
its  own  officers.^  ^ , 

Article  X 

"Immediately  after  the  first  census  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  the  House  of  Delegates  shall  apportion  the  Senate  by  elect- 
ing for  each  state,  out  of  the  citizens  resident  therein,  one  senator 

for   every  members    each    state    shall    have    in    the    House    of 

Delegates.  Each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  have  at  least  one  mem- 
ber in  the  Senate."  *  *  * 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  87 

THURSDAY,  MAY  3151. 

WILLIAM  PIERCE,   from  Georgia,  took  his  seat. 

In  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  Mr.  RANDOLPH'S  proposi- 
tions,— The  third  resolution,"  J/zaf  the  national  hgislature  ought 
to  consist  of  two  branches"  was  agreed  to  without  rebate,  or 
dissent,  except  that  of  Pennsylvania,  given  probably  from  com- 
plaisance to  Dr.  FRANKLIN,  who  was  understood  to  be  partial  to 
a  single  house  of  legislation. 

The  fourth  resolution,  first  clause,  "that  the  members  of  the 
first  branch  of  the  national  legislature  ought  to  be  elected  by  the 
people  of  the  several  states,"  being  taken  up : 

Mr.  SHERMAN  opposed  the  election  by  the  people,  insisting 
that  it  ought  to  be  by  the  state  legislatures.  The  people,  he 
said,  immediately,  should  have  as  little  to  do  as  may  be  about 
the  government.  They  want  information,  and  are  constantly 
liable  to  be  misled. 

Mr.  GERRY.  The  evils  we  experience  flow  from  the  excess 
of  democracy.  The  people  do  not  want  virtue,  but  are  the 
dupes  of  pretended  patriots.  In  Massachusetts  it  had  been  fully 
confirmed  by  experience,  that  they  are  daily  misled  into  the 
most  baneful  measures  and  opinions,  by  the  false  reports  circu- 
lated by  designing  men,  and  which  no  one  on  the  spot  can  refute. 
One  principal  evil  arises  from  the  want  of  due  provision  for 
those  employed  in  the  administration  of  government.  It  would 
seem  to  be  a  maxim  of  democracy  to  starve  the  public  servants. 
He  mentioned  the  popular  clamor  in  Massachusetts  for  the  re- 
duction of  salaries,  and  the  attack  made  on  that  of  the  governor, 
though  secured  by  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  itself.  He 
had.  he  said,  been  too  republican  heretofore :  he  was  still,  how- 
ever, republican  ;  but  had  been  taught  by  experience  the  danger 
of  the  levelling  spirit. 

Mr.  MASON  argued  strongly  for  an  election  of  the  larger 
branch  by  the  people.  It  was  to  be  the  grand  depository  of  the 
democratic  principle  of  the  government.  It  was,  so  to  speak,  to 
be  our  House  of  Commons.  It  ought  to  know  and  sympathize 
with  every  part  of  the  community:  and  ought  therefore  to  be 
taken,  not  only  from  different  parts  of  the  whole  republic,  but 
also  from  different  districts  of  the  larger  members  of  it ;  which 


88  ELECTION    OF 

had  in  several  instances,  particularly  in  Virginia,  different  inter- 
ests and  views  arising  from  difference  of  produce,  of  habits, 
&c.,  &c.  He  admitted  that  we  had  been  too  democratic,  but 
was  afraid  we  should  incautiously  run  into  the  opposite  ex- 
treme. We  ought  to  attend  to  the  rights  of  every  class  of  the 
people.  He  had  often  wondered  at  the  indifference  of  the  su- 
perior classes  of  society  to  this  dictate  of  humanity  and  policy; 
considering,  that,  however  affluent  their  circumstances,  or  ele- 
vated their  situations,  might  be,  the  course  of  a  few  years  not 
only  might,  but  certainly  would,  distribute  their  posterity 
throughout  the  lowest  classes  of  society.  Every  selfish  motive, 
therefore,  every  family  attachment,  ought  to  recommend  such  a 
system  of  policy  as  would  provide  no  less  carefully  for  the 
rights  and  happiness  of  the  lowest,  than  of  the  highest,  order  of 
citizens. 

Mr.  WILSON  contended  strenuously  for  drawing  the  most 
numerous  branch  of  the  legislature  immediately  from  the  people. 
He  was  for  raising  the  federal  pyramid  to  a  considerable  alti- 
tude, and  for  that  reason  wished  to  give  it  as  broad  a  basis  as 
possible.  No  government  could  long  subsist  without  the  confi- 
dence of  the  people.  In  a  republican  government,  this  confidence 
was  peculiarly  essential.  He  also  thought  it  wrong  to  increase 
the  weight  of  the  state  legislatures  by  making  them  the  electors 
of  the  national  legislature.  All  interference  between  the  general 
and  local  governments  should  be  obviated  as  much  as  possible. 
On  examination  it  would  be  found  that  the  opposition  of  the 
states  to  federal  measures  had  proceeded  much  more  from  the 
officers  of  the  states  than  from  the  people  at  large. 

Mr.  MADISON  considered  the  popular  election  of  one  branch 
of  the  national  legislature  as  essential  to  every  plan  of  free 
government.  He  observed  that  in  some  of  the  states  one 
branch  of  the  legislature  was  composed  of  men  already  removed 
from  the  people  by  an  intervening  body  of  electors.  That  if 
the  first  branch  of  the  general  legislature  should  be  elected  by 
the  state  legislatures,  the  second  branch  elected  by  the  first,  the 
executive  by  the  second  together  with  the  first,  and  other  ap- 
pointments again  made  for  subordinate  purposes  by  the  execu- 
tive, the  people  would  be  lost  sight  of  altogether ;  and  the  neces- 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  89 

sary  sympathy  between  them  and  their  rulers  and  officers  too 
little  felt.  He  was  an  advocate  for  the  policy  of  refining  the 
popular  appointments  by  successive  filtrations,  but  thought  it 
might  be  pushed  too  far.  He  wished  the  expedient  to  be  re- 
sorted to  only  in  the  appointment  of  the  second  branch  of  the 
legislature  and  in  the  executive  and  judiciary  branches  of  the 
government.  He  thought,  too,  that  the  great  fabric  to  be  raised 
would  be  more  stable  and  durable,  if  it  should  rest  on  the  solid 
foundation  of  the  people  themselves,  than  if  it  should  stand 
merely  on  the  pillars  of  the  legislatures. 

Mr.  GERRY  did  not  like  the  election  by  the  people.  The 
maxims  taken  from  the  British  constitution  were  often  fallacious 
when  applied  to  our  situation,  which  was  extremely  different. 
Experience,  he  said,  had. shown  that  the  state  legislatures,  drawn 
immediately  from  the  people,  did  not  always  possess  their  con- 
fidence. He  had  no  objection,  however,  to  an  election  by  the 
people,  if  it  were  so  qualified  that  men  of  honor  and  character 
might  not  be  unwilling  to  be  joined  in  the  appointments.  He 
seemed  to  think  the  people  might  nominate  a  certain  number, 
out  of  which  the  state  legislatures  should  be  bound  to  choose. 

Mr.  BUTLER  thought  an  election  by  the  people  an  impracti- 
cable mode. 

On  the  question  for  an  election  of  the  first  branch  of  the 
national  legislature,  by  the  people,  Massachusetts,  New  York, 
Pennsylvania*  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Georgia — aye,  6 ;  New 
Jersey,  South  Carolina — no,  2;  Connecticut,  Delaware,  divided. 

The  remaining  clauses  of  the  fourth  resolution,  relating  to 
the  qualifications  of  members  of  the  national  legislature,  being 
postponed,  item,  con.,  as  entering  too  much  into  detail  for  gen- 
eral propositions, — 

The  committee  proceeded  to  the  fifth  resolution,  that  the  sec- 
ond [or  senatorial]  branch  of  the  national  legislature  ought  to 
be  chosen  by  the  first  branch,  out  of  the  persons  nominated  by 
the  state  legislatures. 

Mr.  SPAIGHT  contended,  that  the  second  branch  ought  to  be 
chosen  by  the  state  legislatures,  and  moved  an  amendment  to 
that  effect. 

Mr.  BUTLER  apprehended  that  the  taking  of  so  many  powers 


90  ELECTION   OF 

out  of  the  hands  of  the  states  as  was  proposed,  tended  to  de- 
stroy all  that  balance  and  security  of  interests  among  the  states 
which  it  was  necessary  to  preserve;  and  called  on  Mr.  RAN- 
DOLPH, the  mover  of  the  propositions,  to  explain  the  extent  of 
his  ideas,  and  particularly  the  number  of  members  he  meant  to 
assign  to  this  second  branch. 

Mr.  RANDOLPH  observed  that  he  had,  at  the  time  of  offering 
hio  propositions,  stated  his  ideas  as  far  as  the  nature  of  general 
propositions  required ;  that  details  made  no  part  of  the  plan, 
and  could  not  perhaps  with  propriety  have  been  introduced.  If 
he  was  to  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  number  of  the  second  branch, 
he  should  say  that  it  ought  to  be  much  smaller  than  that  of 
the  first;  so  small  as  to  be  exempt  from  the  passionate  proceed- 
ings to  which  numerous  assemblies  are  liable.  He  observed 
that  the  general  object  was  to  provide  a  cure  for  the  evils  under 
which  the  United  States  labored ;  that  in  tracing  these  evils  to 
their  origin,  every  man  had  found  it  in  the  turbulence  and  follies 
of  democracy;  that  some  check  therefore  was  to  be  sought  for, 
against  this  tendency  of  our  governments ;  and  that  a  good  Sen- 
ate seemed  most  likely  to  answer  the  purpose. 

Mr.  KING  reminded  the  committee  that  the  choice  of  the 
second  branch  as  proposed  (by  Mr.  SPAIGHT)  viz.,  by  the  state 
legislatures,  would  be  impracticable,  unless  it  was  to  be  very 
numerous,  or  the  idea  of  proportion  among  the  states  was  to 
be  disregarded.  According  to  this  idea,  there  must  be  eighty  or 
a  hundred  members  to  entitle  Delaware  to  the  choice  of  one  of 
them. 

Mr.  SPAIGHT  withdrew  his  motion. 

Mr.  WILSON  opposed  both  a  nomination  by  the  state  legisla- 
tures, and  an  election  by  the  first  branch  of  the  national  legisla- 
ture, because  the  second  branch  of  the  latter  ought  to  be  in- 
dependent of  both.  He  thought  both  branches  of  the  national 
legislature  ought  to  be  chosen  by  the  people,  but  was  not  pre- 
pared with  a  specific  proposition.  He  suggested  the  mode  of 
choosing  the  senate  of  New  York,  to-wit,  of  uniting  several 
election  districts  for  one  branch,  in  choosing  members  for  the 
other  branch,  as  a  good  model. 

Mr.  MADISON  observed,  that  such  a  mode  would  destroy  the 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  91 

influence  of  the  smaller  states  associated  with  larger  ones  in 
the  same  district;  as  the  latter  would  choose  from  within  them- 
selves, although  better  men  might  be  found  in  the  former.  The 
election  of  senators  in  Virginia,  where  large  and  small  counties 
were  often  formed  into  one  district  for  the  purpose,  had  illus- 
trated this  consequence.  Local  partiality  would  often  prefer  a 
resident  within  the  county  or  state,  to  a  candidate  of  superior 
merit  residing  out  of  it.  Less  merit  also  in  a  resident  would 
be  more  known  throughout  his  own  state. 

Mr.  SHERMAN  favored  an  election  of  one  member  by  each  of 
the  state  legislatures. 

Mr.  PINCKNEY  moved  to'  strike  out  the  "nomination  by  the 
state  legislatures";  on  this  question — "Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  no — 9;  Delaware,  divided. 

On  the  whole  question  for  electing  by  the  first  branch  out  of 
nominations  by  the  state  legislatures — Massachusetts,  Virginia, 
South  Carolina,  aye — 3 ;  Connecticut,  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  no — /. 

So  the  clause  was  disagreed  to,  and  a  chasm  left  in  this  part 
of  the  plan. 


THURSDAY,  JUNE  7TH. 

In  Committee  of  the  Whole. — Mr.  PINCKNEY,  according 
to  notice,  moved  to  reconsider  the  clause  respecting  the  negative 
on  state  laws,  which  was  agreed  to,  and  to-morrow  fixed  for  the 
purpose. 

The  clause  providing  for  the  appointment  of  the  second 
branch  of  the  national  legislature,  having  lain  blank  since  the 
last  vote  on  the  mode  of  electing  it,  to-wit,  by  the  first  branch, 
Mr.  DICKINSON  now  moved  "that  the  members  of  the  second 
branch  ought  to  be  chosen  by  the  individual  legislatures." 

Mr.  SHERMAN  seconded  the  motion  ;  observing,  that  the  par- 
ticular states  would  thus  become  interested  in  supporting  the 
national  government,  and  that  a  due  harmony  between  the  two 
governments  would  be  maintained.  He  admitted  that  the  two 


•  This  question  is  omitted  in  the  printed  Journal,  and  the  votes 
applied  to  the  succeeding  one,  instead  of  the  votes  as  here  stated. 


92  ELECTION   OF 

ought  to  have  separate  and  distinct  jurisdictions,  but  that  they 
ought  to  have  a  mutual  interest  in  supporting  each  other. 

Mr.  PINCKNEY.  If  the  small  states  should  be  allowed  one 
senator  only  the  number  will  be  too  great;  there  will  be  eighty, 
at  least. 

Mr.  DICKINSON  had  two  reasons  for  his  motion — first,  because 
the  sense  of  the  states  would  be  better  collected  through  their 
governments,  than  immediately  from  the  people  at  large ;  second- 
ly, because  he  wished  the  Senate  to  consist  of  the  most  distin- 
guished characters,  distinguished  for  their  rank  in  life  and  their 
weight  of  property,  and  bearing  as  strong  a  likeness  to  the  British 
House  of  Lords  as  possible;  and  he  thought  such  characters 
more  likely  to  be  selected  by  the  state  legislatures,  than  in  any 
other  mode.  The  greatness  of  the  number  was  no  objection  with 
him.  He  hoped  there  would  be  eighty,  and  twice  eighty,  of 
them.  If  their  number  should  be  small,  the  popular  branch 
could  not  be  balanced  by  them.  The  legislature  of  a  numerous 
people  ought  to  be  a  numerous  body. 

Mr.  WILLIAMSON  preferred  a  small  number  of  senators,  but 
wished  that  each  state  should  have  at  least  one.  He  suggested 
twenty-five  as  a  convenient  number.  The  different  modes  of 
representation  in  the  different  branches  will  serve  as  a  mutual 
check. 

Mr.  BUTLER  was  anxious  to  know  the  ratio  of  representation 
before  he  gave  any  opinion. 

Mr.  WILSON.  If  we  are  to  establish  a  national  government, 
that  government  ought  to  flow  from  the  people  at  large.  If  one 
branch  of  it  should  be  chosen  by  the  legislatures  and  the  other 
by  the  people,  the  two  branches  will  rest  on  different  foundations, 
and  dissensions  will  naturally  arise  between  them.  He  wished 
the  Senate  to  be  elected  by  the  people,  as  well  as  the  other 
branch ;  the  people  might  be  divided  into  proper  districts  for  the 
purpose ;  and  he  moved  to  postpone  the  motion  of  Mr.  DICKINSON, 
in  order  to  take  up  one  of  that  import. 

Mr.  MORRIS  seconded  him. 

Mr.  READ  proposed  "that  the  senate  should  be  appointed  by 
the  executive  magistrate,  out  of  a  proper  number  of  persons 
to  be  nominated  by  the  individual  legislatures."  He  said  he 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  93 

thought  it  his  duty  to  speak  his  mind  frankly.  Gentlemen  he 
hoped  would  not  be  alarmed  at  the  idea.  Nothing  short  of 
this  approach  towards  a  proper  model  of  government  would 
answer  the  purpose,  and  he  thought  it  best  to  come  directly  to 
the  point  at  once.  His  proposition  was  not  seconded  nor  sup- 
ported. 

Mr.  MADISON.  If  the  motion  (of  Mr.  DICKINSON)  should  be 
agreed  to,  we  must  either  depart  from  the  doctrine  of  propor- 
tional representation,  or  admit  into  the  Senate  a  very  large  num- 
ber of  numbers.  The  first  is  inadmissible,  being  evidently  un- 
just. The  second  is  inexpedient.  The  use  of  the  Senate  is  to 
consist  in  its  proceeding  with  more  coolness,  with  more  system, 
that  the  additional  number  would  give  additional  weight  to  the 
body.  On  the  contrary,  it  appeared  to  him  that  their  weight 
would  be  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  their  numbers.  The  example  of 
the  Roman  Tribunes  was  applicable.  They  lost  their  influence  and 
power,  in  proportion  as  their  number  was  augmented.  The  rea- 
son seemed  to  be  obvious :  they  were  appointed  to  take  care  of 
the  popular  interests  and  pretentions  at  Rome ;  because  the  peo- 
ple by  reason  of  their  numbers  could  not  act  in  concert,  and  were 
liable  to  fall  into  factions  among  themselves  and  to  become  a 
prey  to  their  aristocratic  adversaries.  The  more  the  representa-. 
tives  of  the  people,  therefore,  were  multiplied,  the  more  they 
partook  of  the  infirmities  of  their  constituents,  the  more  liable 
they  became  to  be  divided  among  themselves,  either  from  their 
own  indiscretions  or  the  artifices  of  the  opposite  faction,  and 
of  course  the  less  capable  of  fulfilling  their  trust.  When  the 
weight  of  a  set  of  men  depends  merely  on  their  personal  char- 
acters, the  greater  the  number,  the  greater  the  weight.  When  it 
depends  on  the  degree  of  political  authority  lodged  in  them,  the 
smaller  the  number,  the  greater  the  weight.  These  consider- 
ations might  perhaps  be  combined  in  the  intended  Senate ;  but 
the  latter  was  the  material  one. 

Mr.  GERRY.  Four  modes  of  appointing  the  Senate  have  been 
mentioned.  First,  by  the  first  branch  of  the  national  legisla- 
ture,— this  would  create  a  dependence  contrary  to  the  end  pro- 
posed. Secondly,  by  the  national  executive, — this  is  a  stride 
towards  monarchy  that  few  will  think  of.  Thirdly,  by  the  people ; 


94  ELECTION    OF 

the  people  have  two  great  interests,  the  landed  interest,  and  the 
commercial,  including  the  stockholders.  To  draw  both  branches 
from  the  people  will  leave  no  security  to  the  latter  interest;  the 
people  being  chiefly  composed  of  the  landed  interest,  and  erro- 
neously supposing  that  the  other  interests  are  adverse  to  it. 
Fourthly,  by  the  individual  legislatures, — the  elections  being  car- 
ried through  this  refinement,  will  be  most  like  to  provide  some 
check  in  favor  of  the  commercial  interest  against  the  landed ; 
without  which,  oppression  will  take  place;  and  no  free  govern- 
ment can  last  long  where  that  is  the  case.  He  was  therefore  in 
favor  of  this  last. 

Mr.  DICKINSON/  The  preservation  of  the  states  in  a  certain 
degree  of  agency  is  indispensable.  It  will  produce  that  collision 
between  the  different  authorities  which  should  be  wished  for  in 
order  to  check  each  other.  To  attempt  to  abolish  the  states  al- 
together, would  degrade  the  councils  of  our  country,  would  be 
impracticable,  would  be  ruinous.  He  compared  the  proposed 
national  system  to  the  solar  system,  in  which  the  states  were  the 
planets,  and  ought  to  be  left  to  move  freely  in  their  proper  or- 
bits. The  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  WILSON)  wished, 
he  said,  to  extinguish  these  planets.  If  the  state  governments 
were  excluded  from  all  agency  in  the  national  one,  and  all  power 
drawn  from  the  people  at  large,  the  consequence  would  be  that 
the  national  government  would  move  in  the  same  direction  as  the 
state  governments  now  do,  and  would  run  into  all  the  same 
mischiefs.  The  reform  would  only  unite  the  thirteen  small 
streams  into  one  great  current,  pursuing  the  same  course  with- 
out any  opposition  whatever.  He  adhered  to  the  opinion  that 
the  Senate  ought  to  be  composed  of  a  large  number;  and  that 
their  influence,  from  family  weight  and  other  causes,  would 
be  increased  thereby.  He  did  not  admit  that  the  Tribunes  lost 
their  weight  in  proportion  as  their  number  was  augmented, 
and  gave  an  historical  sketch  of  this  institution.  If  the  rea- 


«It  will  throw  light  on  this  discussion  to  remark  that  an  election 
by  the  state  legislatures  involved  a  surrender  of  the  principle 
insisted  on  by  the  large  states  and  dreaded  by  the  small  ones,  name- 
ly, that  of  a  proportional  representation  in  the  Senate.  Such  a  rule 
would  make  the  body  too  numerous,  as  the  smallest  state  must 
elect  one  member  at  least. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  95 

soning  (of  Mr.  MADISON)  was  good,  it  would  prove  that  the 
number  of  the  Senate  ought  to  be  reduced  below  ten,  the  high- 
est number  of  the  Tribunitial  corps. 

Mr.  WILSON.  The  subject,  it  must  be  owned,  is  surrounded 
with  doubts  and  difficulties.  But  we  must  surmount  them.  The 
British  government  cannot  be  our  model.  We  have  no  mate- 
rials for  a  similar  one.  Our  manners,  our  laws,  the  abolition 
of  entails  and  of  primogeniture,  the  whole  genius  of  the  peo- 
ple, are  opposed  to  it.  He  did  not  see  the  danger  of  the  states 
being  devoured  by  the  national  government.  On  the  contrary, 
he  wished  to  keep  them  from  devouring  the  national  govern- 
ment. He  was  not,  however,  for  extinguishing  these  planets, 
as  was  supposed  by  Mr.  DICKINSON  ;  neither  did  he,  on  the  other 
hand,  believe  that  they  would  warm  or  enlighten  the  sun.  With- 
in their  proper  orbits  they  must  still  be  suffered  to  act  for  sub- 
ordinate purposes,  for  which  their  existence  is  made  essential 
by  the  great  extent  of  our  country.  He  could  not  comprehend 
in  what  manner  the  landed  interest  would  be  rendered  less 
predominant  in  the  Senate  by  an  election  through  the  medium 
of  the  legislatures,  than  by  the  people  themselves.  If  the  leg- 
islatures, as  was  now  complained,  sacrificed  the  commercial  to 
the  landed  interest,  what  reason  was  there  to  expect  such  a 
choice  from  them  as  would  defeat  their  own  views?  He  was 
for  an  election  by  the  people,  in  large  districts,  which  would 
be  most  likely  to  obtain  men  of  intelligence  and  uprightness; 
subdividing  the  districts  only  for  the  accommodation  of  voters. 

Mr.  MADISON  could  as  little  comprehend  in  what  manner 
family  weight,  as  desired  by  Mr.  DICKINSON,  would  be  more 
certainly  conveyed  into  the  Senate  through  elections  by  the  state 
legislatures,  than  in  some  other  modes.  The  true  question  was, 
in  what  mode  the  best  choice  would  be  made?  If  an  election 
by  the  people,  or  through  any  other  channel  than  the  state  leg- 
islatures, promised  as  uncorrupt  and  impartial  a  preference  of 
merit,  there  could  surely  be  no  necessity  for  an  appointment 
by  those  legislatures.  Nor  was  it  apparent  that  a  more  useful 
check  would  be  derived  through  that  channel,  than  from  the  peo- 
ple through  some  other.  The  great  evils  complained  of  were, 
that  the  state  legislatures  ran  into  schemes  of  paper  money, 


96  ELECTION    OF 

&c.,  whenever  solicited  by  the  people,  and  sometimes  without 
even  the  sanction  of  the  people.  Their  influence,  then,  instead  of 
checking  a  like  propensity  in  the  national  legislature,  may  be 
expected  to  promote  it.  Nothing  can  be  more  contradictory 
than  to  say  that  the  national  legislature,  without  a  proper  check, 
will  follow  the  example  of  the  state  legislatures;  and,  in  the 
same  breath,  that  the  state  legislatures  are  the  only  proper 
check. 

Mr.  SHERMAN  opposed  elections  by  the  people  in  districts, 
as  not  likely  to  produce  such  fit  men  as  elections  by  the  state 
legislatures. 

Mr.  GERRY  insisted  that  the  commercial  and  money  in- 
terest would  be  more  secure  in  the  hands  of  the  state  legislatures 
than  of  the  people  at  large.  The  former  have  more  sense  of 
character,  and  will  be  restrained  by  that  from  injustice.  The 
people  are  for  paper  money,  when  the  legislatures  are  against 
it.  In  Massachusetts  the  county  conventions  had  declared  a 
wish  for  a  depreciating  paper  that  would  sink  itself.  Besides, 
in  some  states  there  are  two  branches  in  the  legislature,  one  of 
which  is  somewhat  aristocratic.  There  would,  therefore,  be 
so  far  a  better  chance  of  refinement  in  the  choice.  There 
seemed,  he  thought,  to  be  three  powerful  objections  against 
elections  by  districts.  First,  it  is  impracticable ;  the  people 
cannot  be  brought  to  one  place  for  the  purpose ;  and,  whether 
brought  to  the  same  place  or  not,  numberless  frauds  would  be 
unavoidable.  Secondly,  small  states,  forming  part  of  the  same 
district  with  a  large  one,  or  a  large  part  of  a  large  one,  would 
have  no  chance  of  gaining  an  appointment  for  its  citizens  of 
merit.  Thirdly,  a  new  source  of  discord  would  be  opened  be- 
tween different  parts  of  the  same  district. 

Mr.  PINCKNEY  thought  the  second  branch  ought  to  be  per- 
manent and  independent ;  and  that  the  members  of  it  would 
be  rendered  more  so  by  receiving  their  appointments  from  the 
state  legislatures.  This  mode  would  avoid  the  rivalships  and 
discontents  incident  to  the  election  by  districts.  He  was  for 
dividing  the  states  in  three  classes,  according  to  their  respective 
sizes,  and  for  allowing  to  the  first  class  three  members ;  to  the 
second,  two,  and  to  the  third,  one. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  97 

On  the  question  for  postponing  Mr.  DICKINSON'S  motion, 
referring  the  appointment  of  the  Senate  to  the  state  legislatures, 
in  order  to  consider  Mr.  WILSON'S  for  referring  it  to  the  peo- 
ple, Pennsylvania,  aye — I ;  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New 
York,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Caro- 
lina, South  Carolina,  Georgia,  no — 10. 

Colonel  MASON.  Whatever  power  may  be  necessary  for  the 
national  government,  a  certain  portion  must  necessarily  be  left 
with  the  states.  It  is  impossible  for  one  power  to  pervade  the 
extreme  parts  of  the  United  States,  so  as  to  carry  equal  jus- 
tice to  them.  The  state  legislatures  also  ought  to  have  some 
means  of  defending  themselves  against  encroachments  of  the 
national  government.  In  every  other  department  we  have  stu- 
diously endeavored  to  provide  for  its  self-defence.  Shall  we 
leave  the  states  alone  unprovided  with  the  means  for  this  pur- 
pose? And  what  better  means  can  we  provide,  than  the  giving 
them  some  share  in,  or  rather  to  make  them  a  constituent  part 
of,  the  national  establishment?  There  is  danger  on  both  sides, 
no  doubt ;  but  we  have  only  seen  the  evils  arising  on  the  side 
of  the  state  governments.  Those  on  the  other  side  remain  to 
be  displayed.  The  example  of  Congress  does  not  apply.  Con- 
gress had  no  power  to  carry  their  acts  into  execution,  as  the 
national  government  will  have. 

On  Mr.  DICKINSON'S  motion  for  an  appointment  of  the  Sen- 
ate by  the  state  legislatures, — Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New 
York,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North 
Carolina.  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  aye — 10. 


WEDNESDAY,  JUNE  13111. 
In  Committee  of  the  Whole,—  *  *  * 

The  committee  rose,  and  MR.  GORHAM  made  report,  which 
was  postponed  till  to-morrow,  to  give  an  opportunity  for  other 
plans  to  be  proposed — the  report  was  in  the  words  following : 
#  ****** 

4.  Resolved,  that  the  members  of  the  second  branch  of  the  na- 
tional legislature  ought  to  be  chosen  by  the  individual  legisla- 
tures; to  be  of  the  age  of  thirty  years  at  least;  to  hold  their 
offices  for  a  term  sufficient  to  ensure  their  independence,  namely, 
seven  years:  to  receive  fixed  stipends  by  which  they  may  be  compen- 
sated for  the  devotion  of  their  time  to  the  public  service  to  be 


98  ELECTION    OF 


paid  out  of  the  national  treasury,  to  be  ineligible  to  any  office 
established  by  a  particular  state,  or  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  (except  those  peculiarly  belonging  to  the  functions  of 
the  second  branch)  during  the  term  of  service,  and  under  the  na- 
tional government  for  the  space  of  one  year  after  its  expira- 
tion. *  *  * 


MONDAY,  JUNE  i8xH. 

In  Committee  of  the  Whole,  on  the  propositions  of  Mr.  PAT- 
TERSON and  Mr.  RANDOLPH, — On  motion  of  Mr.  DICKINSON,  to 
postpone  the  first  resolution  in  Mr.  PATTERSON'S  plan,  in  or- 
der to  take  up  the  following,  viz  :  "that  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation ought  to  be  revised  and  amended,  so  as  to  render 
the  government  of  the  United  States  adequate  to  the  exigen- 
cies, the  preservation,  and  the  prosperity  of  the  union," — the 
postponement  was  agreed  to  by  ten  states ;  Pennsylvania  divided. 

Mr.  HAMILTON  *  *  *  reads  his  sketch  in  the  words  follow- 
ing: to  wit. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 

III.  The  Senate  to  consist  of  persons  elected  to  serve  during 
good  behaviour;  their  election  to  be  made  by  electors  chosen  for 
that  purpose  by  the  people.  In  order  to  do  this,  the  states  to  be 
divided  into  election  districts.  On  the  death,  removal  or  resigna- 
tion of  any  senator,  his  place  to  be  filled  out  of  the  district  from 
which  he  came.  *  *  * 

THURSDAY,  JULY  26TH. 

In  Convention,  *  *  * 

The  proceedings  since  Monday  last  were  unanimously  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  of  Detail;  and  the  convention  then 
unanimously  adjourned  till  Monday,  August  6th,  that  the  Com- 
mittee of  Detail  might  have  time  to  prepare  and  report  the 
constitution.  The  whole  resolutions,  as  referred,  are  as  fol- 
lows: 
******** 

4.  Resolved,  That  the  members  of  the  second  branch  of  the 
Legislature  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be  chosen  by  the  individ- 
ual legislatures;  to  be  of  the  age  of  thirty  years  at  least;  to  hold 
their  offices  for  six  years,  one-third  to  go  out  biennially;  to  receive 
a  compensation  for  the  devotion  of  their  time  to  the  public  service; 
to  be  ineligible  to.  and  incapable  of  holding,  any  office  under  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  (except  those  peculiarly  belonging 
to  the  functions  of  the  second  branch)  during  the  term  for  which 
they  are  elected,  and  for  one  year  thereafter.  *  *  * 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  99 

MONDAY,  AUGUST  6xH. 

In  Convention, — Mr.  JOHN  FRANCIS  MERCER,  from  Maryland, 
took  his  seat. 

Mr.  RUTLEDGE  delivered  in  the  report  of  the  Committee  of 
Detail,  as  follows — a  printed  copy  being  at  the  same  time  fur- 
nished to  each  member : 

******** 

Article    V 

Sect.  1.  The  Senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be  chosen  by  the 
legislatures  of  the  several  states.  Each  legislature  shall  choose 
two  members.  Vacancies  may  be  supplied  by  the  Executive  un- 
til the  next  meeting  of  the  legislature.  Each  member  shall  have  one 
vote.  *  *  * 

The  Federalist,  No.  xxvii. 
Alexander  Hamilton. 

To  the  People  of  the  State  of  New  York : 

Various  reasons  have  been  suggested,  in  the  course  of  these 
papers,  to  induce  a  probability  that  the  general  government 
will  be  better  administered  than  the  particular  governments : 
the  principal  of  which  reasons  are  that  the  extension  of  the 
spheres  of  election  will  present  a  greater  option,  or  latitude 
of  choice,  to  the  people ;  that  through  the  medium  of  the  state 
legislatures — which  are  select  bodies  of  men,  and  which  are 
to  appoint  the  members  of  the  national  Senate — there  is  rea- 
son to  expect  that  this  branch  will  generally  be  composed  with 
peculiar  care  and  judgment;  that  these  circumstances  promise 
greater  knowledge  and  more  extensive  information  in  the  na- 
tional councils,  and  that  they  will  be  less  apt  to  be  tainted  by 
the  spirit  of  faction  and  more  out  of  the  reach  of  those  oc- 
casional ill-humors,  or  temporary  prejudices  and  propensities, 
which,  in  smaller  societies,  frequently  contaminate  the  public 
councils,  begets  injustice  and  oppression  of  a  part  of  the  com- 
munity, and  engender  schemes  which,  though  they  gratify  a 
momentary  inclination  or  desire,  terminate  in  general  distress, 
dissatisfaction,  and  disgust.  Several  additional  reasons  of 
considerable  force,  to  fortify  that  probability,  will  occur  when 
we  come  to  survey,  with  a  more  critic'al  eye,  the  interior  struc- 
ture of  the  edifice  which  we  are  invited  to  erect.  *  *  * 


ioo  ELECTION    OF 

The  Federalist.  No.  Ixii. 

[Hamilton  or  Madison.] 

To  the  People  of  the  State  of  New  York : 

Having  examined  the  constitution  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives,  and   answered   such   of   the   objections   against  it  as 
seemed  to  merit  notice,  I  enter  next  on  the  examination  of  the 
Senate. 
******** 

II.  It  is   equally  unnecessary  to   dilate  on   the  appointment 
of  senators  by  the  state  legislature.     Among  the  various  modes 
which  might  have  been  devised  for  constituting  this  branch  of 
the   government,    that    which    has    been    proposed    by    the    con- 
vention is  probably  the  most  congenial  with  the  public  opinion. 
It  is  recommended  by  the  double  advantage  of  favoring  a  se- 
lect appointment  and  of  giving  to  the  state  governments  such 
an  agency  in  the  formation  of  the  federal  government  as  must 
secure  the  authority  of  the  former,  and  may  form  a  convenient 
link  between  the  two  systems. 

III.  The  equality  of  representation  in  the  Senate  is  another 
point,  which,  being  evidently  the  result  of  compromise  between 
the  opposite  pretensions  of  the  large  and  the  small  states,  does 
not  call  for  much  discussion.     If  indeed  it  be  right,  that  among 
a  people  thoroughly  incorporated  into  one  nation,  every  district 
ought  to  have  a  proportional  share  in  the  government,  and  that 
among   independent    and    sovereign    states,    bound    together   by 
a  simple  league,  the  parties,  however  unequal  in  size,  ought  to 
have  an  equal  share  in  the  common  councils,  it  does  not  appear 
to  be  without  some  reason  that  in  a  compound   republic,  par- 
taking both   of  the  national  and  federal  character,  the  govern- 
ment ought  to  be  founded  on  a  mixture  of  the  principles  of 
proportional  and  equal  representation.     But  it  is  superfluous  to 
try,  by  the  standard  of  theory,  a  part  of  the  constitution  which 
is  allowed  on  all  hands  to  be  the  result,  not  of  theory,  but  "of 
a   spirit   of   amity,   and  that   mutual  deference    and   concession 
which  the  peculiarity  of  our  political  situation   rendered  indis 
pensable."     A  common   government,   with   powers   equal   to   its 
objects,   is   called   for  by   the   voice,   and    still   more   loudly   by 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  101 

the  political  situation,  of  America.  A  government  founded  on 
principles  more  consonant  to  the  wishes  of  the  larger  states, 
is  not  likely  to  be  obtained  from  the  smaller  states.  The  only 
option,  then,  for  the  former,  lies  between  the  proposed  gov- 
ernment and  a  government  still  more  objectionable.  Under 
this  alternative,  the  advice  of  prudence  must  be  to  embrace  the 
lesser  evil;  and,  instead  of  indulging  a  fruitless  anticipation  of 
the  possible  mischiefs  which  may  ensue  to  contemplate  rather 
the  advantageous  consequences  which  may  qualify  the  sacrifice. 

In  this  spirit  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  equal  vote  allowed 
to  each  state  is  at  once  a  constitutional  recognition  of  the  por- 
tion of  sovereignty  remaining  in  the  individual  states,  and  an 
instrument  for  preserving  that  residuary  sovereignty.  So  far 
the  equality  ought  to  be  no  less  acceptable  to  the  large  than  to 
the  small  states;  since  they  are  not  solicitous  to  guard,  by 
every  possible  expedient,  against  an  improper  consolidation  of 
the  states  into  one  simple  republic. 

Another  advantage  accruing  from  this  ingredient  in  the 
constitution  of  the  senate  is,  the  additional  impediment  it  must 
prove  against  improper  acts  of  legislation.  No  law  or  resolu- 
tion can  now  be  passed  without  the  concurrence,  first,  of  a 
majority  of  the  people,  and  then,  of  a  majority  of  the  states. 
It  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  complicated  check  on  legis- 
lation may  in  some  instances  be  injurious  as  well  as  beneficial ; 
and  that  the  peculiar  defence  which  it  involves  in  favor  of  the 
smaller  states,  would  be  more  rational,  if  any  interests  common 
to  them,  and  distinct  from  those  of  other  states,  would  other- 
wise be  exposed  to  peculiar  danger.  But  as  the  larger  states 
will  always  be  able,  by  their  power  over  the  supplies,  to  de- 
feat unreasonable  exertions  of  this  prerogative  of  the  lesser 
states,  and  as  the  facility  and  excess  of  law-making  seem  to  be 
the  diseases  to  which  our  governments  are  most  liable,  it  is  not 
impossible  that  this  part  of  the  constitution  may  be  more  con- 
venient in  practice  than  it  appears  to  many  in  contemplation. 


102  ELECTION    OF 

Forum.  16:  272-81.  November,  1893. 

Senate  in  the  Light  of  History. 

Since  the  cause  of  the  Senate's  decline  is  clearly  the  decline 
of  the  political  spirit  of  the  people,  the  Senate  will  regain  its 
dignity  and  its  usefulness  in  proportion  to  the  rise  in  the 
political  spirit  of  the  people.  There  is  no  mechanical  device 
whereby  the  lost  dignity  can  be  restored.  The  election  of  sena- 
tors directly  or  in  effect  by  popular  vote,  methods  that  have  been 
much  discussed,  would  hardly  improve  the  Senate;  for  are  the 
governors  of  the  states  abler  or  more  dignified  men  than  the 
senators?  The  organization  of  the  Senate  and  even  the  meth- 
od of  the  election  of  senators  vindicate  the  wisdom  of  the  fa- 
thers :  its  present  personnel  simply  marks  the  decline  of  politics 
as  one  of  the  noble  professions. 


Forum.  18:  270-8.  November,  1894. 

Should  Senators  Be  Elected  by  the  People  ?    George  F.  Edmunds. 

In  order  that  those  who  do  the  writer  the  honor  of  reading 
this  contribution  to  the  study  of  a  very  important  question  may 
thoroughly  understand  in  what  way  and  to  what  end  the  Sen- 
ate of  the  United  States  came  to  be  composed  as  it  is,  I  beg 
the  reader's  indulgence  to  begin  with  some  generalities  of  the- 
ory and  historic  events,  which,  however  well  known,  can  hard- 
ly, especially  in  these  days,  be  too  often  repeated. 

The  establishment  of  all  good  government  has  been  de- 
signed to  secure  liberty  and  justice.  To  do  this,  restraints  and 
counterpoises  have  been  proved,  both  by  philosophy  and  by  ali 
human  experience,  to  be  absolutely  indispensable.  If  too  much 
power  is  vested  in  the  executive,  there  is  a  constant  tendency 
toward  usurpation  and  tyranny.  If  too  much  power  is  left 
with  the  people,  or  their  immediate  delegates,  unchecked,  there 
is  continual  gravitation  toward  frequent  and  ill-considered 
changes  in  the  laws,  as  temporary  maladies  that  no  law  can 
cure,  or  crude  speculative  theories,  may  disturb  the  content 
or  excite  the  day-dreams  of  the  people, — such  as  fiat  money, 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  103 

loaning  government  money  on  real-estate  security,  and  the  great 
multitude  of  nostrums  that  socialism  and  anarchism  propose 
as  specifics  for  evils  that  are  inherent  among  men  as  social  an- 
imals, and  that  no  act  of  legislation  can  possibly  cure.  Self- 
knowledge  and  self-control  are,  and  always  have  been,  as  nec- 
essary to  the  welfare  of  communities  and  states  as  to  individ- 
uals. All  this  is  as  obvious  and  trite  as  it  is  fundamental ;  but 
as  one  of  the  old  state  constitutions  of  more  than  one  hundred 
years  ago  puts  it,  "a  frequent  recurrence  to  fundamental  princi- 
ples" must  be  the  duty  and  safeguard  of  every  society  that 
wishes  to  be  free  and  happy. 

It  has  been  upon  such  considerations  that  written  constitu- 
tions have  been  framed  and  adopted  in  establishing  govern- 
ments of  the  people,  declaring  inalienable  rights,  separating 
governmental  powers  and  duties  into  three  divisions, — legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  judiciary, — and  dividing  the  legislative  pow- 
er between  two  separate  bodies  differently  constituted  and  com- 
posed by  different  processes  of  popular  action,  and  setting 
bounds  and  barriers  against  the  preponderance  of  any  one  of 
such  divisions,  and  imposing  restraints  upon  any  sudden  change 
in  the  constitutions  themselves.  It  was  upon  such  principles 
and  under  such  conditions  that  the  great,  and  then  unique,  con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  came  into  existence  in  1787. 

The  convention  that  framed  it  was  constituted  by  the  sepa- 
rate and  independent  action  of  all  the  thirteen  original  states 
(excepting  Rhode  Island,  which  sent  no  delegates),  upon  the 
solemn  appeal  of  the  Continental  Congress,  made  after  seven 
years  of  bitter  experience  in  war  and  three  in  peace,  during  both 
of  which  periods  the  need  of  the  fundamental  elements  and  ad- 
justments of  a  government  adequate  to  the  preservation  of  the 
liberties  of  the  people,  the  administration  of  personal  justice, 
and  the  stability  of  the  whole  republic,  were  made  fully  and 
often  painfully  manifest.  The  men  who  composed  the  con- 
vention were  possessed  of  all  that  knowledge  which  the  histo- 
ries and  careers  of  all  other  civilized  countries  and  peoples  could 
furnish ;  they  represented  all  the  principal  occupations  of  civ- 
ilized society  and  all  the  phases  of  political  philosophy— mo- 
narchical in  one  direction,  and  so-called  pure  democracy  in  the 


104  ELECTION    OF 

other.  It  was  presided  over  by  "His  Excellency,  George  Wash- 
ington, Esquire,"  as  he  is  styled  in  the  convention  Journal.  The 
convention  labored  assiduously  from  the  25th  of  May  until 
the  I5th  of  September,  1787,  when  the  completed  constitution 
was  agreed  upon  and  signed  by  representatives  of  all  the  states, 
excepting  Rhode  Island,  which,  as  has  been  said,  took  no  part 
in  the  convention.  Almost  every  example  and  method  of  gov- 
ernment was  examined  and  discussed.  The  apparent  conflicts 
of  interest,  and  the  real  jealousies  existing  between  large  states 
and  small  ones,  were  to  be  accommodated  or  overcome, — undue 
centralization,  on  the  one  hand,  as  well  as  the  fatal  weakness 
of  a  mere  league  of  states  on  the  other,  were  to  be  guarded 
against.  To  accomplish  all  these  supreme  ends,  it  was  easy  for 
those  learned,  experienced,  and  patriotic  men  to  agree  that  the 
new  government  should  be  composed  of  three  independent  de- 
partments,— legislative,  executive,  and  judicial;  and  that  the 
legislative  branch  should  be  composed  of  two  independent  parts, 
each  having  a  negative  on  the  other.  But  the  composition  of  the 
two  houses  was  a  subject  of  extreme  difficulty. 

The  states,  without  regard  to  geographical  dimensions,  pop- 
ulation or  wealth,  freedom  or  slavery,  were,  under  the  Confed- 
eracy, absolute  equals,  and  the  national  powers  scarcely  ex- 
tended to,  or  operated  personally  upon,  any  of  the  citizens  of 
the  states.  At  last,  after  considering  and  reconsidering  nearly 
every  variety  of  propositions,  it  was  agreed  that  the  House  of 
Representatives  should  be  chosen  directly  by  the  people  and  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  inhabitants  in  each  state,  excepting 
two-fifths  of  the  slaves.  And  after  similar  tribulations  of  pro- 
posal and  discussion,  it  was  settled  that  the  president  should 
be  chosen  on  the  principle  of  having  regard,  chiefly,  to  the 
population  of  the  various  states.  So  far,  then,  it  was  a  gov- 
ernment based  upon  capitation,  and,  in  one  part  of  it,  required 
to  be  constituted  by  the  direct  vote  of  the  people, — the  weight 
and  force  of  numbers  alone.  It  was  obvious  that  if  the  other 
branch  of  the  legislature  were  constituted  in  the  same  way, 
either  as  to  the  number  from  each  state  or  the  direct  method 
of  election,  there  would  be  a  perpetual  tendency  toward  the 
effacement  of  state  rights  and  state  sovereignty  in  respect  of 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  105 

local  affairs,  and  the  establishment  of  a  national  democracy 
by  government,  practically,  en  masse,  where  the  weight  of  the 
mass  in  one  part  of  the  country  might,  and  probably  would 
dominate  over  other  parts,  and  might  in  the  end  destroy  the 
peaceful  liberties  of  all,  as  has  been  the  ever-repeating  experi- 
ence of  ill-balanced  and  unchecked  forms  of  government, — de- 
mocracy succeeding  conservatism  and  liberal  order;  the  com- 
mune succeeding  democracy;  anarchism  overturning  the  com- 
mune ;  and  a  single  despot  or  brace  of  despots  springing  from 
the  cabals  and  corruptions  of  communism  and  anarchy  to  be 
the  masters  of  all. 

To  establish  a  secure  barrier  against  such  tendencies  and 
dangers,  the  constitution  of  a  second  legislative  branch  com- 
posed of  persons  having  a  different  constituency,  and  repre- 
senting the  independent  equality  of  the  states,  was  a  supreme 
necessity. 

The  proposal  to  elect  senators  by  the  people  was  brought 
forward  and  considered  deliberately,  and  as  deliberately  and 
almost,  if  not  quite,  unanimously  dismissed.  The  debates  show 
how  calmly  and  fully  the  whole  subject  was  considered,  and 
how  nearly  unanimous  the  great  statesmen  and  patriots  who 
composed  the  convention  were  in  deciding  against  the  propo- 
sition, which  "these  new  charmers  who  keep  serpents"  have 
now  revived.  **• 

The  essential  and  underlying  idea  of  the  structure  of  our 
national  government  is  that  in  its  relations  to  the  people  in 
respect  of  the  subjects  committed  to  it  by  the  constitution,  and 
no  others,  it  is  a  government  operating  upon  persons,  and  that 
in  respect  of  all  its  other  relations  with  the  people  of  the  sev- 
eral states  it  affects  them  in  their  collective  character  as  states. 

The  ultimate  sovereign  power  of  a  free  state  must  and 
should  always  reside  in  the  people.  But  a  wise  people  who 
wish  to  remain  free  and  sovereign  never  undertake  the  task 
of  exercising  their  sovereignty  otherwise  than  by  selecting  rep- 
resentatives responsible  to  them,  to  do  all  acts  of  governmen- 
tal sovereignty,  save  in  passing  ad  referendum  upon  their  con- 
stitutions. It  is  true  that  in  some  of  the  Swiss  republics  and 
in  a  few  of  the  states  of  our  union  some  laws  have  been 


106  ELECTION    OF 

passed  to  take  effect  upon  the  approval  of  the  people,  but  these 
are  rare  exceptions.  The  legislature  of  a  state,  then,  is  the 
depositary  of  the  whole  mass  of  the  sovereign  power  which 
the  people,  as  such,  have  set  forth  and  defined  in  its  constitu- 
tion. It  expresses  the  will  of  the  state;  the  executive  executes 
that  will;  and  the  judiciary,  in  cases  of  dispute,  decides  what 
that  will  is.  In  constituting  and  exercising  such  a  sovereignty, 
the  people  of  a  state  never  elect  either  branch  of  their  legis- 
lature by  the  popular  vote  of  all  the  citizens  on  a  general 
ticket :  that  step  remains  to  come  in  when  the  dream  of  the 
socialist  shall  be  realized.  The  reason  is  obvious.  Such  a 
method  would  be  purely  the  voice  of  an  aggregation  of  mere' 
numbers  regardless  of  intelligence,  property,  and  business  in- 
terests, as  well  as  of  that  innate  sense  of  the  value  of  the 
geographical  distribution  and  separation  of  the  various  parts 
of  a  state  into  small  communities  substantially  homogeneous 
This  notion  begins  with  the  nature  of  man  himself  as  a  separate 
individual ;  it  is  the  foundation  of  the  family,  the  town,  the 
county,  and  of  the  state  also,  in  our  great  republic.  Upon  it 
rests  the  division  of  states  into  congressional  districts,  which 
took  place  in  1842,  after  fifty-three  years  of  experience  had  dem- 
onstrated the  evils  of  the  system  of  electing  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  from  each  state  by  a  vote  en  masse, 
— a  syftem  to  which  no  one  is  yet  wild  enough  to  propose  a 
return.  The  government  of  a  state  is  instituted  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  whole  people,  and  not  for  that  of  party  nor  for 
that  of  a  majority  of  its  people  alone;  and  the  act  of  a  state 
in  choosing  its  senators  is  one  of  the  most  important  parts  of 
its  governmental  duty.  Both  reason  and  experience  prove  that 
an  election  by  a  majority  of  all  the  people  of  a  state  is  radi- 
cally a  different  thing  from  the  choice  of  the  same  officers 
by  the  people  (through  their  representatives)  of  the  separate 
political  divisions  of  it.  In  respect  of  members  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  of  the  state  legislatures,  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  citizens  will  agree  that  such  a  system  of  mass  voting 
would  be  unendurable,  and  dangerous  to,  and  at  last  destruc- 
tive of,  good  government,  and  even  liberty  itself,  as  rational 
men  understand  the  term. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  107 

If  these  conclusions  be  true  as  regards  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  members  of  the 
state  legislatures,  is  it  not  equally  clear  that  the  founders  of 
the  republic  adopted  the  best  possible — and  indeed  imaginable — 
method  of  choosing  the  members  of  the  national  Senate?  They 
believed  that  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  people  of  the  sev- 
eral states — states  which  they  foresaw  would  finally  embrace 
a  continent  in  their  benign  sway — could  only  be  preserved 
by  such  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  the  sources  and  methods 
and  exercise  of  political  power  as  they  adopted  and  provided 
for.  A  century  of  experience  has  demonstrated  the  wisdom  of 
their  marvelous  plan. 

But  a  new  school  of  politicians  has  now  appeared  who  pro- 
fess to  believe  that  the  fathers  were  mistaken  in  their  theory 
of  the  surest  foundation  of  our  national  republic,  and  that 
the  system  they  adopted  has  not,  in  regard  to  senators,  worked 
well, — that  the  senators  have  not  been  the  choice  of,  and  have 
not  represented,  the  great  body  of  the  people  of  the  states  that 
elected  them,  and  therefore  that  elections  of  senators  should  be 
had  by  the  suffrage  of  all  the  voters  in  the  state  acting  together. 
One  test  of  the  truth  of  the  first  statement  is  the  fact  that 
of  the  less  than  900  persons  who  have  served  as  senators 
since  the  government  was  organized  in  1/89,  more  than  200 
have  been  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives — sub- 
stantially one-fourth. 

Only  two  states — Montana  and  Nevada — have  not  been 
thus  represented,  while  more  than  one-half  of  the  senators 
from  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Indiana  and  Maine  have 
been  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives ;  and,  in  addition 
to  these,  a  very  large  fraction  of  the  senators  have  been 
governors  and  judges  elected  by  the  people  in  their  states. 
These  facts  show  that  it  has  been  almost  universally  true  that 
those  chosen  as  senators  have  possessed  the  confidence,  not 
only  of  the  legislative  representatives  of  political  divisions  of 
the  states  but  of  the  whole  body  of  the  people  as  well.  The  sec- 
ond part  of  the  assertion  of  the  persons  who  have  seen  a  new 
light,  as  they  think,  is  that  sometimes  "senators  do  not  represent 
their  states."  This  is  true ;  but,  happily  for  all  the  states  and  their 


io8  ELECTION    OF 

people,  a  senator,  once  chosen,  becomes  a  senator  of  the  United 
States,  and  is  not  the  mere  agent  of  the  state  that  chose  him. 
And,  as  to  the  state  itself  that  chose  him,  it  has  happened, 
and  will,  happen  again,  that  a  gust  of  passion  or  a  misguided 
opinion  has  taken  temporary  possession  of  a  majority  of  the 
people  of  a  particular  state,  which  the  senator,  in  his  bounden 
duty  to  all  the  states,  has  disregarded.  This  was  one  of  the 
very  incidents  that  the  patriots  of  1787  foresaw  and  provided 
against  by  legislative  elections  and  a  long  time  of  service. 

Again,  the  new  school  of  constitution-makers  say  that  they 
think  the  Senate  has  become  a  body  of  rich  men  who  gained 
their  places  by  corrupting  legislatures  in  a  pecuniary  way.  But 
to  any  one  acquainted  with  the  personality  of  the  Senate  as  it  has 
existed  for  a  generation  and  is  now,  such  a  statement  is  known 
to  be  absolutely  destitute  of  foundation.  The  proportion  of 
rich  men  in  the  Senate  is  not  greater  than  that  which  ex- 
ists in  every  state  and  community  in  the  whole  country  where 
the  honors  and  responsibilities  of  public  office  are  shared  alike 
by  the  rich,  the  comfortable,  and  the  poor.  As  a  perfect  mil- 
lennium has  not  yet  been  reached,  it  is  doubtless  true  that 
some  (but  very  few)  men  have  secured  election  as  senators 
by  pecuniary  persuasions,  or,  to  put  it  roughly,  have  "bought 
their  places"  with  money, — a  crime  of  the  worst  character  both 
in  the  buyer  and  in  the  seller.  But,  alas,  this  is  not  a  peculiar- 
ity belonging  to  the  office  of  senator  alone.  It  has  happened 
equally  or  more  often  in  elections  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, as  well  as  in  state  and  municipal  elections.  A  legislative 
election  of  senators,  therefore,  is  not  the  cause  of  this  great 
evil.  In  the  nature  of  things,  it  must  be  worse  in  popular 
elections,  for  the  members  of  a  legislature,  must,  in  the  choice 
of  the  senator,  vote  openly,  so  that  the  constituents  know 
whether  or  not  their  representatives  have  followed  the  general 
judgment  of  the  particular  communities  they  represent, — a 
matter  of  vital  importance  in  all  representative  government. 
But  in  popular  elections,  where  each  citizen  is  acting  in  his 
personal  character  only,  it  is  equally  important  that  he  have  the 
right  to  vote  secretly,  notwithstanding  that  he  may  be  bribed  in 
spite  of  every  precaution  that  the  law  may  adopt  to  prevent 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  109 

it.  And  when  we  go  back  of  the  regular  act  of  a  government 
election  and  reach  the  "primaries"  and  the  district,  the  county 
and  state  .conventions,  all  barriers  and  safeguards  are  left 
behind,  and  the  corruptions  of  riches  and  still  more  of  trad- 
ing machines  and  office  brokerage,  have  their  easiest  and  most 
abundant  field  of  achievement  in  selecting  candidates.  To  cite 
examples  to  the  intelligent  reader  would  be  a  waste  of  time. 
The  real  people  of  this  republic  of  states  and  citizens — those 
who  believe  in  liberty  and  order  as  inseparable,  who  believe  in 
the  value  of  individual  endeavor  and  frugality,  and,  as  a  con- 
sequence, in  the  right  to  save  earnings  and  to  have  homes  and 
houses  and  lands  and  schools  and  churches — should  consider: — 

First,  that  the  constitutional  provision  for  the  choosing  of 
two  senators  from  each  state  by  its  legislature  was  wisely  de- 
signed by  the  states  that  founded  the  government,  as  one  of 
the  corner-stones  of  the  structure  necessary  to  secure  the 
rights  and  safety  of  the  states. 

Second,  that  a  legislative  instead  of  a  popular  election  was 
adopted  as  necessary  to  the  expression  of  the  deliberate  will 
of  the  state  in  its  character  as  such,  represented  in  all  its  parts 
in  the  way  in  which  its  own  constitution  distributed  power. 

Third,  that  the  people  of  the  several  political  divisions  of 
the  state  should  have  the  right  to  express  their  choice  separately 
through  their  legal  representatives,  as  they  do  in  making  laws, 
and  not  be  overwhelmed  by  a  mere  weight  of  numbers  that 
might  occupy  only  a  corner  of  the  state  and  possess  interests 
and  cherish  ambitions  quite  unlike  those  of  all  the  other  sec- 
tions of  the  commonwealth. 

Fourth,  that  the  Senate  as  it  has  existed  for  a  century  has 
demonstrated  the  wisdom  of  the  mode  of  its  constitution. 

Fifth,  that  its  members  have  been  as  free  from  any  just  ac- 
cusation of  corruption,  either  Jn  their  election  or  in  their 
course  as  senators,  as  any  equal  number  of  men  conected  with 
public  affairs  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  or  connected  with  all  the 
employments  of  private  life. 

Sixth,  that  as  the  election  of  senators  by  the  state  legisla- 
tures must  be  by  open  public  voting,  the  danger  of  bribery,  or  the 
misrepresentation  of  constituents  for  other  causes,  is  reduced  to 


no  ELECTION    OF 

a  minimum,  and  stands  in  strong  contrast  with  the  election  of 
senators  by  the  direct  vote  of  the  whole  mass  of  voters  in  the 
several  states,  and  especially  in  states  where  political  parties 
are  nearly  equal  in  numbers. 

Seventh,  that,  whatever  evils  now  and  then  happen  under  the 
present  system,  they  do  not  arise  from  any  fault  in  the  system 
itself,  but  from  the  fault  of  the  body  of  citizens  themselves,— 
non-attendance  at  caucuses  and  primaries ;  non-attendance  at 
registration  and  at  the  polls;  slavish  fidelity  to  party  organiza- 
tions and  party  names;  a  contributing  to  and  winking  at  the 
corrupt  use  of  money  at  nominating  conventions  and  elections ; 
and  the  encouragement  or  tolerance  of  individual  self-seeking 
in  respect  of  getting  possession  of  offices,  all  of  which  are 
truly  public  trusts. 

Eighth,  that  in  ninety-five  instances  out  of  a  hundred,  if 
there  be  an  evil  or  inadequate  senator  or  other  officer  in  the 
public  service,  it  is  because  the  power  that  elected  or  appointed 
him — his  state  or  community — has  been  either  grievously  negli- 
gent or  else  is  fairly  represented.  We  must  believe  that  the 
people's  government  is  a  failure  and  a  delusion,  to  think  other- 
wise. 

Ninth,  and  finally,  there  is  neither  reasonable  nor  plausible 
ground,  then,  for  taking  the  grave  step  of  disturbing  the  ex- 
act and  solid  balance  of  the  powers  and  functions  of  our  na- 
tional constitution,  which  has  in  these  respects  given  us  a  cen- 
tury of  security,  of  state  representation,  and  of  state  rights,  as 
well  as  a  wonderful  national  progress  as  a  people. 


Forum.  21:  385-91.  June,  1896. 

Election  of  Senators  by  Popular  Vote.  John  H.  Mitchell. 
Take  it  altogether,  the  choice  which  the  people  have  as  a 
rule  in  the  election  of  United  States  senators  under  our  pres- 
ent system  is  involved  in  so  many  uncertainties,  and  surrounded 
by  so  many  restrictions,  that  virtually  they  have  no  choice  at 
all  in  relation  to  it.  The  present  system  is  unrepublican,  un- 
democratic, and  vicious  in  all  respects. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  in 

Not  the  least  offensive  of  these  restrictions  imposed  by 
our  present  system  is  that  which  deprives  the  individual  voter 
of  the  right  to  cast  his  vote  directly,  and  without  circumlocution 
through  vicarious  instrumentalities,  for  a  United  States  senator. 

The  arguments  in  favor  of  the  proposed  change  may  be 
thus  summarized : 

First.  United  States  senators,  like  members  of  the  national 
House  of  Representatives,  are  under  our  system  elective  offi- 
cers as  contra-distinguished  from  federal  judges  who  do  not 
come  within  that  category,  and  the  proposition  to  elect  by  a 
direct  vote  of  the  people  is,  it  is  believed,  elemental  as  well  as 
fundamental  when  considered  in  the  light  of  the  underlying 
principle  upon  which  individual  suffrage  is  based.  The  ex- 
istence of  the  right  of  suffrage  implies  the  right,  or  at  least 
should  carry  with  it  the  right,  to  exercise  it  directly  and  not 
vicariously.  The  political  and  moral  supremacy  of  the  people 
can  only  in  this  manner  be  rightfully  expressed  and  maintained. 

Second.  It  will  afford  a  prompt  and  efficient  remedy  for 
the  manifest  evils  made  possible  by,  and  unfortunately  resulting 
too  frequently  from,  the  present  system  of  senatorial  elec- 
tions, namely,  the  great  length  of  time  consumed  in  the  elec- 
tion and  resulting  frequently  in  a  failure  to  choose,  the  con- 
sequent distraction  of  the  legislative  mind  from  important  legis- 
lative business,  and  the  political  and  personal  controversies,  ill 
feeling,  and  strife  which  are  the  usual — the  almost  inevitable — 
accompaniments. 

Third.  It  will  render  less  possible,  and  therefore  tend  to 
the  discouragement  of,  the  use  of  improper  means  to  influence 
the  control  of  senatorial  elections. 

Fourth.  It  will  greatly  diminish  the  temptation  to  gerry- 
mander senatorial  and  representative  districts  by  state  legis- 
latures in  the  interest  of  the  political  party  in  control. 

Fifth.  It  will  be  an  enlargement  of  the  political  rights 
of  the  individual  voter  relating  to  suffrage,  and,  therefore,  a  con- 
cession upon  the  part  of  the  government,  the  effect  of  which, 
it  is  believed,  will  be  salutary  in  tending  to  discourage  unjust 
criticism  of  the  Senate  and  its  individual  members. 

Sixth.     It  will   in   a   great   measure   eliminate   from   primary 


ii2  ELECTION   OF 

and  other  elections,  involving  the  selection  of  members  of  the 
legislature,  one  great  cause  for  irritation  and  unseemly  conten- 
tion wherein  as  a  rule  the  question  upon  which  everything  is 
made  to  turn  is  as  to  how  this  or  that  man  will  vote  for  sena- 
tor, rather  than  upon  the  question  as  to  his  fitness  for  the 
office  of  legislator. 

Seventh.  No  reform  movement  will  so  effectively  as  this 
tend  to  the  destruction  of  "boss  rule"  and  the  elimination  of 
political  "bosses"  from  American  politics  in  state,  county,  and 
municipal  elections. 

Eighth.  A  thoroughly-aroused  and  enlightened  public  opin- 
ion demands  the  change. 

Hence  unless  some  good  reasons  exist  to  the  contrary,  this 
demand  should  be  respected  by  Congress,  to  the  extent  at  least 
.of  giving  the  people  of  the  several  states  through  their  repre- 
sentatives in  the  legislatures  an  opportunity  to  pass  upon  the 
question. 

The  principle  objection  urged  in  opposition  to  the  proposed 
amendment  is  one  based  wholly  upon  the  unwarranted  assump- 
tion that  it  would  in  effect  disturb  the  political  relation  now  ex- 
isting between  the  states  respectively  and  the  national  govern- 
ment, and  change  the  character  of  senatorial  representation  from 
that  of  the  states  in  their  sovereign  or  political  capacity,  as  is 
now  the  case  under  the  existing  provisions  of  the  constitution, 
and  would  thus,  as  it  is  alleged,  tend  to  the  destruction  of  one 
of  the  great  principles  of  checks  and  balances  upon  which  our 
government  is  organized. 

The  answer  to  this,  as  already  indicated,  is  brief  though 
conclusive.  The  proposed  amendment  neither  interferes  with 
the  existing  ratio  of  state  representation  in  the  Senate,  nor 
with  the  character  of  the  representation  itself.  It  has  not  the 
slightest  tendency  to  invade  that  principle  of  the  constitution 
which  its  framers  intended  never  should  be  destroyed,  namely, 
the  principle  of  equal  state  suffrage  in  the  United  States  Senate. 
It  in  no  respect  changes  the  relation  now  existing  between  the 
states  respectively  and  the  national  government;  the  existing 
sovereignty  of  each  in  its  respective  sphere  is  not  in  the 
slightest  manner  disturbed. 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  113 

If  it  be  true  that  senators  now  are,  in  virtue  of  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  constitution,  the  distinctive  representatives  of 
the  states  in  their  sovereign  or  political  capacity,  then  this  is 
not  changed,  nor  is  the  principle  involved  in  such  representa- 
tion invaded  in  any  respect  whatever  by  the  proposed  amend- 
ment. It  is  the  mode  of  choosing  senators  that  will  alone  be 
affected,  and  not  the  capacity  or  character  in  which  they  shall 
serve,  whether  as  the  agents  and  representatives  of  the  states 
as  political  entities,  or  of  the  people.  The  ratio  of  representa- 
tion which  each  state  must  continue  to  have  in  the  Senate  re- 
mains wholly  unaffected.  Whatever  sovereign  functions  attach 
to  the  national  and  state  governments  within  their  respective 
spheres  under  existing  conditions  will  be  neither  enlarged  nor 
diminished.  The  people  of  the  states  now  choose  their  sen- 
ators, but  only  indirectly  through  their  representatives  in  the 
legislatures.  This,  and  this  only,  is  sought  to  be  changed,  thus 
enabling  the  people  to  do  directly  that  which  they  can  now  do 
only  in  a  vicarious  manner. 

All  other  objections  urged  may  be  comprehended  under  the 
general  head  that  the  people,  as  a  whole,  cannot  be  trusted  to 
choose  the:r  own  law-makers.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
distrust  in  this  respect  in  the  minds  of  some  of  the  men  who 
were  members  of  the  constitutional  convention, — a  distrust 
entailed  by  English  conceptions  and  monarchical  notions, — it  is 
safe  to  say  no  harm  is  likely  to  come  to  representative  republican 
government  in  America  by  intrusting  to  the  qualified  electors 
of  the  nation  the  right  to  choose  by  popular  vote  the  men  who 
are  to  make  their  laws,  state  and  national. 

Independent.  52:  1292-9.  May  31,  1900. 
Election  of  Senators  by  Popular  Vote.  William  E.  Chandler. 

I  am  opposed  to  taking  this  step  because  I  believe  it  will 
weaken  rather  than  strengthen  the  structure  of  our  government, 
and  because  it  will  inevitably  lead  to  the  demand  for  other 
amendments  which  it  does  not  seem  desirable  to  adopt. 

Another  objection  is  the  absolute  impossibility  of  investigat- 
ing a  contested  election,  if  committed  to  the  whole  people  of  a 
state. 


ii4  ELECTION    OF 

Independent.  66:  382-3.  February  18,   1909. 
Going  Back  to  the  People. 

Senator  Root,  in  his  address  to  the  New  York  legislature, 
said: 

Because  I  believe  in  maintaining  the  two  grants  of  power  of  the 
constitution — maintaining  the  national  power  to  its  full  limit  and 
still  preserving  the  state  power — I  am  opposed  to  everything  that 
tends  to  belittle,  to  discredit  or  to  weaken  the  authority  of  the 
legislatures  of  the  states.  You  cannot  take  power  away  from 
privileged  public  bodies  without  having  the  character  of  those 
bodies  deteriorate.  For  this  reason  I  am  opposed  to  the  direct 
election  of  senators,  as  I  am  opposed  to  the  initiative  and  refer- 
endum, because  these  things  are  based  upon  the  idea,  that  the 
people  cannot  elect  legislatures  whom  they  trust.  They  proceed 
upon  the  idea  of  abandoning  the  attempt  to  elect  trustworthy  and 
competent  state  legislatures,  but  if  you  abandon  that  attempt — 
if  you  begin  to  legislate  or  to  amend  constitutions  upon  that  theory, 
what  becomes  of  all  the  other  powers  of  the  state  legislatures  in 
maintaining  the  system  of  local  self  government  under  the  constitu- 
tion? 

"If  the  people  of  any  state  are  not  satisfied  to  trust  their  legis- 
lature to  discharge  the  constitutional  duty  of  electing  senators,  let 
them  cure  their  own  faults  and  elect  legislatures  that  they  can 
trust.  Ultimately  in  the  last  analysis  we  must  come  down  for  suc- 
cessful government  to  the  due  performance  of  the  citizen's  duty  at 
the  polls,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  citizens  would 
perform  their  duty  in  the  direct  election  of  senators  or  in  voting 
down  the  initiative  or  the  referendum  any  better  than  they  perform 
it  in  the  election  of  members  of  the  senates  and  assemblies  of  the 
states.  I  am  opposed  to  all  steps  that  proceed  upon  the  theory 
that  the  people  of  our  states  are  to  abandon  the  duty  of  making 
their  state  legislatures  able  and  honored  bodies  competent  to  per- 
form the  great  duties  of  legislation  for  these  great  common- 
wealths. 

Throughout  his  address  Senator  Root  was  concerned  with 
the  danger  of  the  usurpation  of  state  rights  by  the  central  gov- 
ernment ;  and  it  is  this  thought  which,  he  distinctly  says, 
makes  him  an  opponent  of  the  school  which  takes  final  power, 
by  election  of  senators  or  by  initiative  and  referendum,  from 
the  legislatures.  But  his  argument  does  not  hold.  He  says 
that  because  he  believes  in  "maintaining  the  national  power  to 
its  full  limit,  and  still  preserving  the  state  power,"  he  is  "opposed 
to  everything  that  tends  to  belittle,  to  discredit  or  to  weaken 
the  authority  of  the  legislatures  of  the  states,"  such  as  initiative 
and  referendum.  But  it  is  not  the  legislation  of  the  states  that 
is  thus  belittled  or  weakened,  only  the  legislatures  which  are 
reduced  in  power,  and  that  power  maintained  in  full  strength 
in  the  states  and  exercised  by  the  people.  Not  an  iota  of  their 


UNITED    STATES    SENATORS  115 

power  is  transferred  to  the  national  Congress.  Take  an  example. 
The  legislature  of  a  state  feels  unwilling  to  take  the  responsibil- 
ity for  the  enactment  of  a  liquor  law  or  a  taxing  law,  and  refers 
it  to  the  popular  vote.  Senator  Root  can  find  in  that  no  invasion 
by  the  national  power.  The  state  still  rules  supreme.  The 
authority  has  simply  gone  back  to  the  source  which  had  given 
it  to  the  legislatures.  The  people  have  taken  their  own.  The 
question  is  simply  the  old  one  of  difference  between  aristocracy 
and  democracy.  Can  you  trust  the  people?  Or,  to  put  it  in 
another  way,  can  you  trust  the  people  as  a  whole  any  better 
than  you  can  trust  their  representatives?  We  are  inclined  to 
think  we  can.  We  think  that,  if  the  people  were  appealed  to  as 
they  are  when  we  elect  a  president  or  a  governor  they  are  more 
likely  to  give  a  sound  ethical  judgment  and  less  likely  to  be  ma- 
nipulated by  designing  or  selfish  or  corrupt  men.  Of  course  they 
will  make  mistakes,  but  they  can  rectify  them  next  time.  Even 
legislatures  make  sad  mistakes. 

Nation.  76:  104-5.  February  5,  1903. 
Power  of  the  Senate. 

That  body,  under  the  present  conditions,  draws  to  itself 
chiefly  the  more  presentable  bosses  and  the  mediocre  sort  of 
successful  business  men  who  fill  the  party  chest  and  do  the 
boss's  bidding — "wealth  unguided  and  uninformed,  untempered 
by  a  patriotic  and  statesmanlike  regard  for  the  general  welfare." 

North   American   Review.    188:    700-15.   November,    1908. 

Election  of  United  States  Senators  by  the  People. 
Emmet   O'Neal. 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States  has  been  termed  the  mas- 
terpiece of  the  [constitutional]  convention.  Its  creation  was 
not  the  result  of  previously  formed  plans.  Emerging  from 
the  deliberations  of  the  convention  as  the  result  of  compromises 
made  between  sovereign  and  independent  states,  vested  with  both 
legislative  and  executive  functions,  its  formation  was  less  the 


ii6  ELECTION    OF 

result  of  theory  than,  in  the  language  of  its  framers,  "of  a 
spirit  of  amity  and  of  mutual  deference  and  concession,  which 
the  peculiarity  of  the  situation  of  the  United  States  rendered 
indispensable." 

Although  the  Senate  has  made  itself  eminent  and  respected, 
and  has  maintained  an  intellectual  supremacy  over  the  other  co- 
ordinate branch  of  the  legislative  department;  although  it  has 
fulfilled  the  ardent  hopes  and  verified  the  profound  wisdom  of 
its  creators  by  its  ability  to  check  what  has  been  termed  the 
"democratic  recklessness"  of  the  House  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  tendency  to  executive  usurpation  on  the  other ;  has  per- 
formed all  its  functions  with  marked  ability,  patriotism  and 
efficiency ;  and  has  drawn  into  its  ranks  the  most  distinguished 
men  who  have  entered  public  life,  yet  in  recent  years  a  powerful 
movement  has  been  growing  to  destroy  the  very  feature  which, 
in  the  judgment  of  all  former  students  and  critics,  has  been  the 
chief  cause  of  its  excellence — the  indirect  election  of  its  mem- 
bers. 

Have  the  lurid  headlines  of  yellow  journalism  as  to  the  trea- 
son of  the  Senate — the  irresponsible  utterances  of  those  whose 
sorry  role  is  to  pander  to  the  morbid  appetite  for  the  sensational 
— so  affected  the  public  mind  that  the  American  people  are 
ready  to  welcome  any  change,  however  radical? 

But  it  is  seriously  claimed  that  the  legislatures  of  the  states 
are  too  often  composed  of  men  without  experience  and  training, 
with  little  knowledge  of  national  affairs,  and  therefore  incom- 
petent to  make  wise  selections— too  often  swayed  by  the  arts 
of  the  demagogue — obeying  the  behests  of  party  bosses  and  ma- 
chine politicians,  dominated  by  corporate  power  or  the  selfish 
greed  of  special  interests,  often  corrupt  and  therefore  unfit  to 
exercise  so  important  a  function  as  the  selection  of  a  United 
Sfates  senator. 

If  this  indictment  were  true,  it  would  be  a  confession  that 
the  people  were  incapable  of  self-government.  The  members 
of  the  legislatures  of  the  different  states  are  the  agents  and  di- 
rect representatives  of  the  people,  and  if  it  be  true  that  as  a 
whole  they  are  incompetent,  unworthy  and  corrupt,  it  would 
follow  that  the  masses  of  the  people  from  whom  they  spring. 


UNITED   STATES    SENATORS  117 

and  from  whom  they  are  selected,  were  also  either  corrupt  or 
criminally  indifferent  to  their  interests  and  liberties. 

The  election  of  senators  by  popular  vote  would  secure  to  the 
larger  cities  and  masses  of  population  an  undue  influence  and 
preponderance  and  would  substitute  pluralities  for  majorities. 
Such  a  radical  change  in  one  of  the  great  departments  of  the 
government  would  soon  spread  to  the  entire  system.  The  reasons 
which  demand  it,  when  carried  to  their  logical  conclusion,  would 
lead  to  the  election  by  direct  popular  vote  and  by  popular  major- 
ities of  the  president,  vice-president  and  the  entire  federal 
judiciary.  The  next  step  that  would  inevitably  follow  would 
be  the  placing  of  all  elections  under  national  control,  with  the 
result  that  the  rights  of  the  states  would  be  overthrown  and  a 
consolidated  government  erected  on  the  ruins  of  our  beautiful 
federal  system*. 

For  over  a  hundred  years  amid  all  the  storms  of  party  pas- 
sion, the  rivalry  and  struggles  of  sections,  the  clamor  of  fanatical 
agitation,  the  Senate  has  maintained  its  distinctive  features, 
calm,  dignified,  patriotic  yet  considerate,  firm  but  not  precipitate, 
constituting,  as  was  designed  by  the  fathers  of  the  constitution, 
a  model  second  chamber,  interposing  that  delay  which  furnished 
time  for  reflection  and  deliberation,  checking  the  evil  effects  of 
sudden  and  strong  excitement  and  of  precipitate  measures,  and 
protecting  the  country  against  the  dangers  and  confusion  which 
arise  from  the  enactment  of  laws  which  did  not  reflect  the  calm 
judgment  of  the  people  but  the  temporary  and  transient  folly 
or  madness  of  the  hour,  and  maintaining  unimpaired  the  rights 
of  the  states  and  of  the  national  government.  If  the  proposed 
change  were  affected,  the  division  of  the  Congress  into  two 
branches  would  prove  of  no  intrinsic  value,  for  elected  by  the 
same  methods,  influenced  by  the  same  motives,  they  would  both 
but  duplicate  all  the  evils  and  dangers  of  a  single  legislative 
body. 

*While  this  article  was  in  preparation,  on  the  23rd  of  May, 
Senator  Owen  of  Oklahoma  offered  in  the  Senate  a  joint  resolution 
(number  91)  providing  frr  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  to 
elect  United  States  senators  by  a  direct  popular  vote.  Mr.  Depew 
of  New  York  offered  an  amendment,  providing  that  all  elections  for 
senators  and  representatives  shall  be  placed  vnder  national,  control,  and  that  the 
qualifications  of  each  voter  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States- 


n8  ELECTION    OF 

It  is  time  that  all  who  love  our  free  institutions  should  array 
themselves  in  opposition  to  a  change  which,  whether  effected  by 
constitutional  method  or  party  usage  or  custom,  "will  result  in 
the  overthrow  of  the  whole  scheme  of  the  Senate,  and  in  the 
end  of  the  whole  scheme  of  the  national  constitution  as  designed 
and  established  by  the  framers  of  the  constitution  and  the  people 
who  adopted  it." 

Outlook.  61 :  27-34.  January   7,  1899. 
In  the  Seats  of  the  Mighty.  Condit  Crane. 

"Let  the  Senate  be  chosen  by  popular  vote,"  the  politicians 
say.  Every  season  some  such  measure  is  passed  by  the  House, 
from  purely  disinterested  motives,  doubtless.  Disregarding  the 
obvious  and  fatal  defect  in  such  a  scheme,  that  the  Senate  would 
never  approve  it,  what  reason  is  there  to  suppose  that  any  im- 
provement would  result  from  the  change?  Is  the  quality  of  a 
state  political  convention  any  higher  than  that  of  a  state  legis- 
lature? Should  it  not  be  easier  to  raise  the  standard  of  the 
latter,  rather  than  that  of  the  former,  since  its  members  are 
elected  and  sworn  to  perform  their  duty?  No,  no;  reform 
should  be  from  within  and  not  without ;  new  methods  are  only 
a  confession  of  governmental  weakness.  As  the  people  are,  so 
the  Senate  will  be.  It  is  a  representative  body,  and  can  justly 
retort,  "Physician,  heal  thyself." 


21-95m-7,'37 


YB  08426 


210088 


r 


.T~3 


